

# Improving our understanding of the role of defence and security forces (DSF) in the prevention of violent extremism (PVE) in West Africa

Comparative study relating to the review and analysis of political, legislative, and operational frameworks, as well as practical experiences

**Synthesis report**  
**(2020-2022)**



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# Editors' note and acknowledgements

This paper presents a summary of the findings of the study undertaken at the instigation and under the responsibility of the Swiss FDFA and DCAF (Geneva). The authors are responsible for any misreporting of the information or views collected for the purposes hereof.

Moreover, the opinions collected from individual interlocutors or extracted from a range of sources, including national reports, represent the views of the people or authors concerned and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Swiss FDFA, DCAF, or the editors.

This report and the project on which it is based are the product of a collective effort. We take this opportunity to present the team and express our most sincere gratitude to a number of people without whose expertise and active contributions this considerable undertaking would not have been possible. To the eight specialists responsible for the lion's share of the task of collecting field data, namely Dr Séverin Kouamé (regional expert, Côte d'Ivoire), General Amêyi Célestin Guidimey (national expert, Benin), Dr Sampala Balima (national expert, Burkina Faso), Souleymane Cissoko (national expert, Côte d'Ivoire), Major Michael Naah (national expert, Ghana), Fousseini Allassan (national expert, Niger), Colonel Doudou Sall (national expert, Senegal), and Nakmak Douti (national expert, Togo). To the Senegalese Centre of Advanced Defence and Security Studies (CHEDS) (General Mbaye Cissé, General Director, and Christiane Agboton Johnson, Director of Special Programmes), for the significant contribution made to the Senegal part of the study. And last but by no means least, to the teams of DCAF (Anne Bennett, Head of Sub-Saharan Africa Division; Anne Moltes, Project Coordinator, who was subsequently replaced in this role by Ariane Inkesha; Hervé Gonsolin, Project Coordinator) and of FDFA (Carol Mottet, Senior Advisor, and Jean-Daniel Biéler, PVE Programme Advisor).

We hope the motivation by which we were inspired to undertake this project will stimulate the readers of this report in the same way. Particularly, that it will inspire and support the actions of those who share our view that defence and security forces should play a more prominent role in the prevention of violence.

Carol Mottet, Senior Advisor, Peace and Human Rights Division, FDFA  
Ariane Inkesha, Project Coordinator, DCAF

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# Acronyms and Abbreviations

**ABÉGIEF:** Beninese Integrated Border Area Management Agency (Benin)  
**ACLED:** Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project  
**ACSRT:** African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism of the African Union  
**AILCT:** International Counter-Terrorism Academy (Côte d’Ivoire)  
**ASP:** Community Policing Assistance Agency (Senegal)  
**AU:** African Union  
**CCE:** Ethics Advisory Committees (Côte d’Ivoire)  
**CCM:** Civil-Military Cells (Côte d’Ivoire)  
**CDS:** Departmental Security Committees (Côte d’Ivoire)  
**CHEDS:** Centre of Advanced Defence and Security Studies (Senegal)  
**CICO:** Framework for Intervention and Coordination of Counter-Terrorism Operations (Senegal)  
**CIPLEV:** Inter-Ministerial committee for the prevention and fight against violent extremism (Togo)  
**CLAT:** Counter-Terrorist Cell (Senegal)  
**CMA:** Civil-Military Action  
**CNAP:** National Centre for the Coordination of the Early Warning Mechanism and Responses to Security Risks (Niger)  
**CNART:** National Terrorism Analysis and Intelligence Unit (Benin)  
**CNES:** National Strategic Study Centre (Burkina Faso)  
**CNESS:** National Strategic and Security Study Centre (Niger)  
**CNI:** National Armed Forces Training Centre (Togo)  
**CNLCREVT:** Permanent Secretariat for the National Commission for Countering Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Terrorism (Benin)  
**CPU:** Community Police Unit (Ghana)  
**CSO:** Civil Society Organization  
**DCAF:** Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance  
**DSF:** Defence and Security Forces  
**ECCAS:** Economic Community of Central African States  
**ECOWAS:** Economic Community of West African States  
**EU:** European Union  
**FDFA:** Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Switzerland)  
**HACP:** High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace (Niger)  
**HCRRUN:** High Commissioner for Reconciliation and Strengthening National Unity (Togo)  
**LSC:** Local Security Committees  
**NAFPCVET:** National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (Ghana)  
**NGO:** Non-Governmental Organization  
**NHRC:** National Human Rights Committee  
**NPC:** National Peace Council (Ghana)  
**NSC:** National Security Council  
**PHRD:** Peace and Human Rights Division of FDFA (Switzerland)  
**PUMA:** Emergency Programme for the Modernization of Border Roads and Territories (Senegal)  
**PVE:** Preventing Violent Extremism  
**SSG/R:** Security sector governance and reform  
**SSG:** Security Sector Governance  
**UN:** United Nations  
**VDP:** Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (Burkina Faso)  
**VE:** Violent Extremism  
**VEOs:** Violent Extremist Organizations  
**UEMOA:** West African Economic and Monetary Union

NB – The multiple acronyms and abbreviations featured in chapter 3 (list presented in table format) are not included in the aforementioned list and are explained as and when they appear in the paper.

# Introduction

In one guise or another violent extremism, driven by individual, collective, local, regional or international factors, continues to rear its ugly head in many parts of the world in the 21st century, including the region to which this report essentially relates: West Africa. In response, governments have generally adopted the textbook approach of deploying their defence and security forces (DSF), supported by partners' armed forces, with a view to "eradicating" violent extremists (VE).

According to a recently published policy paper<sup>1</sup>, which analyses the spread of VE towards the Gulf of Guinea, there are growing concerns that the northern zones of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin are increasingly at risk. What was once the 'Northern Mali Conflict' and then the 'Sahel Conflict' now threatens most of West Africa. Violent extremist organizations (VEOs) have not stopped in Niger and Burkina Faso. In 2021, Côte d'Ivoire experienced at least 13 attacks, totalling 17 violent incidents linked to al-Qaeda affiliated groups since 2020. So far in 2022, Benin has reportedly been the target of at least 21 attacks, the last of which took place 30 kilometres within its border. Togo has lost eight soldiers and seen 13 others wounded in an attack also claimed by JNIM. Even in Ghana — which has avoided attacks thus far — local youths are being recruited into VEOs and armed groups are increasingly crossing the borders.

Governments must determine the most appropriate course of action in response to this cycle of violence. In many places, their approach cannot consist exclusively of repressive measures. According to a growing school of thought, to reduce violence and provide civilian populations with the support and sense of belonging they strive for, politicians should direct their attention to the peripheral regions of states often blighted by VE; development projects should be undertaken and local communities should be given the opportunity to discuss their needs with the powers that be.

### **Appeal for a different approach**

On this basis, several initiatives have been launched in light of the UN Secretary-General's appeal for action in 2015 as part of his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE)<sup>2</sup>. They include the PVE programme launched by Switzerland in 2016 which aims to promote a different approach to armed violence focussing on the root causes of and responses to this scourge. In this context, approximately 40 meetings and workshops, attended by more than 2,000 participants, have been organized in Africa in recent years. These platforms give all relevant state or non-state actors the opportunity to discuss the issues associated with this violence and to establish collaborative relationships in a bid to redefine their responses. The critical role played by DSF in PVE figured prominently in these discussions; so too did the difficult or often precarious situation in which they carry out their mission to protect civilian populations.

### **DSF on the front line ... of prevention**

The DSF of countries affected by VE are on the front line in the battle against the armed groups that oppose the state, its organization and its sovereignty. In the performance of their daily operations, they often face uncertain situations. For instance, following an attack, the enemy may seek shelter among the civilian population, thereby placing in danger individuals with whom DSF are in contact for the purposes of carrying out their operations or receiving information vital to security. These can also be the same civilians DSF assist through civil-military initiatives or whom, by contrast, DSF treat in an abusive manner. In order to provide an effective response, DSF must clearly understand their mandate and the scope of their actions, have in-depth knowledge of the environment, receive the support of their commanding officers and political leaders, and, in particular, command the respect of the civilian populations they are protecting.

The role of DSF is further complicated when the violence perpetrated across society is the result of a certain malaise that festers within the general population. There is nothing DSF can do to prepare for this paradox. It is therefore necessary to pinpoint the objective that their mandate is ultimately attempting to achieve. What if it were possible to redefine this mandate to such an extent that it was no longer viewed through a reactive lens? The protective mandate of DSF would therefore factor in the needs of

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<sup>1</sup> L. Sanders, R. Lyammouri & J. Moss. Militarized Border Security Will Not Stop the Spread of Extremism. Policy Centre for the New South, Morocco, August 2022, p. 5

<sup>2</sup> <https://undocs.org/en/A/70/674>



civilian populations and their relations with the state (also represented by DSF). This mandate would prevent situations whereby individuals feel the need to resort to violence when the protection they crave from a state is either insufficient or ineffective. On this basis, the actions of DSF would be carried out in a preventive capacity.

However, DSF — from senior officers to the soldiers in the field — are at times ill-equipped to extricate themselves from the confines of their standard repressive role. Their actions are governed by the principles of official procedures from a bygone age when conflicts opposed one state against another. As such, they are no longer fit for purpose in light of the asymmetric nature of violence involving multiple actors and complex causes. Traditional approaches to security should therefore be redefined to accommodate a human security model based on the needs of the citizen. However, as state representatives, DSF can serve as agents to convey the security climate in a country or a region, through their actions (not least in terms of respect for human rights), their anticipation of violence, their interaction with civilian populations, the trust they inspire and any mediation in which they are involved. Consequently, they are, and continue to be, at the heart of preventive efforts.

### **How can DSF instill a culture of dialogue?**

It is undoubtedly key for DSF to interact and engage with civilian populations. But this essential action raises a fundamental question: do DSF have the mandate, the resources and the "political" authority to spearhead this dialogue-orientated approach? And on this basis, are they given the autonomy to manage or even prevent this violence, including the authority to control and moderate the acts of violence perpetrated by their own members? Do they feel they have the support and authority to do so? Do they have the flexibility they need to promote institutional dialogue across their various units with a view to developing a mutual understanding of — and a practical approach to — the prevention of violence? To what extent are they able to strengthen the link that is so important to the peace of a country, i.e., between army and nation? Does their organization take into account cultural sensitivities for the purpose of adapting to the different environments in which they operate? Have they received training in respect of these new paradigms of human security and the resources they will need in this respect? How can this uniting culture of dialogue be developed?

### **A cycle of dialogue and a study to improve our understanding of the preventive role of DSF**

These matters were addressed at four regional meetings on the role of DSF in PVE in Africa, organized in Dakar by the Senegalese Centre of Advanced Defence and Security Studies (CHEDS) and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) from 2017 to 2022<sup>3</sup>. They were discussed at length by those in attendance including senior DSF representatives, political leaders, parliamentarians, researchers, opinion leaders, media representatives, and men, women and young representatives from civil society. Following the third meeting held in 2019, and in view not only of experiences, shortcomings and proposals, but also of doubts expressed at that stage, both institutions invited the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) to contribute to a joint study in seven West African countries with a view to exploring the issue more comprehensively and fostering the cycle of dialogue based on the results of this undertaking. This report presents the findings of that study. The three-party initiative set out to shed light, as systematically as possible, on the political, legislative and operational frameworks in which DSF undertake their mission and the extent to which PVE is integrated into that mission. It is necessary to consider the link between violence and the organization of society, the relationship between civilian populations and authorities, and an appropriate long-term solution to the problem. It is therefore important to show how DSF can follow in the footsteps of other actors and redefine their role such that an emphasis is placed on the prevention of violence.

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<sup>3</sup> Final reports: 4th regional meeting (23-25 May 2022) (report being prepared), 3rd regional meeting (2-4 October 2019) <https://www.cheds.gouv.sn/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Rapport-seminaire-régional-CHEDS-DFAE-2019-Ang.pdf>, 2nd regional meeting (2-3 October 2018) <https://www.cheds.gouv.sn/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/RAPPORT-ANGLAIS-OK.pdf> and 1st regional meeting (9-10 October 2017) <http://www.cheds.gouv.sn/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/RAPPORT-SÉMINAIRE-RÉGIONAL-2017.pdf>.



# **Chapter 1**

**Overview of the project and study**



The introduction above explains the purpose and the wider context in which the project and this comparative study have been carried out. It makes clear that the aim of the project was to **improve our understanding of the potential role of defence and security forces (DSF) to prevent violent extremism (PVE) in West Africa.**

In pursuit of this general aim, we undertook to • improve our understanding of the way that extreme violence leaves its mark on DSF, • explain how DSF can actively contribute to PVE, • strengthen the resolve and improve the skills and expertise of DSF in this respect and • analyse and further develop the frameworks that regulate the scope of PVE in the mission of DSF.

Building on the cycle of dialogue fostered by the Swiss FDFA and Senegalese CHEDS since 2017, **the project and study have expressly sought to establish a more systematic knowledge base with a view to promoting further ongoing dialogue.**

### 1.1. Objectives of the study

- Establish a systematic knowledge base on political, legislative and operational frameworks relating to DSF currently active in West Africa (non-exhaustive);
- Analyse the actual or potential extent to which PVE is integrated into the mission of DSF;
- Identify the PVE practices of DSF;
- Draw lessons from the particular situations of the countries in question (by way of examples) and at regional level, while highlighting either useful practices or obstacles in policies or texts that regulate the scope of PVE in the mission of DSF;
- Identify the needs for regulatory frameworks, structures, mechanisms, operations or training programmes;
- Help to identify potential areas where DSF can further integrate PVE into their mission, especially on the basis of a regional comparative analysis;
- Lay the technical groundwork for the 4th regional meeting, organized by the Senegalese CHEDS and the Swiss FDFA, at which discussions with DSF are scheduled to take place;
- Spark a regional debate by organizing round tables on the best practices and experiences of the countries under consideration in relation to PVE and the extent to which it is part of the mission of DSF.
- Conceptualize the way in which to implement the following three points:
  - (i) How can particular political, legislative and operational frameworks relating to DSF and PVE be developed?
  - (ii) How to document the progress made since 2017 on the basis of the live audit — represented by the study and the cycle of dialogue?
  - (iii) How to expand the scope of the dialogue to include the report's political and operational recommendations?


### 1.2. Geographic scope of the study

In pursuit of these objectives, a comparative study relating to the systematic review and analysis of the political, legislative and operational frameworks that promote the integration of PVE in the mission of DSF across West Africa, has been carried out.

This study included two complementary aspects: an inventory and analysis of any frameworks introduced by the seven countries of the study **at national level**; and a **comparative analysis** highlighting the trends and potential scope for action of **the whole of the West and Central African region.**

The basic idea was to identify a limited number of West and Central African countries. It was not, therefore, to conduct an exhaustive study of ECOWAS and ECCAS countries, which would have been overambitious, and a step too far given the human and material resources deployed to undertake this project. While the initial sample included a wider range of case studies, including Central Africa, it was reduced to a total of seven West African countries in light of the Covid-19 pandemic.

The **seven countries** to which this comparative study relates are as follows: **Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, Senegal and Togo**. The study also drew on projects previously carried out by FDFA and CHEDS<sup>4</sup> to establish a basis of comparison not only for the West African region, but also, to a certain extent, for Central Africa, since the latter had contributed to the Dakar cycle of dialogue since 2017.



*Map of the seven countries to which the study relates, and of the West and Central African region involved in the dialogue process undertaken by FDFA and CHEDS since 2017, to which the findings of this study will also be of interest.*

### 1.3. Conduct and methodology of the study

#### Project team

Experts from the Swiss FDFA and DCAF have worked alongside a team of specialists from the region to undertake this project. A national expert was recruited for each of the seven countries covered by the study. Their primary tasks were to collect data, conduct research, provide expertise and prepare a summary report for their respective country. A regional expert was also commissioned to systematize the collected data and facilitate the comparative analysis on the basis of which the study is conducted. A specialist acting under the authority of two study supervisors at DCAF and the Swiss FDFA was responsible for overall coordination of the project. These experts, as well as the CHEDS, were actively integrated into the project during a number of orientation phases. The entire team indicated above contributed to this report under the joint supervision of DCAF's Head of Sub-Saharan Africa Division and the Swiss FDFA's Director of the PVE Programme.

#### Data collection and research method

Data for this study were collected by way of information retrieval (collection of relevant official texts) and direct interviews during missions undertaken in each of the seven countries to which the study relates. For the purposes of objectifying and systematizing the basis of the study, a document setting out the working methodology and an interview guide<sup>5</sup> were produced in advance. Interviews were qualitative and semi-structured in such a way so as to cover the whole range of pre-determined questions and to explore the specific points made by participants themselves. Questions, which were either open or closed, were followed by a general discussion with participants to ascertain their perceptions and

<sup>4</sup> See the cycle of dialogue reports produced by the Swiss FDFA and the Senegalese CHEDS in the region since 2017, op. cit.

<sup>5</sup> The interview guide is attached as annex 1.

experiences. As interviews were conducted under the Chatham House Rule, the examples referred to in this report have been anonymized. The data collected in this capacity are both quantitative and qualitative. The data were collected over the period between November 2019 and August 2021.<sup>6</sup>

**Questions were categorized to highlight the following information:**

- Existence and assessment of a strategic PVE framework, and the extent to which PVE is integrated into defence and security frameworks.
- Implementation of PVE frameworks and resources, relevance for DSFs, and links between DSFs and other actors.
- Prominence of PVE in the mission of DSFs.
- The extent to which DSFs liaise with civilian populations in relation to PVE.

### **What is meant by "frameworks"?**

The study set out to itemize and analyse the political, legislative and operational frameworks in relation to the role played by DSF in PVE across West Africa. Three particular points should be explained in this respect:

- The term "frameworks" denotes, on the one hand, the various sources and forms of precepts governing the scope of defence and security forces (DSF), collectively referred to as the "governing principles", i.e., official public policy, legislation or administrative acts, training programmes, and rules of engagement.
- On the other hand, the term refers to the functional measures and arrangements through which DSF are able to engage in PVE, i.e., special bodies or institutions, spaces for dialogue, and cooperative mechanisms.
- The scope of the study was not limited exclusively to frameworks that related specifically to DSF or made special provision for PVE, but analysed more general frameworks which actually or potentially lay the groundwork for DSF to play a role in PVE.

### **Participants in interviews**

Participants in interviews were also pre-determined in the interests of diversity at national level (professional profiles, governmental/non-governmental, gender) and in order to provide a systematized basis of regional comparison. Participant categories include political leaders, elected officials, government ministries (especially defence, security, and justice), various defence and security units, inspection agencies, training centres, public institutions, public policy centres, academic and research institutions, and civil society.<sup>7</sup>

### **Dialogue as a constituent part of the methodology**

This study is distinguished by the fact that it combined a standard survey methodology for comparative research purposes, involving data collection and analysis (of a "unilateral" nature), with a consultative and inclusive process in the form of an interactive dialogue. As part of this approach, an inter-disciplinary and regional team was assembled, the number and heterogeneity of interlocutors (almost 300 people) were guaranteed, and, most notably, a platform for dialogue was provided by the experts during project implementation, thereby casting aside the observational dimension and paving the way for a process of joint reflection.

### **Stages of data processing, analysing and sharing findings**

Data were processed according to a standardized approach. A national report was produced for each case study. The reports respectively itemized the relevant official documents and available frameworks

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<sup>6</sup> Direct interviews took place as part of seven assignments carried out in the countries to which the study relates, between February 2020 and August 2021: Côte d'Ivoire (18-21.02.2020), Burkina Faso (26.02-04.03.2020), Senegal (11-17.10.2020), Togo (20-24.10.2020), Benin (14-18.12.2020), Ghana (18-23.01.2021), Niger (01-08.08-2021).

<sup>7</sup> The comprehensive typology of interlocutors is attached as annex 2.

and analysed them according to a pre-determined standard approach. It should be noted that these reports were prepared as working documents and have not been published. Data were subsequently organized into a matrix which juxtaposed the findings by country and served as a basis for comparative analysis. All experts involved in the project took part in several internal consultation, updating and validation processes between March 2021 and August 2022. This summary report, which presents the final conclusion of the comparative study, has been produced on this basis. It is the only document published in the context of the project and is available in French and English. The preliminary findings of the study were also reviewed at the 4th Regional Meeting organized in Dakar in May 2022 by the Swiss FDFA and Senegalese CHEDS; the definitive results will also be presented during a series of public round tables to be held in West Africa and Geneva in the second half of 2022.

Methodological approach				
11.2019	→	→	→	11.2022
Collection	Dialogue	Country analysis	Comparative analysis	Summary report and presentation of findings
<i>How ?</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Literature review</li> <li>Document collection</li> <li>Interview guide</li> <li>Direct interviews during assignments</li> </ul>	<i>How ?</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Direct discussions during assignments</li> <li>Internal project team discussions</li> </ul>	<i>How ?</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National reports</li> <li>Internal project team discussions</li> </ul>	<i>How ?</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Comparison matrix</li> <li>Internal project team workshops and discussions</li> </ul>	<i>How ?</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Production and publication of report</li> <li>Regional Meeting (Dakar)</li> <li>Public round tables</li> </ul>

### Objective constraints and limitations of the study

While a study of this kind is carried out according to a robust process given its methodology, duration, team, substantial and geographic scope, and the density and capacity of interviewees, it is inevitably subject to certain limitations. We fully acknowledge any limitations and shortcomings it may contain. However, we believe that they are not detrimental either to the collection of data, or to the analyses, which have been conducted in such a way so as to fully meet the objectives of the study: i) **systematize** the knowledge base (without claiming to be exhaustive), ii) **set out** the challenges, shortcomings, useful and potential practices, and iii) **encourage** DSF to play a more prominent role in PVE.

Several limitations arose in connection with the choices made by study coordinators on the basis of practical considerations. For instance, working with a representative sample of case studies, rather than with all West and Central African states; or spending a limited period of 5-7 days collecting data during missions in the seven countries; and focusing primarily on interlocutors based in capital cities, and not in local regions or administrative districts.


The objective conditions of the study include the health context related to the Covid-19 pandemic. As some missions were postponed on several occasions, the data collection process took longer than expected. Moreover, the number of case studies had to be reduced (notably those projected to take place in Central Africa) in order to limit the collection period and preserve the durability of collected data. In light of the political context and security situation, or of the sensitivity of particular data, appointments with participants were occasionally rearranged or documentation was not always available (especially training material).

Despite the precautions to standardize criteria and methodological tools, occasional discrepancies were noted, meaning that data were not always collected in the same way from one country to the next. This was the case for the profile and capacity of interlocutors (for instance, we were not always given full access to some security sector actors, to the defence and security committees of national assemblies, to DSF training centres, or even to justice sector actors), although this had no bearing on the critical mass or capacity and heterogeneity of the interviewees.



# Chapter 2

**Local perceptions of — and state responses  
to — the threat and causes of VE**



## 2.1. The deep-rooted, long-term problem of armed violence

During the decade beginning in 2010, the countries of Central Sahel, and subsequently West Africa, saw an escalation in armed violence that has proven to be particularly devastating in terms of the cost to human life and property. The situation makes for distressing reading: attacks by armed "violent extremist" groups, inter-community and intra-community violence, abuse by domestic armed forces and allied forces, armed militias operating under little or no supervision, all forms of trafficking also perpetrated amid acts of violence, chaotic political transitions... Given the inability of states to effectively mediate and to promote inclusive development, and in view of the unsuitability of security mechanisms, these recurring events seem to have created a breeding ground for violent behaviour to become a deep-rooted, long-term problem across the entire region.<sup>8</sup>

Today, the Central Sahel and a number of West African coastal countries share the same fate: their security situation rests on a knife-edge and the peaceful co-existence of communities is far from certain. This situation is borne out by the "spectre of the spread of jihadism" and the threat of segregation and violent clashes between communities, in turn fuelled by conflicts over the use of natural resources (farmland, extractives, pastureland for example) or tensions caused by the delimitation or appropriation of land. This state of affairs casts doubts on the nature of the response of West African states and their ability to devise meaningful preventive strategies.

As such, there was a need for research and analysis into (i) the **level of political awareness of the risk and narrative surrounding the threat** as perceived by those who devise and implement security policies, not least defence and security forces (DSF), and (ii) the **changes of strategy which seem to arise** in the political, strategic and operational responses to these complex and, in some cases, unprecedented social and security challenges.

## 2.2. Perceptions on the ground

In respect of the seven countries covered by this study, the level of awareness of the risk and the perceptions of the threat of VE by senior DSF officials and political actors interviewed strongly correlate with two elements: on the one hand, the perception of an exogenous and purely security-related threat for coastal countries; and on the other, a growing, albeit sometimes belated, awareness that the threat is becoming deep-rooted within the borders of Central Sahel countries.

### 2.2.1. A threat considered to be exogenous rather than endogenous

On the one hand, the threat is perceived through the prism of the prevailing security situation within the country or at its borders. Indeed, in countries where the threat posed from within by VE groups is more limited, there is a greater tendency to associate the threat with a probable **exogenous contagion** effect caused by the permeability of borders. It is widely suggested that the perceived security risk essentially arises from the inroads made by VE groups from North Mali towards Central Mali and the region of the three borders, and from the Central Sahel to coastal countries. While the domestic socio-political or economic dynamics of the countries, which are liable to create a breeding ground for the phenomenon, are rarely mentioned by the interlocutors in the study, they are indeed frequently referred to by civil society actors and researchers.

On the other hand, the perception is based on the fact that causes of violence are viewed through the lens of security and fail to take account of socio-economic and political situations. **As such, there is a risk of misinterpreting and producing truncated analysis of the situation and underlying causes of the violence.**

*"In practice, most terrorist organizations make hay in areas where **institutions are absent/weak**. Terrorist organizations undertake recruitment operations in grey zones.*

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<sup>8</sup> According to the calculation of Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), violent incidents perpetrated by armed terrorist groups in the Sahel region have doubled every year since 2015. Looking at 2019 in isolation, for approximately 700 recorded incidents, the number of victims of these attacks rose from 225 to 2,000 during the same period. This increased violence has caused more than 900,000 people to flee the area, including more than 500,000 from Burkina Faso alone (<https://africacenter.org/fr/publication/repondre-a-lesser-de-lextrémisme-violent-au-sahel/>).



*Organizations have been known to tap into the sense of neglect that tends to increase in proportion to the distance of the local communities from the capital. These groups take advantage of deprived areas in need of investment (for instance, financing of drilling projects to fill the void left by the state). Civilians are sometimes willing to protect the interests of these organizations to the detriment of state forces."<sup>9</sup>*

**"In relation to violent extremism, governance is a more significant contributing factor than security. For a long time, it was in the interest of governments to sweep this aspect under the carpet. VE actually lays bare a crisis between state and society. [...] In view of this problem, the spotlight is placed on governments rather than the extremists. All the drivers of VE have been gone unchecked: democratic deficit, poor governance, and impunity. It is high time the root cause of the problem is addressed: the crisis afflicting relations between state and society. People are not born that way so what possesses them to resort to such extremes?"<sup>10</sup>**

Limited analysis of the root causes of social vulnerabilities may result in the state reacting belatedly to the distinct risk of the phenomenon spreading insidiously and becoming a deep-rooted problem — as in the case in of Sahel countries — and ultimately failing to contain the threat in an adequate and sustainable manner.

### 2.2.2. Burkina Faso: A domestic threat gone unrecognized for too long

In the sub-region, Burkina Faso is perceived to have been caught off-guard by the internal threat. Huge swathes of the national territory now face the devastating effects of armed violence, the principal victims of which are civilians. Indeed, the feeling most commonly expressed by those interviewed during the study, namely actors involved in public affairs and security, is that the **threat has been allowed to fester for so long** that VE has become a deep-rooted, long-term problem. **There is also a general consensus with regard to the identification and consideration of structural weaknesses** which may explain why this phenomenon is able to take hold in the country.

*"The problem that Burkina Faso often faces is its lack of foresight. [...] We should have considered what happened in Mali and Niger and devised a plan for the future. How has a once stable nation become unstable? **Why were we not able to challenge certain practices from an anthropological and social perspective?** Had we anticipated these phenomena, we would have realized that that area required particular attention. Yet, the action rightly or wrongly taken in these communities has failed to effectively address the causes of these problems. The Peul community has actually risen up against the authorities in a bid to defend its interests in light of the threat posed by other communities — which may be weaponized — or by DSF."<sup>11</sup>*

For Burkinabe officials, both military and political, this lack of anticipation, which they now recognise, would seem to be the fate, today, of certain coastal countries in which the threat is obvious and where the public authorities run the same risk of making a truncated analysis of the situation.

### 2.2.3. Neglected northern and eastern border areas of coastal countries

During the interviews, the military and political authorities responsible for the public defence and security policies of Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Ghana and Togo, frequently asserted that the "threat is at their door", on their borders, generally in the northern or eastern regions of their respective countries, i.e., in areas bordering the Sahel countries. **They therefore believe that the threat is external.**

*"We are not denying the existence of a threat; we are not living in a bubble. Our country is surrounded by countries that face a serious terrorist threat. We cannot look the other way.*

<sup>9</sup> An official interviewed for the purposes of this study, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, February 2020.

<sup>10</sup> A researcher interviewed for the purposes of this study, Cotonou, Benin, December 2020.

<sup>11</sup> An official interviewed for the purposes of this study, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, March 2020.

*We must put in place measures to make sure we are prepared and protected **from the threat arising from the sub-region**".<sup>12</sup>*

*"The threat of terrorism often spreads in **border areas** because they have long been neglected by our states and vast expanses of land in those areas are deprived of basic social services."<sup>13</sup>*

*"VE or its prevention is associated — not with deprived urban areas — **but with border areas**."<sup>14</sup>*

These peripheral areas are often characterized by **permeable borders**; the inability of DSF to exercise strict control over the movement of goods and people across the border; deep-rooted cross-border crime primarily involving the trafficking of miscellaneous goods; the spread of illegal gold mining; and in many areas ineffective or non-existent governance.

Moreover, one key consideration to bear in mind is that the peripheral areas of almost all coastal countries contain **natural reserves and areas with high economic potential, especially due to the presence of minerals**. As such, it is sometimes difficult to assure their security.

*"Terrorist groups take advantage [of these spaces and resources] to secure supplies and create a safe haven. Most of these groups actually attempt to move to and base themselves permanently in these areas."<sup>15</sup>*

Although some coastal countries feel less at risk than others, given their faith in the robustness of internal mechanisms (Muslim brotherhoods<sup>16</sup> in Senegal, stronger sense of national belonging in Ghana, relative control of Territory in Togo, etc.), the overall security situation of the sub-region remains a genuine cause for concern for political and military authorities.

## **2.3. The predominance of security-driven approaches**

As DSF of the sub-region are acutely aware of the security challenge posed by the escalation of violence in the Central Sahel region and the area of the three borders, and by the advance of extremist groups from Central Sahel to coastal countries; and as they come face to face with armed groups that are often well-equipped, well-organized, highly motivated, battle-hardened, mobile and familiar with the terrain, **they tend to react in a precipitous and haphazard manner, with an emphasis placed on military and security considerations**.

### **2.3.1. Making the best of a bad situation: shoot first and dialogue later**

In the seven countries to which this study relates, DSF agree on the form that the response to the phenomenon should take, subject to one or two nuanced differences: **first and foremost, the threat must be suppressed** since the fundamental duty of the army, in their opinion, is to react to danger:

*"We have traditionally **operated as instruments of repression**. It is now generally accepted that repressive approaches have limited results. Even patrolling units, whose task is to prevent potential attacks, do not respond until an attack takes place. **There is no escaping the fact that reform is needed**."<sup>17</sup>*

In practical terms, the various military personnel operate according to a principle whereby they deploy any force, weaponry and strategy that is required to face down the threat. **DSF often refer to "military build-up" and the "deployment of special units"** both in Central Sahel and coastal countries. In

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<sup>12</sup> An official interviewed for the purposes of this study, Accra, Ghana, January 2021.

<sup>13</sup> An official interviewed for the purposes of this study, Cotonou, Benin, December 2020.

<sup>14</sup> An official interviewed for the purposes of this study, Dakar, Senegal, October 2020.

<sup>15</sup> A DSF representative interviewed for the purposes of this study, Cotonou, Benin, December 2020.

<sup>16</sup> Predominantly Sufi

<sup>17</sup> A DSF representative interviewed for the purposes of this study, Niamey, Niger, August 2021.

coastal countries, forces have been deployed within borders and at borders with the Central Sahel to act as a deterrent and to respond to any impending threat.

*"In the middle of last year [2020], when the situation in Burkina Faso deteriorated, particularly in view of the attack in Côte d'Ivoire, it dawned on us that we did not realize just how far they had progressed. They come from the North and across other borders too. We have responded by deploying forces to secure all the borders of Ghana."<sup>18</sup>*

Moreover, the best-laid plans of the armed forces to rid the territory of a threat do not always go off without a hitch, as tensions tend to flare up between neighbouring countries in some border areas of the sub-region. The most effective way to address this issue and reduce the tensions on both sides of borders seems to be for the sub-region to take concerted action.

*"The Accra Initiative, which resulted in Operations Koudalgou I and II, was launched to enhance cooperation between countries. [...] This operation in 2018 prompted [security] communities to work together. It led to a partial resolution of the problem between French and English-speaking countries. Confidence has grown. Although most of these areas are regarded as no man's land, joint patrols are able to quickly detect threats. Local conflicts and acts of illegal trafficking, which can fuel VE, have decreased."<sup>19</sup>*

In addition to this concerted action involving numerous countries, some states, such as Togo, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, have also carried out **internal operations**. Forces adopt a **repressive approach** in this capacity. Some military and political authorities are adamant that this concept will only be effective if a combined package of "hard" and "soft" measures is introduced.

*"We believe the measures we have put in place, notably the deployment of DSF, are sufficient to keep our country safe. We also accept that it is necessary to supplement these measures with a "soft" approach and acknowledge that we have to make a case to these communities that their lives are better off in our hands, rather than under the control of terrorists. We try to raise awareness and prevent radicalization. But by and large, the approach has involved the effective deployment of DSF."<sup>20</sup>*

However, closer links between DSF and civilian populations are essentially underpinned by a **security-driven strategy**. According to the concept that military and police personnel continue to embrace, the aim of trust-building exercises is to facilitate the flow of intelligence and normalize the presence of their forces.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, as part of the action taken up to this point to counter VE, **civilians have played a role limited to that of informants**, except when they are deployed alongside DSF in an auxiliary capacity, as in the case of Burkina Faso.<sup>22</sup> This tactic remains a bone of contention in that country.

*"I don't think we can fight without the assistance of civilians, as long as they are used exclusively as informants. Civilian self-defence forces are not desirable; they set in motion a vicious cycle of attack followed by retaliation."<sup>23</sup>*

Broadly speaking, two conclusions can be drawn from the interviews and documents collected during the study: **(i) PVE is considered by DSF to be a minor part of their operations; and (ii) it plays a very limited role in their approach**. The principal stakeholders of DSF and political bodies suggest during their interviews that PVE **should remain within the purview of civil-military action**.<sup>24</sup>

However, one noteworthy **exception** is the approach advocated by Nigerian and Nigerien authorities. Under policies adopted at the turn of 2017-2018, both **reached out** to members of VE groups with a view to their rehabilitation and reintegration. Niger has set up a transition unit to promote the

<sup>18</sup> An official interviewed for the purposes of this study, Accra, Ghana, January 2021.

<sup>19</sup> An official interviewed for the purposes of this study, Accra, Ghana, January 2021.

<sup>20</sup> An official interviewed for the purposes of this study, Accra, Ghana, January 2021.

<sup>21</sup> Indeed, in many countries, relations between DSFs and civilians are beset by tensions and mistrust. The need to normalize the presence of DSFs, in the absence of any meaningful cooperation between them and civilian populations, remains an important challenge in the public service of keeping people safe and protecting property.

<sup>22</sup> See chapter 4, sub-section 4.2.5. Supervision of self-defence forces.

<sup>23</sup> An official interviewed for the purposes of this study, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, March 2020.

<sup>24</sup> See chapter 4, sub-section 4.2.3. Civil-military action.

rehabilitation and reintegration of former members of VE organizations, and Nigeria has introduced a programme designed to deradicalize former prisoners and reintegrate former members of Boko Haram. However, laudable though these efforts are, they ought to incorporate a holistic approach and take into account the following risks: the perception of victims that participants in these programmes are not made to pay for their; recidivism; infiltration, etc. Burkina Faso is now following their lead.

### 2.3.2. Should the task of prevention be assigned exclusively to civilians?

Although it seems repressive measures are predominantly implemented in response to VE or terrorism, the concept of prevention is not altogether excluded from public discourse. However, no meaningful action has yet been taken, as recognized by the military and security authorities interviewed, and confirmed by the frameworks considered under this study (see chapters 3 and 4 below). Some even go as far as to attribute the task to another force. One participant asserted that *"the first force that springs to mind in a discussion about prevention is the police. The army does not concern itself with matters of prevention."*<sup>25</sup> Moreover, in the seven countries to which the study relates, **matters of prevention tend to be assigned to civil society, whose role is to "raise awareness from the bottom up"**, even though there is growing recognition that these tasks should be integrated into the mission of DSF.

The idea of a **multi-party approach to the prevention** of VE through structured, inclusive and participatory dialogue does not seem to be making headway. This could be explained by the fact that the social and security situation has become unstable, or because there does not seem to be a forum in which to discuss the matter, or even because DSF have not yet embraced — or dedicated resources to — that practice. There are some examples (see chapter 4 below) however to suggest that the situation is changing.

*"LSC (local security committees) have been set up to promote prevention. The state has realized that it is not possible to assure the security of citizens without the support of local communities. [...] The committee is made up of multiple parties (women, young people, hunters, traditional leaders, local authorities, vice president and commissioner of arrondissement, etc.) who meet to discuss and submit proposals to the commissioner who subsequently formulates preventive strategies. The purpose of the committee is to produce information in order to prevent any potential security risk."<sup>26</sup>*

**Most countries to which this study relates recognize that dialogue must be facilitated in order to raise awareness of the drivers of VE and of the vulnerabilities that pave the way for the phenomenon to become deep-rooted in societies.** But despite the admission that preventive strategies are needed, and that they are most effective when dialogue is facilitated, **it is by no means clear what form it will take or how it will be implemented**, especially with regard to the involvement of DSF.

## 2.4. Redefining preventive approaches to prioritize social vulnerabilities

As indicated above, senior DSF officials and the politicians to whom they are answerable in the seven countries under consideration seem to share the view that the risk is exogenous. They seemingly view the matter exclusively through the prism of security. As such, they underestimate two key factors.

On the one hand, the **risk that violence may actually develop endogenously on account of the domestic socio-economic and political situation.** By viewing the issue of violence solely through the prism of security, they disregard social inequalities and the risks to which ungoverned or poorly governed territories give rise, and consequently make whole swathes of the population vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups.

On the other hand, the fact that **security institutions have a sociological role to play.** They are driven by values and practices that are **shaped by society**, historical identity, and political choices, and should be constantly adapted to maintain and reinforce a nation's social and political cohesion.

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<sup>25</sup> An official interviewed for the purposes of this study, Cotonou, Benin, December 2020.

<sup>26</sup> An official interviewed for the purposes of this study, Cotonou, Benin, December 2020.

**The over-reliance on military and security-driven responses has been prompted not so much by a security crisis motivated by an insidious threat, but by a failure to consider the factors that have contributed to the security crisis and by a failure to accommodate the needs of civilian populations.** This perception is much more prominent among interviewed civil society leaders and some politicians who share this view.

With the benefit of hindsight, **two conclusions can be drawn.** Although these more profound reflections are yet to be developed in greater detail, they are referenced by some political figures and DSF members interviewed in the context of this study.

On the one hand, while this situation has immediately highlighted the inability of the region's armed forces to deal with a threat described by many as a conflict of asymmetric warfare, it may also provide the added benefit of **making clear that structural reforms are absolutely necessary.** These reforms ought to transform armed forces that are broadly divided along ethnic lines, ill-equipped, immobile, demotivated, and operating in the interests of a regime rather than civilian populations, and turn them into effectively organized republican bodies that are able to fulfil their sovereign mission of defending the territory and keeping all civilian populations safe.

This transformation may also help to **redefine the principles under which DSF operate,** to such an extent that they consider themselves to be — not agents of repression — but providers of a public service rendered in the interest of a state's civilian population, both in times of peace and war. That inevitably requires an appraisal of their role based on the tangible and intangible well-being needs of human beings. A **human security approach which lays the foundations for peace over a path that may have otherwise led to war.**

*"If one considers the history of armies and the relationship between the army and society, there is a genuine debate to be had. **What role do armies actually play in our societies?** Until the issue of approaches is addressed, people won't know what to think. The only way we'll find a solution to this problem is if we have the courage to discuss it. It is true that we, as military personnel, are in the process of internalizing a new set of norms. We would really appreciate your support and the chance to discuss this issue."<sup>27</sup>*


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<sup>27</sup> An official interviewed for the purposes of this study, Cotonou, Benin, December 2020.



# **Chapter 3**

**Inventory of political, legislative, and operational frameworks relating to the role of DSF in PVE in the seven countries**



The comparative study conducted from 2020 to 2022 in seven West African countries included the fundamental task of **systematically collecting data on available frameworks** from direct sources (during assignments in the countries in question) or by way of remote information retrieval. While this task set out to produce a **snapshot** of the situation<sup>28</sup>, it also served to provide a detailed overview of the data. A subsequent comparative analysis of aggregated data showcased predominant trends and particularly highlighted the initiatives taken in the interest of PVE. The analysis covered not only itemized frameworks but also the discussions held with various participants during assignments and their perceptions and experiences of PVE. Chapter 4 will focus particularly on the comparative analysis and the major trends observed. In the meantime, chapter 3 will present, via the list below, **the live audit of existing frameworks and their connection to PVE**.

The following **explanations of terms and methodologies** are provided to facilitate comprehension of the list below:

- **What is meant by frameworks?** On the one hand, the various sources and forms of precepts governing the scope of the mission of defence and security forces (DSF), collectively referred to as the "governing principles", i.e., official public policy, legislation or administrative acts, training programmes, and rules of engagement. On the other hand, the term refers to the functional measures and arrangements through which DSF are able to engage in PVE, i.e., special bodies or institutions, spaces for dialogue, and cooperative mechanisms.
- The scope of the study was not limited exclusively to frameworks that either related specifically to DSF or made special provision for PVE but **analysed more general frameworks** that effectively or potentially lay the groundwork for DSF to play a role in PVE.
- The itemized frameworks have therefore been classified into the following **categories**:
  - 1) **Public defence and security policies** (including training programmes)
  - 2) **Policies and strategies linked directly to violent extremism and/or terrorism** (and their prevention)
  - 3) **General peacebuilding policies and structures**
  - 4) **Institutions and mechanisms that act in the interest of — or are relevant to — PVE**
- The data are presented successively in a **table corresponding to each individual country covered by the study** and in alphabetical order (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, Togo), and are followed by a **section dedicated to international and regional frameworks**.

At the head of each country-specific list, there is an **"Analysis of opportunities for PVE"** which briefly summarizes the possibilities for enhancing the role that DSF can play in PVE in the given context.

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<sup>28</sup> Caveat: For the purposes of this paper, the authors have, where possible, undertaken the meticulous task of updating initially collected data in order to ensure that the "snapshot" presents the most up-to-date image of the situation. Moreover, the study did not claim to be exhaustive. As such, the list may not include unreported or unmarked items. There is also a record of whether or not references are made to frameworks during interviews, and of the occasions on which they are referenced. However, that does not alter the mass of collected data or their overall value.

### 3.1. BENIN

**Analysis of opportunities for PVE:** The creation of the Beninese Agency for the Integrated Management of Border Areas (ABéGIEF), the attributions and missions entrusted in 2016 to the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security (MISP) and sectoral actions carried out to make borders viable and reduce fragility on the national territory, have been operational responses to the threat. Since 2019, prevention measures were methodically improved and expanded. Institutions, NGOs and cooperation bodies have invested in the areas under threat to further structural prevention and awareness-raising actions, as well as socio-community investments, in order to counter the influence and expansion of EV groups. To coordinate all these actions, Benin initiated in 2019 the process of developing a National Strategy for the Prevention of Violent Extremism (SNPEV) 2021-2030, which is pending adoption. Since 2021, the increase in security incidents and violence linked to EV groups and conflicts between farmers and herders offer, today more than before, alongside security treatment, more diversified and multiform opportunities for PVE. Attentive to the continuous reinforcement of prevention actions, the government is more systematically attacking the causes of this violence and is committed to a prevention approach that involves communities, elected officials and the DSF for reinforced actions in the field of the co-production of security, the prevention and resolution of conflicts and the establishment of peace promotion mechanisms.

BENIN

Existing frameworks	Type of framework	Scope (national, subnational, regional, etc.)	A. Start Date of drafting process B. Status (underway, finalized, aborted, etc.) C. Date of adoption	A. Integrates or not PVE B. Reference or not to VE and/or related concepts ( eg radicalization, terrorism) and terminology used	A. Institution(s) responsible for drafting B. Institution(s) responsible for implementation and linked stakeholders C. DSF concerned by the framework
1. Defence and security policies (including curricula)					
Decree No. 2021-579 of November 3, 2021 on the general organization of the Armed Forces of Benin (FAB) and the organization of command in the Armed Forces of Benin	Regulatory	National	A. 2020 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2021	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions terrorism (the Chief of Staff has a technical adviser in the fight against terrorism; the National Guard participates in the fight against terrorism)	A. national ministry of Defence B. Army
Decree No. 2021-456 of September 15, 2021 on the powers, organization and functioning of the Directorate General of the Republican Police	Regulatory	National	A. 2021 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2021	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions VE and related concepts (the director of the Republican police coordinates the research and exploitation of intelligence that may be linked to VE, terrorism, organized crime, cybercrime and emerging threats)	A. Government B. Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, Ministry of economy and finance, Ministry of justice C. Republican police
Decree No. 2021-055 of February 10, 2021 approving the statutes of the Beninese Agency for Integrated Management of Border Areas	Regulatory	National	A. 2020 B. Finalized	A. Integrates PVE, by acting on the causes, risks and factors of VE through a development policy for border areas B. Mentions terrorism	A. Government B. Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, ABéGIEF C. Republican police





BENIN	(ABéGIEF) and repealing the provisions of Decree No. 2012-503 of December 10, 2012 on the powers, organization and operation of the Beninese Agency for Integrated Management of Border Areas, as amended by Decree No. 2019-516 of November 20, 2019, and any other prior provisions  Order No. 139/MISP/DC/SGM/DGPN/DG-ABéGIEF/SA of 21 September 2016 on the creation, powers, organization and functioning of the Special Border Surveillance Unit			C. Adopted in 2021; created in 2012		
	Decree No. 2020-500 of October 14, 2020 on the creation, attribution, organization and functioning of pasture management and security committees in the Republic of Benin  Decree No. 2020-574 of December 02, 2020 amending Decree No. 2020-500 of October 14, 2020 on the creation, attribution, organization and functioning of the Committees for the management and securing of grazing and the fight against kidnappings in the Republic of Benin	Regulatory	National and subnational	A. 2020 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2020	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts. These committees are created for the police surveillance of pastures, transhumance and the fight against kidnappings and other acts of violence in pasture areas; they thus participate in the settlement of conflicts between farmers and herders, sources of violence in almost all departments of Benin	A. Government B. Office of the President, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Decentralization and Local Governance, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of economy and finance, Ministry of the living environment and sustainable development, pasture management and security committees, prefectures and municipalities C. Republican police, army, water, forests and hunting
	Decree No. 2020-389 of July 29, 2020 on the powers, organization and functioning of the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security (MISP)	Regulatory	National	A. 2020 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2020	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions VE and related concepts (Developing policy and coordinating the fight against radicalization, VE and terrorism)	A. Government B. Ministry of the Interior and Public Security C. republican police
	Law No. 2020-15 of July 3, 2020 amending and supplementing Law No. 90-016 of June 18, 1990 creating the Beninese Armed Forces (FAB)	Legislative	National	A. 2019 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2020	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Parliament B. Ministry of National Defence C. Army
	Decree No. 2020-322 of June 24, 2020 on the powers, organization and	Regulatory	National	A. 2020 B. Finalized	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Integrates the strategic watch and the coordination of the actions of fight	A. Government

BENIN	functioning of the Ministry of National Defence			C. Adopted in 2020	against terrorism in liaison with the National Defence and Security Council	B. Ministry of National Defence, National Defence and Security Council, National Intelligence Council C. Army
	Law No. 2017-41 of December 29, 2017 establishing the Republican police in the Republic of Benin	Legislative	National	A. 2016 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2019	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts. But Decree No. 2017-503 of October 24, 2017 conveying this bill states that it is to have a comprehensive solution against criminal threats, terrorism, armed groups, EV that the One Interior Security Force was created	A. Government B. Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, Ministry of economy and finance, Ministry of justice, Ministry of National Defence C. Republican police
	Law No. 2019-40 of November 07, 2019 amending the Constitution of the Republic of Benin  Law No. 1990-32 of December 11, 1990 on the Constitution of the Republic of Benin	Legislative	National	A. 2017 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2019	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions the fight against terrorism	A. Parliament B. Parliament, Government, Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication, associated actors (CSOs and citizens) C. All DSF
	Law No. 2018-14 of July 2, 2018 amending and supplementing Law No. 2012-15 of March 18, 2013 on the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Republic of Benin	Legislative	National	A. 2016 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2018	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Gives a definition of terrorism and what constitutes a terrorist act	A. Parliament B. Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, Penitentiary Agency of Benin, courts and tribunals C. republican police
	Law No. 2018-13 of July 2, 2018 amending and supplementing Law No. 2001-37 of August 27, 2002 on the organization of the judiciary in the Republic of Benin as amended and creation of the Court for the Suppression of Economic Crimes and Terrorism (CRIET)	Legislative	National	A. 2017 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2018	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions the notions of terrorism and related offenses and assigns jurisdiction to the Court for the Suppression of Economic Crimes and Terrorism	A. Government B. Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, Ministry of Finance , National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF), Court for the Suppression of Economic Crimes and Terrorism (CRIET) Penitentiary Agency of Benin, courts and tribunals C. republican police
	Law No. 2017-44 of February 05, 2018 on the collection of intelligence in the Republic of Benin	Legislative	National	A. 2016 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2018	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions the prevention of terrorism and all threats related to VE, organized crime, the fight against the proliferation of weapons	A. Parliament B. National Intelligence Control Commission, National Defence and Security Council, Office of the President C. Republican police, Army
	Decree No. 92-5 of January 22, 1992 establishing and assigning the	Regulatory	National	A. 1991 B. Finalized	A. Does not mention PVE	A. Office of the President

BENIN	Directorate of Liaison and Documentation Services			C. Adopted in 1992	B. Does not refer to any related concept. Benin's internal and external intelligence and counterintelligence service, at the forefront of counterterrorism, cooperation with foreign services and neighboring services within the framework of ECOWAS, WAEMU and the Accra initiative	B. Office of the President, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security C. Army, Republican police
	<b>Curriculum frameworks</b>					
	No relevant information collected					
	<b>2. Policies and strategies related to VE and terrorism (and their prevention)</b>					
	National Strategy for the Prevention of Violent Extremism 2021-2030 (SNPEV) (2021)	Policy	National	A. Since 2019 B. Finalized C. Adoption pending	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions VE, radicalization, terrorism. This holistic strategy document makes an overall diagnosis of VE, defines orientations and axes, the various mechanisms for coordinating PVE actions, the programmatic and financing implementation plan.	A. Government B. All ministries and agencies, state and non-state actors, technical and financial partners, CSOs, National Association of Benin Municipalities (ANCB), communities, Parliament, National Defence Council C. All DSF
	Law No. 2021-14 of December 20, 2021 on the Code of Territorial Administration in the Republic of Benin	Legislative	National	A. 2020 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2021	A. Does not mention PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts. Confers prefects and mayors with security and administrative police powers, also integrating the prevention of threats including terrorism and VE	A. Parliament B. Government, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Decentralization and Local Governance, prefectures, town halls, districts C. Republican police, Army
	Law No. 2020-25 of September 2, 2020 amending Law No. 2018-17 of July 25, 2018 on the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in the Republic of Benin  Decree No. 2019-047 of January 31, 2019 establishing, assigning, organizing and operating the National Technical Committee	Legislative  Regulatory	National	A. 2019 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2020	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not refer to VE or radicalization, but gives a definition of the terrorist act. The committee's mission is to monitor the implementation of the national strategy to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.	A. Parliament and Government B. Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF), Benin Penitentiary Agency C. Republican police
National policy and strategy document for the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism in Benin (2018)	Policy	National	A. 2018 B. Finalized C. Adopted in December 2018	A. Does not integrate PVE B. This document reinforces the legislative and institutional framework of the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism on the one hand, and the reinforcement of the capacities of key actors involved on the other hand.	A. Government B. Ministry of economy and finance, Ministry of justice, National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF), Penitentiary Agency of Benin C. Republican police	



BENIN	Decree No. 2018-347 of July 25, 2018 on the attribution, organization and operation of the National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF)	Regulatory	National	A. 2018 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2018	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE but the related concept, terrorism. CENTIF processes financial information with a view to combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism	A. Government B. Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, Court for the Suppression of Economic Crimes and Terrorism, National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF), Penitentiary Agency of Benin C. Republican police
	Law No. 2020-07 of February 17, 2020 amending and supplementing Law No. 2001-07 of August 27, 2002 on the organization of the judiciary in the Republic of Benin as amended by Law No. 2018-13 of July 2, 2018 relating to the Court repression of economic crimes and terrorism	Legislative	National	A. 2019 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2018	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE but related concepts. This framework relates to the judicial organization, the repression of economic offenses and terrorism and related offenses including VE	A. Parliament B. Ministry of justice, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, courts and tribunals, Penitentiary Agency of Benin C. republican police
	Law No. 2018-16 of June 4, 2018 on the Criminal Code in the Republic of Benin amending and supplementing Law No. 2012-15 of March 18, 2013 on the Code of Criminal Procedure	Legislative	National	A. 2013 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2018	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Gives a definition of terrorism	A. Parliament B. Ministry of justice, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, courts and tribunals C. republican police
	<b>3. General peace policies and structures</b>					
	Decree No. 2021-316 of June 16, 2021 creating a post of High Commissioner for the sedentarization of stockbreeders	Regulatory	National	A. 2021 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2021	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not explicitly mention VE or related concepts (but may refer to them implicitly)	A. Office of the President B. Office of the President, High Commissioner for the sedentarization of Herders, Associations of Transhumant Herders and Farmers, CSOs, Communities, Prefectures and Communes C. Republican police, army, water, forests and hunting
	National Peace Coalition (CNP), Communal Peace Committees (CCP) and Departmental Peace Committees (CDP) (2011)	Administration	National and subnational	A. 2011 B. Finalized C. Established in 2011	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not incorporate related concepts. Has as mission to ensure the watch for the preservation of peace in Benin. Decentralized mechanism, with today 77 CCPs and 6 CDPs	A. High Commission for Collaborative Governance B. National Peace Coalition (CNP), Communal Peace Committees (CCP) and Departmental Peace Committees (CDP) C. All DSF

4. Institutions and mechanisms of interest or relevant to PVE						
BENIN	Permanent Secretariat of the National Commission for the Fight against Radicalization, VE and Terrorism (CNLCREVT) (2016)	Administration	National	A. 2016 B. In process C. ...	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions VE and related concepts. Institution in charge of defining the strategy for preventing and combating terrorism, radicalism and VE and overseeing its implementation	A. Government B. Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, municipalities, communities C. Republican police
	National Defence and Security Council (CNDS)	Administration	National	A. 2019 B. In process C. Not yet operationalized by an implementing decree clarifying its operation	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions the fight against terrorism. The CNDS is the organization that assists the Head of State, responsible for national security in terms of responses to major crises, including those related to terrorism and VE.	A. Government B. Office of the President, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, Military High Command C. All DSF
	National Intelligence Council (CNR)	Administration	National	A. 2020 B. In process C. ...	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts. The CNR is the umbrella intelligence coordination structure. It assists the Head of State in matters of intelligence, defines the strategies and priorities assigned to services including those in charge of PVE, the fight against serious threats including terrorism, organized crime, etc.	A. Office of the President B. Office of the President, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Justice, Directorate of Liaison and Documentation Services, Penitentiary Agency of Benin, ordinary and special courts and tribunals C. Republican police, Army
	Decree No. 2020-068 of February 12, 2020 on the creation, missions and composition of the Committee responsible for monitoring national territory security missions	Regulatory	National	A. 2020 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2020	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE and related concepts but guides the committee in its missions on reducing the causes of radicalization and VE generated by the FDS themselves	A. Office of the President B. Office of the President, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security C. Republican police, Army, customs, Waters, forests and hunting, Municipal police
	Decree No. 2019-519 of November 22, 2019 on the creation, powers and composition of the High Level Committee in charge of the fight against terrorism and insecurity at the borders  Decree No. 2019-520 of November 22, 2019 on the creation, powers and composition of the Implementation	Regulatory	National	A. 2019 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2019	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions VE, terrorism and prevention of insecurity. The Committee develops the strategy and carries out actions to combat VE and border insecurity. The Unit's mission is to implement the actions decided by the committee to strengthen the PVE at the borders, react to all forms of attacks related to the VE	A. Office of the President B. Office of the President, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Beninese Agency for Integrated Border Management (ABÉGIEF) C. Republican police, Army, Customs

BENIN	Unit for the Strategy to Combat VE, Terrorism and Insecurity at the Borders					
	Decree No. 2014-418 of August 4, 2014 establishing the National Terrorism Analysis and Intelligence Unit (CNART)	Regulatory	National	A. 2014 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2014	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Integrates intelligence on terrorism and related crimes	A. Government B. Office of the President, Ministry of economy and finance, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of foreign affairs, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security C. Republican police, Army
	Order No. 2012-143/MISPC/MDGLAAT/DC/SGM/DGPN/SA of August 10, 2012 on the creation, powers, organization and operation of local security committees in the Republic of Benin	Regulatory	National and subnational	A. 2012 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2012	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE and related concepts. Created in the 546 boroughs, these committees function as local frameworks for consultation and decision-making on safety	A. Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Decentralization B. Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, Ministry of Decentralization, prefectures, town halls and arrondissements C. republican police
	Law No. 2012-36 of December 17, 2012 establishing the Beninese Human Rights Commission (CBDH)	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2012	A. Does not integrate PVE, but is in charge of preventing any kind of human rights violation B. Does not mention VE and related concepts	A. National Assembly B. The Beninese Human Rights Commission (CBDH) C. All DSF
	Law No. 2009-22 of August 11, 2009 establishing the Mediator of the Republic of Benin	Legislative	National	A. 2004 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2009	A. Does not integrate PVE, but receives complaints about state services that may be causes of VE B. Does not explicitly mention VE or related concepts (but may refer to them implicitly)	A. Government B. Office of the President, Government, CSOs, civil servants, communities, citizens C. All DSF
	National Association of Communes of Benin (ANCB), registered under n° 2004/0087/DEP-ATL-LIT/SG/SAG/ASSOC of March 05, 2004	Associative	National	A. 2003 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2004	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE and related concepts	A. National Association of Communes of Benin (ANCB) B. Municipalities, communities, prefectures, technical and financial partners, CSOs, all local actors C. No mention
	Decree No. 2000-106 of March 9, 2000 on the creation, composition, organization and functioning of the National Commission for the Fight against the Proliferation of Light Weapons	Regulatory	National	A. 1999 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2000	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE and related concepts	A. Office of the President B. Office of the President, Government, CSOs specialized in the culture of peace, communities, prefectures and communes C. All DSF
	Center for Training in Local Administration (CeFAL)	Administration	National	A. ... B. Operational C. ...	A. Does not integrate PVE, but could play a role there as a center responsible for training local, municipal and municipal	A. Ministry of Decentralization B. Ministry of Decentralization, Center for Training in Local Administration



<b>BENIN</b>					<p>elected officials and town hall executives on the themes of security, territorial intelligence, local governance and administration of municipalities</p> <p>B. Does not mention VE and related concepts</p>	<p>(CeFAL), prefectures, municipalities and local districts</p> <p>C. No mention</p>
	Commission for Foreign Relations and Development Cooperation, Defence and Security of the National Assembly	Parliamentary	National	<p>A. 2017</p> <p>B. Finalized</p> <p>C. Adopted in 2020</p>	<p>A. Does not integrate PVE</p> <p>B. Does not mention VE and related notions</p>	<p>A. Parliament</p> <p>B. Parliament, Government, citizens, CSOs</p> <p>C. All DSF</p>

### 3.2. BURKINA FASO

**Analysis of opportunities for the ENP – Burkina Faso:** The reform of the security sector initiated since 2017 is based on a new holistic dimension of national security, which extends to all of national life. In this configuration, if the old policies did not integrate the concept of PVE, the new ones give it a prominent place. The National Strategy for the Prevention of Radicalization and the Fight against Violent Extremism (SNPREV), Adopted in August 2022, the National Strategy for Social Cohesion (SNSC), the National Strategy for the Recovery of Internally Displaced Persons (SNRPDI) are examples. With the aim of ensuring consistency, the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (SNCT) takes into account all the strategies contributing to the PVE and the fight against terrorism. This new referential constitutes an opportunity for engagement of the DSF in PVE, insofar as the objective is to mobilize diversified responses to the root causes of the threats. For example, Strategic Axis 2.3 of the SNRPDI deals specifically with bringing DSF closer to displaced populations through (i) the implementation of military security operations; (ii) stabilization of reclaimed areas; (iii) the operationalization of community policing; and (iv) the return and maintenance of public administration. The action of the DSF could thus progressively integrate the PVE, even more so if PVE was included in their curricula. The new National Security Policy (NSP) of 2021, as well as the structure that will carry it, will also be opportunities to ensure a horizontal and vertical integration of PVE into policy frameworks and operations of DSF.

BURKINA FASO

Existing frameworks	Type of framework	Scope (national, subnational, regional, etc.)	A. Start Date of drafting process B. Status (underway, finalised, aborted, etc.) C. Date of adoption	A. Integrates or not PVE B. Reference or not to EV and/or related concepts (e.g. radicalisation, terrorism) and terminology used	A. Institution(s) responsible of drafting B. Institution(s) responsible of implementation and linked stakeholders C. DSF concerned by the framework
<b>1. Defence and security policies (including curricula)</b>					
Draft Law on the General Organization of National Security	Legislative	National	A. 2021 B. Finalized C. Not yet Adopted	A. Does not integrate PVE, but article 14 deals with human security B. Mentions VE and related concepts	A. Group of experts, General Secretariat for National Defence (SGDN) B. Ministry of Defence, Ministry of territorial administration, decentralization and security C. All DSF
Draft National Security Strategy (NSS)	Policy	National	A. 2020 B. Finalized C. Not yet Adopted	A. Does not integrate PVE but considers the notion of human security (pillar III) B. Mentions VE and related concepts	A. Group of experts, General Secretariat for National Defence (SGDN) B. Not yet designated (will probably be carried by the new National Security Secretariat located at the Office of the President)



BURKINA FASO	National Security Policy (NSP) (2021)	Policy	National	A. 2019 B. Finalized C. Adoption by ministerial decree in 2021	A. Provides for the national PVE strategy, particularly in the sectoral declination mechanism B. Mentions external aggressions, terrorist attacks and VE	C. All DSF A. Multisector Committee, General Secretariat for National Defence (SGDN) B. Not yet designated (will probably be supported by a new structure that will emerge from the new National Security organization) C. All DSF
	Law No. 002-2020/AN of January 21, 2020 establishing Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP)	Legislative	National	A. 2019 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2020	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. National Assembly B. Department of Defence C. The MSDS set
	Decree No. 2015-1149 of October 16, 2015 establishing the National Defence and Security Council (CDSN)	Regulatory	National	A. 2015 B. Operational C. Adopted in 2015	A. Does not integrate PVE, but cites (art. 2) the prevention and management of actions or crisis situations likely to harm national interests B. Does not mention VE or related concepts, which may be implicitly included in Article 2	A. Office of the President B. Several ministries (17) C. All DSF
	National Internal Security Strategy (2010)	Policy	National	A. 2010 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2010	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Refers to terrorism	A. Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security (MATDS) B. Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security, Ministry of the Environment, Ministry of Finance C. All DSF
	Decree No. 2005-025/PRES/PM/SECU/MATD/DEF/MJ of January 31, 2005 on the organization of law enforcement in Burkina Faso	Regulatory	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2005	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention EV or related concepts	A. Office of the President B. administrative police C. National Police, Departmental Gendarmerie, Mobile Gendarmerie, Armed Forces when legally required
	Law No. 32-2003/AN of May 14, 2003 relating to internal security	Legislative	National	A. 2003 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2003	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions terrorism (Title II art. 6) and the prevention of insecurity (art. 6)	A. National Assembly B. Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security (MATDS), Ministry of Customary and Religious Affairs C. All DSF
	<b>Curriculum frameworks</b>					
No relevant information collected						

2. Policies and strategies related to VE and terrorism (and their prevention)						
BURKINA FASO	National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (SNCT) and its action plan 2021-2023 (2022)	Policy	National	A. 2021 B. In process of finalization C. Priority areas Adopted in the Council of Ministers in October 2021	A. Aggregates the entire SNPREV B. The action plan mentions radicalization and VE	A. National Center for Strategic Studies (CNES) B. Government C. All DSF
	Joint Order No. 2022-0011 MCSRN-MEPT of July 25, 2022 adopting the National Strategy for the Prevention of Radicalization and the Fight against Violent Extremism (SNPREV) 2021-2025 and its Action Plan (2022)	Policy	National	A. 2018 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2022	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions VE and related concepts	A. Ministry of National Reconciliation and Social Cohesion (MRNCS), Ministry of Economy, Finance and Foresight B. Ministry of National Reconciliation and Social Cohesion (MRNCS), with other ministries, including Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security (MATDS), Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs (MDAC), Ministry of Religious and Worship Affairs (MARC), Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Education National Literacy and Promotion of National Languages (MENAPLN), Ministry of Economy, Finance and Foresight C. All DSF
	Law n° 006-2017/AN of January 19, 2017 on the creation, organization and functioning of a judicial center specialized in the repression of acts of terrorism	Legislative	National	A. 2017 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2017	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Speaks of an act of a terrorist nature	A. National Assembly B. High Court Ouaga II C. Territorially competent judicial police officers and agents
	Law No. 016-2016/AN of May 3, 2016 on the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism	Legislative	National	A. 2015 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2016	A. Integrates the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (Title II) B. Gives a definition of terrorism in its article 1	A. National Assembly B. Taxable persons (public treasury, BCEAO, financial institutions) C. Internal Security Forces
	Law No. 060-2009/AN of December 17, 2009 on the suppression of acts of terrorism	Legislative	National	A. 2015 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2015	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Defines the act of terrorism	A. National Assembly B. Justice C. Internal Security Force
	3. General peace policies and structures					
Decree No. 2022-0117/PRES-TRANS/PM of April 13, 2022	Regulatory	National and subnational	A. 2022 B. Created	A. Does not explicitly integrate the ENP, but practically contributes to it	A. Ministry of National Reconciliation and Social Cohesion (MRNCS)	

BURKINA FASO	establishing the National Coordination of local dialogue committees for the restoration of peace			C. In process of operationalization	B. Mentions terrorism	B. The coordination C. All DSF	
	National Reconciliation Strategy (SNR) and its action plan 2022-2026 (2022)	Policy	National	A. 2021 B. Finalized C. Validated in 2022	A. Does not integrate PVE, but practically contributes to it B. Mentions the concepts of conflict prevention and management	A. Minister of State for Social Cohesion and National Reconciliation B. Leadership of the Ministry of Social Cohesion and National Reconciliation; other ministries according to strategic objectives C. No mention	
	National Social Cohesion Strategy (SNCS) (2022)	Policy	National	A. 2021 B. Finalized C. Validation on June 16, 2022	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions prevention of radicalization and VE	A. Minister of State for Social Cohesion and National Reconciliation B. Leadership of the Ministry of Social Cohesion and Reconciliation National, other ministries depending on strategic objectives C. All DSF	
	Draft National Strategy for the Recovery of Internally Displaced Persons (SNRDPI)	Policy	National	A. 2021 B. In project C. Not yet Adopted in	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions conflict prevention and peacebuilding	A. Minister of State for Social Cohesion and National Reconciliation B. Leadership of the Ministry of Social Cohesion and Reconciliation National, other ministries depending on strategic objectives C. All DSF	
	Decree No. 2015-1397 PRES-TRAN of November 26, 2015 promulgating Law No. 074-2015/CNT of November 06, 2015 on the creation, attribution, composition, organization and functioning of the High Council for Reconciliation and National Unity (HCRUN)	Regulatory	National	A. 2015 B. Operational C. Adopted in 2015	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions serious human rights violations of a political nature	A. Office of the President B. Executive Committee of the High Council for Reconciliation and National Unity (HCRUN) C. All DSF	
	<b>4. Institutions and mechanisms of interest or relevant to the ENP</b>						
	Decree No. 2020-0175 PRES/PM/MDNAC/MINEFID of February 27, 2020 establishing the National Center for Strategic Studies (CNES)	Regulatory	National	A. 2019 B. Operational C. Creation 2020	A. Integrates PVE B. Some activities of the center address VE	A. Office of the President B. Department of Defence C. All DSF	
	Decree No. 2015-1645 PRE/TRANS/PM/MJDHPC/MATD/MEF of December 28, 2015 on the creation and	Regulatory	National	A. 2015 B. Operational C. Adopted in 2016	A. Does not integrate PVE, uses the term community conflict instead B. Same	A. Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Civic Promotion B. Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security	

BURKINA FASO	attribution of a National Observatory for the Prevention and Management of Community Conflicts					(MATDS), Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), National Institutions and CSOs C. No mention
	Special Intervention Unit of the National Gendarmerie (USIGN) governed by Decree No. 2005-025/PRES/PM/SECU/MATD/DEF/MJ of January 31, 2005 on the organization of law enforcement in Burkina Faso	Regulatory	National	A. 2013 B. Created C. Functional since 2013	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions the fight against terrorism	A. Department of Defence B. National Gendarmerie C. Gendarmerie
	Decree No. 2005-245/PRES/PM/SECU/DEF/MATD/MFB/MPDH of 12 May 2005 on the creation, composition, powers and operation of Local Security Committees (CLS)	Regulatory	National and subnational	A. 2005 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2005	A. Does not specifically mention PVE but includes related actions B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Office of the President B. Several ministries (notably Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs, Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security) C. All DSF
	General Secretariat of National Defence (SGDN)	Administrati on	National	A. ... B. Operational C. ...	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Primature B. Primature, SGDN C. All DSF
	Law No. 001-2016/AN of March 24, 2016 establishing the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH)	Legislative	National	A. 2001 B. Finalized C. Functional since 2001, the CNDH was reformed in 2015 and 2016	A. Integrates PVE B. Integrates all related concepts	A. Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Civic Promotion B. Ministry of Justice Human Rights Civic Promotion C. No mention
	Organic Law No. 22/94/ADP of May 17, 1994 establishing a Mediator of Faso	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 1994	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE and related concepts	A. Office of the President B. Mediator of Faso C. No mention
	National School of Administration and Magistracy (ENAM)	Administrati on	National	A. ... B. Operational C. ...	A. Does not integrate PVE, but could play a role in it as a school responsible for training magistrates, local elected officials and staff of local authorities B. Does not mention VE and related concepts	A. Ministry of Decentralization B. Ministry of Decentralization, National School of Administration and Magistracy (ENAM), central and local administrations, local elected officials and staff of local authorities C. No mention
	Defence and Security Committee (CODES) of the National Assembly	Parliamentary	National	A. ... B. Operational C. ...	A. Integrates all security dimensions insofar as the question is submitted to them B. Same	A. National Assembly B. Defence and Security Committee of the National Assembly C. All DSF

### 3.3. IVORY COAST

**Analysis of opportunities for the ENP – Côte d'Ivoire:** The main frameworks dealing with PVE, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) and its action and implementation plan (pending adoption by the executive branch), consider prevention in terms of identifying propaganda channels and methods and ways to develop a counter-narrative to this propaganda used by VE groups to attract and recruit youth and other vulnerable people. While prevention is mentioned in these documents however, the scope of the link between DSF and PVE is hardly addressed, due to the specific focus of the documents. For the time being, therefore, the approach of the DSF remains anticipatory with a focus on intelligence rather than a real analytical dialogue fostering collaboration between the DSF and the population in a constructed prevention work. The future Strategy does not provide a framework for promoting DSF's PVE role, which is increasingly recognized as central, and the leadership and political framework for strengthening such a role have yet to be established. An operational opportunity does exist, however, through the Departmental Security Committees (DSCs), the Civil-Military Cells (CCMs) or the Ethics Advisory Committees (EACs), which, if they are effectively equipped, could play an important role in this regard.

IVORY COAST	Existing frameworks	Type of framework	Scope ( <i>national, subnational, regional, etc.</i> )	A. Start Date of drafting process B. Status ( <i>underway, finalised, aborted, etc.</i> ) C. Date of adoption	A. Integrates or not PVE B. Reference or not to VE and/or related concepts (e.g. radicalisation, terrorism) and terminology used	A. Institution(s) responsible of drafting B. Institution(s) responsible of implementation and linked stakeholders C. DSF concerned by the framework
	1. Defence and security policies (including curricula)					
	Law No. 2016-10 of January 13, 2016 on military programming 2016 to 2020	Legislative	National	A. 2015 B. Finalized C. Adopted in January 2016, still in application	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention EV or related concepts, being a law relating to the structural organization of the Army	A. National Security Council (CNS), Ministry of State, Ministry of Defense B. Ministry of State, Ministry of Defense C. All DSF
	Inter-Army Doctrine (IAD)	Operational	National	A. 2020 B. In process of elaboration C. ...	A. Does not integrate PVE, but the objective is to bring the Army closer to the communities, so that it is not (seen as) an aggravating factor of VE B. Does not mention EV or related concepts	A. Army General Staff B. InterArmys Operational Center (COIA) - Internship Employment Division C. Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FACI)
	Circular note n° 4701/MEMIS/DGPN/CAB of	Regulatory	National and subnational	A. ... B. Finalized	A. Does not integrate PVE, but invites National Police officers to create a	A. National Police General Directorate

IVORY COAST	October 08, 2013 on the creation of Consultative Ethics Committees (CCE)			C. Signed in 2013	framework for dialogue and trust with the populations, through Advisory Ethics Committees (CCE) B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	B. National Police (Deputy Directors General, Police Prefects, District Heads, Heads of Police Departments), population C. National Police
	<b>Curriculum frameworks</b>					
	InterArmys Command Center (COIA) Human Rights (DH) Training Modules (2017)	Operational	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. In application since 2017	A. Does not explicitly integrate PVE B. Initial training on human rights in schools and training centers for officers and non-commissioned officers and awareness-raising in units	A. InterArmy Command Center (COIA) B. InterArmys Command Center (COIA) , Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FACI ) C. Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FACI )
	<b>2. Policies and strategies related to VE and terrorism (and their prevention)</b>					
	National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (SNLT) and its action and implementation plan	Policy	National	A. 2016-2017 B. Strategy Finalized; action and implementation plan pending finalization C. Strategy awaiting adoption by the executive (CNS and Government)	A. Integrates PVE (Provides introduction of the issue of VE in school and university curricula) B. Mentions and defines terrorism	A. National Security Council (CNS), National Intelligence Coordination (CNR), CSOs B. National Security Council (CNS), various ministries, CSOs C. All DSF
	Law No. 2019-574 of June 26, 2019 on the Penal Code	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2019	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not deal with VE, terrorism or related concepts	A. Ministry of Justice and Human Rights B. Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (magistrates, judicial police officers) C. All DSF
	Law No. 2018-864 of November 19, 2018 amending Law No. 2015-493 of July 07, 2015 on the suppression of terrorism	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2018	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Deals with individual terrorist, terrorist organizations, groups of terrorists	A. Office of the President B. Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, population C. All DSF
Educational kit (2018)	Operational	National	A. Prepared from December 18 to 21, 2017 B. Finalized (January 2018) C. Broadcasted from January 2018	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Defines and raises awareness on radicalization	A. National Intelligence Coordination (CNR), Directorate of General Intelligence, university researchers and Muslim religious guides B. National Intelligence Coordination (CNR), Directorate of General Intelligence, DSF, prefectural corps, magistrates, CSOs C. All SDSs	

IVORY COAST	Framework Document for the Implementation of the Action Plan against Terrorism (PACT) (2015)  [Access limited to relevant actors only]	Operational	National	A. Elaborated in 2015 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2015	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions terrorism	A. Ministry of State, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and Security, National Intelligence Coordination B. Ministry of Defence, Interministerial Council for the Fight against Terrorism (CILAT) C. All DSF
	<b>3. General peace policies and structures</b>					
	No relevant information collected					
	<b>4. Institutions and mechanisms of interest or relevant to PVE</b>					
	Ordinance No. 2021-431 of September 08, 2021 establishing an International Counter-Terrorism Academy (AILCT)	Legislative	Regional	A. ... B. Finalized C. Inaugurated in 2021	A. Integrates PVE B. Training academy that covers all aspects of the fight against terrorism	A. Ministry of State, Ministry of Defense B. Ministry of State, Ministry of Defence, DSF, magistrates, intelligence services C. All DSF
	Decree No. 2021-436 of September 08, 2021 on the organization and operation of the International Academy for the Fight against Terrorism (AILCT)	Regulatory				
	Order No. 2019-001 of September 17, 2019 of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization on the creation, composition, attribution and functioning of Departmental Security Committees (CDS)	Regulatory	National and subnational	A. ... B. Finalized C. Circulated in 2019	A. Does not integrate PVE, but talks about local security diagnostics (DLS) B. Does not mention VE or terrorism but has the mission of working to strengthen relations between the DSF and the populations; 108 departmental CDS and civil -military cells (CCM)	A. Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization B. Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, Prefects and Sub-Prefects C. All DSF
Decree No. 2016-122 of March 2, 2016 establishing the National Center for Coordination of the Early Warning Response Mechanism (CNCMR)	Regulatory	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Inaugurated on May 24, 2018	A. Integrates PVE B. Does not mention VE or terrorism but related concepts relating to 05 themes: environment, governance, security, crime and health	A. ECOWAS, authorities ivorian B. Steering Committee, Ministry of State, Ministry of Defense C. All DSF	
Law No. 2018-900 of November 30, 2018 on the creation, powers, organization and functioning of the National Human Rights Council (CNDH)	Legislative  Regulatory	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2018 and 2019 respectively	A. Does not integrate PVE, but provides in particular human rights training for the DSF and the National Intelligence Coordination B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Government, Parliament B. CNDH Central Commission, public institutions, DSF, CSOs, communities C. All DSF	



	Decree No. 2019-165 of February 27, 2019 appointing the members of the CNDH Central Commission					
IVORY COAST	Decree No. 2012-786-08 August 2012 on the creation, attribution, organization and functioning of the National Security Council (CNS)	Regulatory	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2012	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Office of the President B. National Security Council C. All DSF
	Decree No. 2009-154 of April 30, 2009 establishing the National Commission to Combat the Proliferation and Illicit Circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (ComNat -CI)	Regulatory	National	A. .... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2009	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Integrates the fight against terrorism	A. Ministry of State, Ministry of Defense B. ComNat-CI, Ministry of State, Ministry of Defence, DSF, magistrates, intelligence services C. All DSF
	Defense and Security Commission of the National Assembly	Parliamentary	National	A. ... B. Operational C. ...	A. Does not integrate PVE, but carries out "deputy rounds" to sensitize border populations against VE and terrorism B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. National Assembly B. Defense and Security Commission of the National Assembly, DSF, populations C. All DSF



### 3.4. GHANA

**PVE Opportunity Analysis – Ghana:** The National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET) is based on four pillars of prevention, anticipation, protection and response, laying DSFs as key stakeholders in its implementation. However, this framework assigns a limited role to the DSF in matters of PVE. An action plan for the implementation of NAFPCVET has been developed this year (2022) and is awaiting validation. However, even if the framework provides for spaces for collaboration between the DSF, political actors, parliamentarians, populations, CSOs and research organizations, these spaces for collaboration remain *ad hoc* and the links between the DSF and these different actors are not clearly defined. It should be noted, however, that the concept of decentralized security is a major asset in SDF's implementation of these documents. At the top of the security architecture is the National Security Council (NSC), which has regional and district branches. This structure, as well as the Community Policing Units (CPUs), are important tools for monitoring the security situation and anticipating the threat with the collaboration of the population. Lastly, a particularity of Ghana is the existence of a formal peace architecture, the National Peace Council (NPC), at the central level as well as in all regions and districts, which is also responsible for the implementation of the NAFPCVET and can contribute to the mobilization of DSF in PVE.

GHANA

Existing frameworks	Type of framework	Scope ( <i>national, subnational, regional, etc.</i> )	A. Start Date of drafting process B. Status ( <i>underway, finalized, aborted, etc.</i> ) C. Date of adoption	A. Integrates or not PVE B. Reference or not to EV and/or related concepts (e.g. radicalization, terrorism) and terminology used	A. Institution(s) responsible for drafting B. Institution(s) responsible for implementation and linked stakeholders C. DSF concerned by the framework
<b>1. Public defense and security policies (including training curricula)</b>					
National Security Strategy 2020, replacing the National Defense Policy 2012	Policy	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Signed in 2020, implementation from 2021	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions VE and terrorism	A. Ministry of National Security B. Ministry of National Security C. All DSF
Act. No. 1038 of December 29, 2020 on cybersecurity	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2020	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Terrorism defined in accordance with the Ghana Anti-Terrorism Act 2008 (Act 762)	A. Ministry of National Security B. Ministry of Communication C. All DSF
Act. No. 1030 of October 06, 2020 on the Security and Intelligence Agency, revising Act. No. 526 of December 30, 1996	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2021	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts, provides Administrative and legal advice on the operations of intelligence agencies	A. Ministry of National Security B. Ministry of Interior C. All DSF

GHANA	Security Governance Initiative (2014)	Operational	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2014	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts; multi-year regional program aimed at improving the governance and capacity of the security sector to deal with threats	A. Ministry of National Security B. Ministry of National Security C. All DSF	
	<i>Curriculum frameworks</i>						
	Education Manual "Preventing Violent Extremism in Ghana" (2019)	Operational	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2019	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions VE and terrorism	A. Ministry of National Security B. Same C. All DSF	
	<b>2. Policies and strategies related to VE and terrorism (and their prevention)</b>						
	National Framework for the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET) Action Plan	Policy	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. In validation process	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions VE, radicalization and terrorism	A. Ministry of National Security B. Same C. All DSF	
	National Framework for the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET) (2019)	Policy	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2019	C. Integrates PVE D. Mentions VE, radicalization and terrorism	A. Ministry of National Security B. Same C. All DSF	
	Act. No. 842 of April 16, 2012 on anti- terrorism policy, amending Law No. 762 of October 10, 2008	Legislative	National	A. .... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2012	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions and defines the terrorist act	A. Parliament B. Ministry of National Security, security agencies C. All DSF	
	Regulation No. LI 2183-2012 of June 14, 2012 on economic operations and the fight against organized crime	Regulatory	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2012	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions the prevention, detection and suppression of terrorism and its financing	A. Parliament B. Attorney General's Office, Ministry of National Security , Ministry of Interior C. All DSF	
	<b>3. General peace policies and structures</b>						
	Act. No. 818 of May 16, 2011 Establishing the National Peace Council (NPC)	Legislative	National and subnational	A. ... B. Finalized C. Established in 2011	A. Does not integrate PVE, but the Peace Council and its branches address the causes of conflict, which includes raising awareness of VE and terrorism B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Parliament B. Ministry of National Security (monitoring role), National Peace Council (NPC), Peace Mediation Committees, DSF, religious organizations, CSOs C. All DSF	
Peace Mediation Committees (2011)	Administration	Subnational	A. ... B. Created on an <i>ad hoc basis</i> by the National Peace Council	A. Does not integrate PVE, but Committees address causes of conflict, including VE and terrorism awareness	A. Parliament B. Ministry of National Security (monitoring role), Peace Mediation Committees, DSF, religious organizations, CSOs		

GHANA			C. Since 2011	B. Do not mention VE or related concepts	C. All DSF	
	<b>4. Institutions and mechanisms of interest or relevant to PVE</b>					
	National Anti-Terrorism Fusion Center of the Counter-Terrorism Department, governed by Law No. 1030 of October 06, 2020 on the Security and Intelligence Agency	Administration	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Created in 2019	A. Integrates PVE and coordination of PVE intelligence efforts B. Mentions VE and defines terrorism	A. Ministry of National Security B. Ministry of Interior C. All DSF
	Act. No. 759 of June 20, 2008 on Chieftaincy	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2008	A. Does not integrate PVE, however the chieftaincy is considered as a source of community resilience in the face of various conflicts B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Constitution, Parliament B. Parliament, chiefdoms C. Indirect role of the DSF (consultation and collaboration)
	Act. No. 736 of May 18, 2007 establishing the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2007	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions the fight against terrorism	A. Parliament B. The Commission C. All DSF
	Act. No. 456 of 6 July 1993 creating the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHARJ). Has in his functions also the role of Ombudsman of Ghana and anti-corruption agency	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 1993	A. Does not integrate PVE, but CHARJ focuses on human rights B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Constitution, Parliament B. independent institution C. All DSF
	National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) (1993)	Administration	National	A. ... B. Adopted in C. Established in 1993	A. Does not integrate PVE, but ensures through its civic programs a proactive deterrence of any terrorist intent or act B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Constitution, Parliament B. independent institution C. All DSF
	Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (1963)	Operational	National	A. ... B. Operational C. Created in 1963	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions security issues as a whole	A. Constitution, Parliament B. ministry of defense C. All DSF
	Parliamentary Commission for Defense and Interior (1992)	Parliamentary	National	A. ... B. Operational C. Created in 1992	A. Does not integrate PVE, but can contribute to it through the formulation of defense laws, internal laws and monitoring of security sector development B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Constitution, Parliament B. Parliament C. All DSF

### 3.5. NIGER

**Analysis of opportunities for the PVE – Niger:** There is a will and a commitment from the highest authorities in Niger to initiate multidimensional responses to VE, including through the PVE and civil-military dialogue. Niger has Adopted in 2021 a National Strategy for the Prevention of Radicalization and the Fight against Violent Extremism (SNPRLEV), but also for example, in 2022, a National Strategy for Local Security (SNSP) as a model for community-oriented security management. Structures such as the National Security Council (CNS), which has ramifications at regional and departmental level, the National Center for Strategic and Security Studies (CNESS), the National Center for Coordination of the Early Warning Mechanism and responses to security risks (CNAP), as well as the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace (HACP) and its local Peace Committees, are all levers for coordinated and effective PVE action, including between DSF and communities. This ability to work at the local level with a central political orientation is an advantage that Niger possesses and which it can make the most of to strengthen this DSF-population link. However, the consultations revealed a need for coordination and operational synergy between implementing structures, in order to rationalize and strengthen its effectiveness. There is also potential to be exploited on the side of the DSF, which are still too marginally involved in the PVE process, through the creation of an integrated multi-stakeholder space.

NIGER	Existing frameworks	Type of framework	Scope ( <i>national, subnational, regional, etc.</i> )	A. Start Date of drafting process B. Status ( <i>underway, finalized, aborted, etc.</i> ) C. Date of adoption	A. Integrates or not PVE B. Reference or not to EV and/or related concepts ( eg radicalization, terrorism) and terminology used	A. Institution(s) responsible for drafting B. Institution(s) responsible for implementation and linked stakeholders C. DSF concerned by the framework	
	1. Defense and security policies (including curricula)						
	Draft National Security Policy (NSP)	Policy	National	A. 2017 B. In validation phase C. Not yet adopted in	A. To be confirmed after publication B. Same	A. National Center for Strategic and Security Studies (CNESS) B. All national actors (Cabinet of the President of the Republic, key ministries, DSF, CSOs) C. Nigerien Armed Forces (FAN), National Gendarmerie (GN), National Police (PN), Niger National Guard (GNN), Civil Protection (PC), Municipal Police, prison staff, DGDSE etc.	
National Local Security Strategy 2022-2026 (SNSP) and its action plan (2022)	Policy	National	A. 2020 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2022	A. Indirectly integrates the PVE in that its objective is to contribute to the strengthening of trust and	A. Ministry of the Interior, Public Security, Decentralization and Customary and Religious Affairs		

NIGER					collaboration between the DSF and communities for better management of security issues B. Mentions VE and related concepts	B. Ministry of the Interior, Public Security, Decentralization and Customary and Religious Affairs, Populations C. security forces interior	
	National Internal Security Strategy (SNSI) and its 2020-2026 action plan, Adopted ins by decree of June 22, 2022 revising decree n° 2017-760/PRN/MISP/ACR of September 29, 2017	Policy ( with adoption by way of Regulatory )	National	A. 2017 updated in 2019 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2022	A. Indirectly integrates the PVE (strategic axis 1: measures Adopted ins to strengthen the prevention system, including local security strategies and local safety plans) B. Mentions VE, radicalization as well as terrorist recruitment	A. Ministry of the Interior and Decentralization, General Inspectorate of Security Services (IGSS) B. Internal security forces, civil society, traditional chiefs, religious leaders, population C. Interior security forces (National Police, National Guard, Civil Protection, National Gendarmerie)	
	<b>Curriculum frameworks</b>						
	No relevant information collected						
	<b>2. Policies and strategies related to VE and terrorism (and their prevention)</b>						
	Decree No. 2021-101/PRN/PM of February 12, 2021 adopting the National Strategy for the Prevention of Radicalization and the Fight against Violent Extremism (SNPREV) and its action plan	Policy (with adoption by regulatory way)	National	A. 2019 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2021	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions VE, radicalization, their factors	A. National Center for Strategic and Security Studies (CNESS) (development) and National Center for Coordination of the Early Warning and Security Risk Response Mechanism (CNAP) (Coordination of implementation) B. SNPREV Multisectoral Orientation and Steering Committee (CMOP), other public actors, CSOs, populations C. Nigerien Armed Forces (FAN), National Gendarmerie (GN), National Police (PN), Niger National Guard (GNN), Civil Protection (PC), Municipal Police, prison staff, DGDSE etc.	
Law No. 2018-86 of December 19, 2018 amending and supplementing Law No. 61-27 of July 15, 1961, establishing the Penal Code	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2018	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions terrorism (art. 399.1.17 punishes any act of participation in the organization, preparation or commission of a terrorist offense or any form of support (positive or negative) in the commission of a terrorist offence)	A. National Assembly B. ministry of justice C. All DSF		
Law n° 2016-33 of October 31, 2016, relating to the fight against	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2016	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions terrorism (condemns any act of providing or raising funds knowing	A. Ministry of justice, Ministry of finance / National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF)		

NIGER	money laundering and the financing of terrorism				that they will be used by a terrorist organization)	B. Ministry of justice, Ministry of finance / CENTIVE C. All DSF
	<b>3. General peace policies and structures</b>					
	National Action Plan of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda 2020-2024 (2020)	Policy	National	A. .... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2020	A. Does not specifically integrate the PVE, but integrates conflict prevention and management B. Does not mention EV or related concepts	A. Ministry for the Promotion of Women and the Protection of Children B. Ministry for the Promotion of Women and the Protection of Children, C. All DSF
	Decree No. 2011-217/PRN of July 26, 2011, organizing the services of the Office of the President and setting the powers of their managers, amended by Decree No. 2011-361 of August 24, 2011 and Decree No. 2011 -481/PRN of 04 October 2011 determining the powers of the President of the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace (HACP) and establishing the organization and functioning of the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace (HACP)	Regulatory	National	A. 2011 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2011	A. Integrates PVE (notably through civil - military actions, community policing, peace committees and training of DSF members on dialogue with communities and human rights) B. Mentions related concepts (terrorism, radicalization)	A. Office of the President B. High Authority for Peacebuilding (HACP) C. All DSF
	Communal peace committees set up by the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace (HACP) (2011)	Administration	Subnational	A. 2011 B. Operational (on an <i>ad hoc basis</i> ) C. Since 2011	A. Integrates PVE in that it is through these committees that the HACP has monitored the state of play at the national level B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. High Authority for Peacebuilding (HACP) B. High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace (HACP), Local Peace Committees, local authorities, populations C. All DSF
	<b>4. Institutions and mechanisms of interest or relevant to PVE</b>					
	Decree No. 2020-684/PRN/PM of September 04, 2020 amending and supplementing Decree No. 2020-184/PRN/PM of March 06, 2020, creating the National Center for Coordination of the Early Warning and Response Mechanism security risks (CNAP)	Regulatory	National and subnational	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2020	A. Does not integrate PVE as CNAP (but Integrates PVE as coordinating body of SNPREV) B. Mentions VE, terrorism, radicalization	A. Office of the President, Office of the Prime Minister B. Regional delegates appointed by order of the Prime Minister upon proposal of the Director; all ministries C. All DSF
	Decree No. 2017-516/PRN/MI/SP/D/ACR of June 16, 2017, on the organization of the General Inspectorate of Security	Regulatory	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2017	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention EV or related concepts	A. Ministry of the Interior, Public Security, Decentralization and Customary and Religious Affairs

NIGER	Services (IGSS) and setting the attributions of its managers					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>B. Ministry of the Interior, Public Security, Decentralization and Customary and Religious Affairs</li> <li>C. security forces interior</li> </ul>
	Order No. 2017-0246/MJ/GS/DGA/DAP/G of September 8, 2017 establishing the National Coordination Committee for the Fight against Terrorism, the Financing of Terrorism and Violent Extremism	Administration	National	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. ...</li> <li>B. Finalized</li> <li>C. Adopted in 2017</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Does not integrate PVE</li> <li>B. Mentions EV , terrorism, financing of terrorism , , transnational crime</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. ministry of justice</li> <li>B. Public prosecutor, presidents and investigating judges of specialized centres, director of the central anti-terrorist service, director of the judicial police, Nigerien Armed Forces ( FAN), National Gendarmerie (GN), National Police (PN), National Guard of Niger (GNN), Civil Protection (PC), Municipal Police, prison staff, DGDSE</li> <li>C. All DSF</li> </ul>
	Law n° 2014-57 of November 05, 2014 amending Law n° 2011-47 of December 14, 2011 determining the composition, powers and operating rules of the National Security Council (CNS)	Legislative	National and subnational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. ...</li> <li>B. Finalized</li> <li>C. Adopted in 2014 &amp; 2015</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Does not integrate PVE</li> <li>B. Does not mention VE or related concepts (These texts focus on the internal functioning of the CNS and also provide for its dismemberments at regional and departmental levels)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Office of the President</li> <li>B. Is chaired by the Office of the President; also includes: Chief of Staff of the Armies, High Commander of the National Gendarmerie, Special Chief of Staff of the President of the Republic, Director General of Documentation and External Security, High Commander of the National Guard of the Niger, Director General of the National Police, Security Advisor to the President of the Republic, President of the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace</li> <li>C. All DSF</li> </ul>
	<p>Decree No. 2015-12 of January 16, 2015, setting the terms of application of Law No. 2014-57 of November 5, 2014</p> <p>Order No. 2015-41/PRN of September 2, 2015 on the composition, organization and powers of the National Operational Center of the National Security Council (CNO-CNS)</p>	Regulatory  Regulatory				
Decree No. 2015-013/PRN of January 16, 2015 establishing the National Center for Strategic and Security Studies (CNESS)	Legislative	National	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. ...</li> <li>B. Finalized</li> <li>C. Adopted in 2015</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Does not integrate PVE, but the CNESS piloted the development of the National Strategy for the prevention of radicalization and the fight against VE</li> <li>B. Mentions VE and related concepts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Office of the President</li> <li>B. Minister of the Interior, Minister of National Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister, Rectors of public universities in Niger, Director General of the National School of Administration (ENA)</li> <li>C. All DSF</li> </ul>	



NIGER	Law No. 2011-18 of August 8, 2011 establishing a Mediator of the French Republic	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2011, completed in 2013	A. Does not explicitly integrate PVE, but develops conflict prevention strategies in areas affected by VE B. Does not mention VE or related notions	A. National Assembly B. The Mediator C. All DSF
	National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH), provided for by article 44 of the Constitution of November 25, 2010	Administrati on	National	A. ... B. Operational C. Adopted in 2010	A. Does not integrate PVE, but focuses on human rights as a source of VE as well B. Does not mention EV or related concepts	A. National Assembly B. National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) C. All DSF
	Decree No. 94-195/PRN of November 28, 1994, revised by Decree No. 99/417/PCRN of October 8, 1999, establishing the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (CNCCAI)	Regulatory	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 1994	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions the fight against terrorism	A. Office of the President B. The Commission C. All DSF
	Defense and Security Committee of the National Assembly	Parliamentary	National	A. ... B. Operational C. ...	A. Does not integrate the PVE, but can contribute to it through the formulation of defense laws, internal laws and monitoring of the development of the security sector B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. National Assembly B. Defense and Security Committee of the National Assembly C. All DSF



### 3.6. SENEGAL

**Analysis of opportunities for PVE – Senegal:** At the time of the consultations, no explicit prevention framework existed. Actors made reference to the 2014 National Defence and Security Concept (CDSN), drafted to complement Law 70-23 of 1970 on the general organization of national defence. This official document is considered holistic in that it integrates a dimension of preemption and risk reduction; however, it is little known by actors, which weakens its scope. In the absence of an explicit prevention framework, certain milestones nevertheless provide for a gradual takeover of the PEV approach: for example, the concept of Army-Nation, which is at the heart of Senegal's defence and security doctrine, or the work of the Agency for Assistance to the Community Police (ASP), are developments that allow the DSF to project themselves into a mandate of service and protection of the population. The Emergency Program for the Modernization of Border Areas and Territories (PUMA), which promotes the principle of territorial equity, is part of the same awareness of the need to address the vulnerabilities of the neglected peripheries of the national territory. The Centre des Hautes Etudes de Défense et de Sécurité (CHEDS) is also working to raise awareness among DSF of the PVE approach. Finally, the Senegalese authorities have initiated a process to develop a National Strategy for the Prevention and Fight against Terrorism, which presents an opportunity to solidly integrate the PVE dimension and give it a more strategic focus.

SENEGAL

Existing frameworks	Type of framework	Scope ( <i>national, subnational, regional, etc.</i> )	D. Start Date of drafting process E. Status _ ( <i>underway, finalized, aborted, etc.</i> ) F. Date of adoption	C. Integrates or not PVE D. Reference or not to VE and /or related concepts ( eg radicalization, terrorism) and terminology used	D. Institution(s) responsible of drafting E. Institution(s) responsible for implementation and associated stakeholders F. DSF concerned by the framework
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#### 1. Defence and security policies (including curricula)

National Defence and Security Concept (CDSN) (2014)	Policy	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2014	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions terrorism _	A. Office of the President B. All DSF C. All DSF
Decree No. 2013-1152 of August 20, 2013 relating to the National Security Council (CNS)	Regulatory	National	A. .... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2013	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions terrorism and monitoring of national security and response to threats and crises	A. Office of the President B. Office of the President as well as CNS member institutions C. The MSDS set
Decree No. 2013-1063 of August 5, 2013 creating the Community Police Assistance Agency (ASP)	Regulatory	National and subnational	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2013	A. Does not explicitly integrate the PVE, however, some of its missions participate in it, in particular in the development of the national plan for the prevention and fight against	A. Assembly, Ministry of Defence B. Ministry of Justice (supervision), Ministry of the Interior C. National Police, National Gendarmerie, National Fire Brigade, Water, Forests and Hunting

SENEGAL					delinquency and its contribution to community policing B. Does not mention VE or related concepts		
	Law No. 2009-18 of March 9, 2009 relating to the status of National Police personnel	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2009	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions the fight against terrorism, organized crime and transnational organized crime	A. National Assembly B. Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior C. National Police	
	Decree No. 2001-753 of October 2, 2001 relating to the organization and attributions of the Superior Council for National Defence (CSDN)	Regulatory	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2001	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Study all problems relating to National Defence	A. Office of the President B. Office of the President as well as CSDN member institutions C. All DSF	
	Law No. 1994-44 of May 27, 1994 on the Code of Military Justice	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in May 1994	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Ministry of Armed Forces B. Ministry of Armed Forces C. The MSDS set	
	Law No. 70-23 on the general organization of National Defence	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in June 1970	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention EV and related concepts	A. National Assembly B. All DSF C. All DSF	
	<b>Curriculum frameworks</b>						
	Training program of the National Police Academy and continuing education	Operational	National	A. ... B. Operational C. ...	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Ministry of Interior B. Ministry of Interior C. Commissioners, inspectors, officers, non-commissioned officers and police auxiliaries	
	<b>2. Policies and strategies related to VE and terrorism (and their prevention)</b>						
	Draft National Strategy for the Prevention and Fight against Terrorism	Policy	National	A. 2021 B. In process of elaboration C. Not Adopted yet	A. Integrates PVE B. Mention terrorism and related concepts	A. Ministry of Justice, National Gendarmerie, National Police, Intelligence Services, National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF), Framework for Intervention and Coordination of Counterterrorism Operations (CICO) B. To be defined C. All DSF	
	Law No. 1965-60 of July 21, 1965 on the Penal Code, amended by Law No. 2016-29 of November 08, 2016	Legislative	National	D. ... E. Finalized F. Adopted in 2016	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions and defines terrorist acts	A. National Assembly B. Ministry of Justice C. All DSF	

SENEGAL	Law n° 2009-16 of March 02, 2009 relating to the fight against the financing of terrorism	Legislative	National	A. .... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2009	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions and defines the financing of terrorism	A. National Assembly B. National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF) C. All DSF
	3. General peace policies and structures					
	4. Institutions and mechanisms of interest or relevant to PVE					
	Decree No. 2016-946 of February 29, 2016 creating and setting the rules for the organization and operation of the Interministerial Intervention and Coordination Framework for Counter-Terrorist Operations (CICO)	Regulatory	National and subnational	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2016	A. Does not integrate PVE Adequate prevention and protection against terrorism B. Mentions terrorism, terrorist attacks, the fight against terrorism	A. Ministry of the Interior and Public Security B. Ministry of Interior, representative of ministries and heads of FDS, CICO at local level C. Army, National Gendarmerie, National Police, General Delegation for National Intelligence, National Fire Brigade
	Decree No. 2016-1543 of October 3, 2016 creating the Emergency Program for the Modernization of Border Axes and Territories (PUMA)	Regulatory	National and subnational	A. ... B. Created C. Adopted in 2016	A. Does not explicitly integrate PVE, but contributes to it by addressing vulnerabilities that may cause VE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Office of the President B. Ministry of Community Development, Social and Territorial Equity, National Coordinator of PUMA, representatives of the Office of the President, sectoral ministries, regional public services, and all other useful skills C. All DSF
	Decree No. 2003-388 of May 30, 2003 establishing the Anti-Terrorism Unit (CLAT)	Regulatory	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2003	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Prevent any terrorist action likely to be committed on or from national territory	A. Ministry of Interior B. Ministry of Interior C. Military personnel, gendarmes and police
	Order No. 009543 of October 20, 2000, establishing the National Commission to Combat the Proliferation and Illicit Circulation of Light Weapons in Senegal (COMNAT)	Regulatory	National	A. .... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2000	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions the fight against terrorism	A. Primature B. The Commission C. All DSF
	Law No. 97-04 of March 10, 1997 establishing the Senegalese Human Rights Committee (CSDH)	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 1997	A. Does not integrate PVE, but its mission is to promote and protect HR whose violations can be causes of VE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. National Assembly B. independent institution C. All DSF
Law No. 99-04 of January 29, 1999 establishing a Mediator of the French Republic	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 1999	A. Does not integrate PVE, but receives complaints about state services that may be causes of VE	A. National Assembly B. independent institution C. All DSF	



SENEGAL					B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	
	Defence and Security Commission of the National Assembly	Parliamentary	National	A. ... B. Operational C. ...	A. Does not integrate PVE, but can contribute to it through the formulation of defence laws, internal laws and monitoring of security sector development B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. National Assembly B. Defence and Security Committee of the National Assembly C. All DSF

### 3.7. TOGO

**Analysis of opportunities for PVE – Togo:** The process of operationalizing the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism (CIPLEV), created in 2019 and around which the preventive response is focused, is in its early stages. The Committee engages both the main regal ministries, two NGOs as well as two representatives of religious organizations. Set up by presidential decree, it embodies the expression of a political will to make the security response to the terrorist threat more flexible and to provide civilian alternatives that are sensitive to internal dynamics. The latter are collected, analyzed and relayed by the Prefectural Committees and the Communal Committees for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism (CP-PLEV and CC-PLEV). As of February 2021, Togo launched the elaboration of the National Strategy for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism (SNAPLEV) 2022-2026, for the benefit of the CIPLEV; it was validated on July 5, 2022. One of the major actions planned by the SNAPLEV is the strengthening of the capacities of the defense and security forces (DSF) in the prevention of violent extremism. This is an affirmation of the Togolese state's desire to prevent the threats posed by VE groups through a differentiated approach, and this emphasis on the role of the DSF is innovative. This is an opportunity that must be seized by progressively building a culture and capacities in line with this political vision.

TOGO

Existing frameworks	Type of framework	Scope (national, subnational, regional, etc.)	G. Start Date of drafting process H. Status (underway, finalized, aborted, etc.) I. Date of adoption	E. Integrates or not PVE F. Reference or not to EV and/or related concepts (eg radicalization, terrorism) and terminology used	G. Institution(s) responsible for drafting H. Institution(s) responsible for implementation and linked stakeholders I. DSF concerned by the framework
<b>1. Defense and security policies (including curricula)</b>					
Law No. 2020-020 of December 24, 2020 on military programming 2021-2025	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2020	A. Does not integrate PVE B. General frame of reference of the traditional mission of the DSF. The provisions of the law apply in the event of terrorist attacks or the threat of terrorist actions	A. Ministry of Armies, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection B. Ministry of Armies, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, Ministry of Finance C. All DSF
Law No. 2019-009 of August 07, 2019 relating to internal security (LSI)	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2019	A. Does not integrate PVE B. The provisions of the law apply in the event of terrorist attacks or the threat of terrorist actions	A. Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Territorial Development, National Assembly B. Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Territorial Development, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, Ministry of Justice and Legislation

TOGO	Decree No. 2016-001/PR of January 13, 2016 on the reorganization of the National Gendarmerie	Regulatory	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2016	A. Does not integrate PVE B. The provisions of the law apply in the event of terrorist attacks or the threat of terrorist actions	C. All DSF A. Ministry of Armies, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection B. Ministry of Armies, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection C. National Gendarmerie
	Law No. 2016-008 of April 21, 2016 on the new Code of Military Justice	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2016	A. Does not integrate PVE B. The provisions of the law apply in the event of terrorist attacks or the threat of terrorist actions	A. Ministry of Justice and Legislation, Ministry of Armies, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, National Assembly B. Ministry of Justice and Legislation, Ministry of Armies, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection C. Togolese Armed Forces, National Police
	Law No. 2015-005 of July 28, 2015 on the special status of the National Police	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2015	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, National Assembly B. Ministry of Security and Civil Protection C. National Police
	Law No. 2015-010 of November 24, 2015 on the new Penal Code	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2015	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Lists terrorism-related offenses in its article 716	A. Ministry of Justice and Legislation, National Assembly B. Ministry of justice and legislation C. All DSF
	Decree No. 2015-129/PR of 24 December 2015 creating the operational reserve within the Togolese Armed Forces (FAT)	Regulatory	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2015	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Ministry of Armies B. Ministry of Armies, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection C. MSDS set
	Law No. 2007-010 on the general status of military personnel of the Togolese Armed Forces (FAT)	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized D. Adopted in 2007	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Ministry of Armies, National Assembly B. Ministry of Armies C. National Gendarmerie and Armed forces
	<b>Curriculum frameworks</b>					
Training module for officers, non-commissioned officers and police officers, National Police School (2015)	Operational	National	A. .. B. Operational C. In application since 2015	A. Does not directly integrate the ENP B. Definition of the terrorism and extremism concepts, driving factors for extremism, links between extremism and terrorism, radicalization	A. Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, National Police School B. Same C. National Police	
Doctrinal reference document on community policing for the use of trainers from National Police and Gendarmerie schools in Togo (2014)	Operational	National	A. ... B. Finalized D. Adopted in 2014	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Ministry of Security and Civil Protection B. Ministry of Security and Civil Protection D. National Police, National Gendarmerie	
<b>2. Policies and strategies related to VE and terrorism (and their prevention)</b>						
National Strategy for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism 2022-2026 (SNAPLEV) (2022)	Policy	National and subnational	A. 2021 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2022	A. Integrates PVE in that it aims to eradicate or significantly reduce the spread of VE by giving grassroots	A. Interministerial Committee for the Prevention and Combating of Violent Extremism (CIPLEV)	

TOGO				communities the tools and support they need to fight this scourge and to strengthen collaboration between them, local administration and DSF	B. CIPLEV and its dismemberments C. All DSF	
	Law n° 2018-004 of May 4, 2018 relating to the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2018	B. Mentions VE and related concepts A. Does not integrate PVE B. Defines the act terrorist	A. Ministry in charge of finance; National Assembly B. Ministry in charge of finance; Ministry of Security and Civil Protection C. Police; National Gendarmerie
	Law n° 2018-026 of December 07, 2018 on cybersecurity and the fight against cybercrime	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2018	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Defines cybercrime offenses and penalties	A. Ministry of Digital Economy and Digital Transformation, Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Territorial Development, National Assembly B. Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Territorial Development, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection C. National Police, National Gendarmerie
	<b>3. General peace policies and structures</b>					
	Decree No. 2013-040/PR of May 24, 2013 amended by Decree No. 2014-103/PR of April 3, 2014 establishing the High Commission for Reconciliation and Strengthening National Unity (HCRRUN)	Regulatory	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2008	A. Does not integrate PVE, but can contribute to it indirectly B. Does not mention VE and related concepts	A. Government B. High Commission for Reconciliation and Strengthening National Unity (HCRRUN), Government C. All DSF
<b>4. Institutions and mechanisms of interest or relevant to PVE</b>						
Decree No. 2019-076/PR of 15 May 2019 establishing the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism (CIPLEV), Prefectural Committees for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism (CP-PLEV) and cantonal committees for the prevention and fight against violent extremism (CC-PLEV)	Regulatory	National and subnational	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2019	A. Integrates PVE in that its primary mission is to work towards eradicating or substantially reducing the spread of VE by giving grassroots communities the tools and support they need to combat this scourge and to strengthen collaboration between them, the administration and the DSF for effective prevention and control B. Expressly mentions EV and related concepts	A. Ministry of Security and Civil Protection B. Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Territorial Development, Ministry of Finance, Ministry in charge of Grassroots Development, CIPLEV and its branches C. All DSF	

	Decree No. 2008-048/PR of May 7, 2008 on the creation, organization and functioning of the National Youth Council (CNJ) and regional, prefectural and municipal youth councils	Regulatory	National and subnational	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2008	A. Integrates PVE in that it constitutes a platform for raising awareness and citizen monitoring on issues of peace, social cohesion and PVE at the national level and in the regions B. Does not mention EV or related concepts	A. Ministry of Grassroots Development, Youth and Youth Employment B. Ministry of Grassroots Development, Youth and Youth Employment and its branches C. All DSF
	Decree No. 2001-098/PR of March 19, 2001 creating the National Commission to Combat the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLPAL)	Regulatory	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2001	A. Integrates PVE in its 2022 updated action plan to respond to new security challenges in the West African sub-region B. Mentions VE and related concepts	A. CNLPAL Permanent Secretariat B. CNLPAL Permanent Secretariat, Office of the President C. All DSF
	Armed Forces Officers School (EFOTAT) (1995)	Administration	National	A. ... B. Finalize C. Adopted in 1995	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Ministry of Armies B. Ministry of Armies, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection A. All DSF
TOGO	National Training Center (CNI) of the Togolese Armed Forces (FAT)	Administration	National	A. ... B. Operational C. ...	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Ministry of Armies B. Ministry of Armies, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection C. All DSF
	Organic law of March 30, 2021 amending organic law n° 2003-021 of December 09, 2003 on the status and powers of the Mediator of the French Republic and the composition, organization and functioning of his services	Legislative	National	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2021	A. Does not integrate the PVE, but receives complaints about state services that may constitute causes of the VE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Government B. Mediator, Office of the Mediator C. All DSF
	Law No. 87-09 of June 9, 1987 establishing the National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH), Organic Law of June 29, 2021 amending Organic Law No. 2018-006 of June 20, 2018 relating to the composition, organization and functioning of the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH)	Legislative	National and subnational	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 1987	A. Does not integrate PVE, but its main mission is to promote and protect HR whose violations can be causes of VE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts	A. Government B. CNDH, CNDH Secretariat C. All DSF
	Defense and Security Commission of the National Assembly	Parliamentary	National	A. ... B. Operational C. ...	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Vote of laws that can address the issue of PVE and terrorism	A. Assembly B. Defense and Security Commission of the National Assembly, all the ministries concerned C. All DSF



### 3.8. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS

**Analysis of opportunities for PVE – International and regional frameworks:** The primary framework of reference is the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2006 by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/288, a global instrument designed to support counter-terrorism efforts at the national, regional and international levels. The provisions examined for the seven countries covered by the study show that, at the international and regional levels, the fight against terrorism is clearly the main focus, with the prevention approach occupying only a minor place in the conventional, political or operational frameworks adopted by the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS and the various West African sub-regional organizations. A fortiori, overall, international and regional frameworks offer little framework for DSF engagement in an PVE approach. Joint military operations at the regional level, which are part of a counterterrorism rationale and were mentioned many times during the consultations, seem to be favored. Nevertheless, the interlocutors see two advantages: on the one hand, they believe that these are examples of cooperation between states that work, and on the other hand, these operations can pave the way and frame, even integrate, actions conducive to the PVE. In order to move forward in this direction, the consolidation of a common political vision favorable to the PVE will be crucial for the region.

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS

Existing frameworks	Type of framework	Scope (national, subnational, regional, etc.)	J. Start Date of drafting process K. Status (underway, finalized, aborted, etc.) L. Date of adoption	G. Integrates or not PVE H. Reference or not to EV and/or related concepts (eg radicalization, terrorism) and terminology used	J. Institution(s) responsible for drafting K. Institution(s) responsible for implementation and linked stakeholders L. DSF concerned by the framework
<b>A. United Nations (UN)</b>					
Resolution A/RES/60/288 on the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006)	Policy	International	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2006 and reviewed every two years. Report of the 7th <sup>revision</sup> June 2021	A. Integrates PVE B. Aims to strengthen national, regional and international efforts to combat terrorism.	A. United Nations General Assembly B. UN, States members C. All DSF
Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact (2018)	Policy	International	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2018	A. Integrates PVE in that it aims at the balanced implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy B. Same	A. United Nations General Assembly B. UN, States members C. All DSF
United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/71/291 establishing the Office of Counter-Terrorism (2017)	Operational	International	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2017	A. Integrates PVE in that it aims to help Member States implement the Counter-Terrorism Strategy but focuses on terrorism B. Same	A. United Nations General Assembly B. Counter Terrorism Bureau C. All DSF



Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Extremism (2015)	Policy	International	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2015	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions related concepts of countering terrorism and radicalization	A. United Nations General Assembly B. UN, States members C. All DSF
Resolution A/RES/66/10 establishing the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Center (2011)	Operational	International	A. .... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2011	A. Integrates PVE in that it contributes to the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy B. Integrates the fight against terrorism	A. United Nations General Assembly B. The United Nations Counterterrorism Center C. The MSDS set
Resolution A/RES/64/168 protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (2009)	Policy	International	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2009	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions the prevention and suppression of terrorism	A. United Nations General Assembly B. UN, Member States, Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights C. All DSF
Resolutions on measures to eliminate international terrorism	Policy	International	A. 1985 B. Finalized C. Regularly updated	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions the prevention and suppression of terrorism	A. United Nations General Assembly B. UN, States members C. All DSF
<b>B. African Union (AU)</b>					
African Charter of Values and Principles of Decentralization, Local Governance and Local Development (2014)	Policy	continental	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2014	A. Does not specifically integrate the PVE, but promotes inclusion, equity, equality (art. 10 and 11) B. Does not mention EV or related concepts	A. States AU members _ B. AU, States members C. All DSF
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2006)		continental	A. 2006 B. Finalized C. Adopted in and in force from 2012	A. Does not specifically include the PVE but support conflict prevention and resolution initiatives B. Does not incorporate VE or related concepts	A. States AU members _ B. AU, States members C. All DSF
African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (2011)	Policy	continental	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2011	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE but Integrates the fight against terrorism and all forms of organized crime	A. states AU members _ B. AU, States members C. All DSF
Additional Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2004)	Policy	continental	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2004	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE but prevention and fight against terrorism	A. States AU members _ B. AU, States members C. All DSF
African Center for Studies and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) (2004)	Operational	continental	A. ... B. Created C. Functional since 2004	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions VE and terrorism	A. States AU members _ B. African Center for Studies and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), Member States C. All DSF
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (2003)	Operational	continental	A. ... B. Finalized	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE or related concepts, but is responsible for matters	A. States _ AU members _ B. U A , Member States, APRM Secretariat C. All DSF



INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS				C. Created in 2003	relating to regional peace, stability and security		
	Governmental Meeting on Terrorism in Africa (2002)	Operational	continental	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2002	A. Does not integrate PVE, but mentioned in the SNAPLEV document 2022-2026 B. Mentioned the EV	A. states AU members _ B. AU, States members C. All DSF	
	Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999)	Policy	continental	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 1999, entered into force in 2002	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Does not mention VE but prevention and fight against terrorism	A. states AU members _ B. AU, States members C. All DSF	
	<b>C. ECOWAS, other West African sub-regional organizations and other relevant frameworks</b>						
	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Counter Terrorism Strategy Implementation Plan (2019)	Operational	Regional	A. 2015 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2019	A. Integrates PVE B. Integrates the fight against terrorism; the development and reinforcement of proactive and operational capacities to anticipate, detect and disrupt terrorist activities.	A. Heads of States of ECOWAS B. Member States, ECOWAS Commission and all relevant institutions C. All DSF	
	ECOWAS Five-Year Plan of Action (2020-2024) for the Eradication of Terrorism (2019)	Operational	Regional	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2019	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions VE and related concepts	A. ECOWAS B. Member States, ECOWAS Commission and all relevant institutions C. All DSF	
	Francophone network for the prevention of violent radicalization and extremism that can lead to terrorism ( FrancoPREV ) (2018)	Operational	International	A. 2016 B. Finalized C. Created in 2018	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions VE and terrorism	A. States _ members of the Francophonie B. Network FrancoPREV , States members , OIF C. All DSF	
	Regional guide for preventing radicalization and countering violent extremism in the Sahel and West Africa (2018)	Operational	Regional	A. 2016 B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2018	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions VE and terrorism	A. MISAHEL / African Union, G5 Sahel B. West African States C. All DSF	
	Accra Initiative (2017)	Policy	Sub- regional	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2017	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions VE and terrorism; aims to prevent the spillover of terrorism from the Sahel and to fight against transnational organized crime and VE in the border areas of the States members	A. Member States (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo; observers Niger, Mali B. states members, initiative secretariat _ C. All DSF	
	Resolution on the prevention of violent radicalization and extremism conducive to terrorism, adopted at the XVIth Conference of Heads of State and Government speaking French (2016)	Policy	International	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2016	A. Integrates PVE B. Mentions VE and terrorism	A. Member States of La Francophonie B. Member States, OIF C. All DSF	



INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS	Directive No. 02/2015/cm/UEMOA on the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism in the Member States of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) (2015)	Regulatory	Sub- regional	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2015	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions the definition of the terrorist act and its financing	A. WAEMU Council of Ministers B. UEMOA states members C. All DSF
	G5 Sahel (2014)	Policy	Sub- regional	A. 2013 B. Created C. In operation since 2014	A. Integrates PVE into its “Regional VE Prevention and Control Guide for Sahel and West African Countries” developed with the African Union Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) B. Mentions VE and terrorism; its objective is to strengthen the link between economic development and security, and the fight against terrorism	A. G5 Member States (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad) B. States _ G5 members C. G5 Sahel Joint Force (established in 2017)
	ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy (2013)	Policy	Regional	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2013	A. Should be part of the PVE as it is an implementation of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy B. Mentions terrorism, the spread of terrorism and inter-governmental cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism	A. Heads of States of ECOWAS B. ECOWAS, States members C. All DSF
	ECOWAS Political Declaration and Common Position on Counter-Terrorism Yamoussoukro (2013)	Policy	Regional	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2013	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions VE and terrorism	A. Heads of States of ECOWAS B. ECOWAS States members C. All DSF
	ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2006)	Policy	Regional	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2006	A. Does not integrate PVE B. Mentions conflict prevention and resolution and terrorist acts	A. Heads of States of ECOWAS B. ECOWAS States members C. All DSF
	Declaration of the International Organization of La Francophonie on conflict prevention and human security in the French-speaking world (known as the Declaration of Saint-Boniface) (2006)	Policy	International	A. ... B. Adopted in D. May 14, 2006	A. Does not explicitly incorporate the PVE, but related concepts of conflict prevention and human security D. Does not mention VE or terrorism	A. States members of the Francophonie B. states members, OIF A. All DSF
	ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) (2003)	Operational	Regional	A. ... B. Created C. Functional since 2003	A. Does not integrate PVE B. The 1999 Mechanism that establishes it mentions conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping operations, the fight against cross-border crime	A. Heads of States of ECOWAS B. ECOWAS States members C. All DSF
	ECOWAS Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance (2001)	Policy	Regional	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2001	A. Does not explicitly integrate the PVE B. Mentions the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, as well as the prevention and fight against terrorism	A. Heads of States of ECOWAS B. ECOWAS States members C. All DSF



INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS	ECOWAS Council of Elders (2001)	Policy	Regional	A. ... B. Created C. Functional since 2001	A. Does not explicitly integrate the PVE B. Integrates preventive diplomacy and conflict management	A. ECOWAS state members B. Council of Elders C. All DSF
	Declaration of the International Organization of La Francophonie on democracy, rights and freedoms in the French-speaking world (known as the Bamako Declaration) (2000)	Policy	International	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 2000	A. Does not explicitly include the PVE, but related concepts of democracy and human rights B. Does not mention VE or terrorism	A. States _ members of the Francophonie B. OIF States members, C. All DSF
	ECOWAS Protocol A/AP1/12/99 relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Maintenance of Peace and Security (1999)	Policy	Regional	A. ... B. Finalized C. Adopted in 1999	A. Does not explicitly include the PVE B. Integrates conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping operations, the fight against cross-border crime, international terrorism, the proliferation of small arms, and anti-personnel mines	A. Heads of States of ECOWAS B. ECOWAS States members C. All DSF
	Council of the Entente (1959)	Policy	Sub- regional	A. ... B. Created C. Functional since 1959	A. Integrates PVE through the PVE Community Guidelines Document in the Entente Space B. Mentions the prevention and fight against terrorism	A. Member States of the Council of the Entente B. Member States of the Council of the Entente C. All DSF



# **Chapter 4**

**Analysis of frameworks and practical involvement  
of DSF in PVE**



The various perceptions of the threat, as analysed in chapter 2, determine the approaches adopted by officials in charge of defence and security sectors. Essentially sector-based and state-centred, they view the mandate of defence and security forces (DSF) through the lens of security and require their forces to focus on control, repression or even combat. For the past ten years or so, every country to which this study relates has introduced reforms according to timetables adapted to their individual situations, particularly with a view to redefining their respective approach to the threat. Yet, their efforts have drawn attention to the preceptive and operational limitations of their approach to violent extremism (VE) which is now rearing its ugly head in much of West Africa. This underscores the importance of the questions raised at the heart of this study. **Are we witnessing a change of strategy in public security sector governance? Are we ready to consider the reasons why such violence is able to take hold?** By and large, the region to which the study relates is progressively integrating the prevention of violent extremism (PVE) into a new approach that seeks to address the root causes of this violence. What form does that take in practice and what role do DSF play in this respect? The answers to these questions are provided in this chapter and are based on an analysis of the frameworks systematically referenced in the previous chapter (see the corresponding tables for specific details of the frameworks).

#### 4.1. The role of prevention in public defence and security frameworks

By and large, the study draws the general conclusion that, in the seven countries under consideration, **the process of integrating PVE into the mandate of DSF is particularly slow and ponderous.** That is partly due to the fact that fundamental texts and codes under which DSF operate have not been updated. Indeed, it took many years before these texts, which date back to the time of independence, made provision for terrorist threats, and it was not until recent reforms were introduced that PVE was actually considered. On the other hand, most armed and domestic security forces still operate in line with a Westphalian concept of war or threat, i.e., an outside enemy or "other" that subverts the state. Little consideration is therefore given to the concept of violence that is fuelled by a society itself and draws attention to its structural weaknesses. The findings of the study suggest, however, that there is greater awareness of the need to develop this approach. **But it is becoming increasingly clear that DSF need to engage with civilian populations in a different way and bear in mind their specific needs.** To develop relationships to this end, the mandate of DSF will need to be redefined to such an extent that it enables DSF to foster positive relations with the general public on whose shoulders the nation is built, and to address causes of disenfranchisement which can lead to violence. **DSF must seize this clear opportunity to engage in PVE.**

##### 4.1.1. Prescriptive frameworks on terrorism and VE and the consideration of PVE

###### In respect of the seven countries to which the study relates

Regarding frameworks that explicitly relate to terrorism or VE, **Benin** criminalizes acts of terrorism and any related practices such as money laundering or implements an institutional framework for the purposes of raising awareness of — or countering — acts of terrorism in border areas. An emphasis is placed on the reorganization of DSF (notably by establishing the republican police force, arising from the merger between the police and gendarmerie) to create an effective territorial network and promote closer links with the civilian population in the delivery of a public security service. As it stands, no public policy framework expressly links the role of DSF and PVE except for the National Commission for Countering Radicalization, VE and Terrorism (CNLCREVT) and the National Strategy on the Prevention of Violent Extremism (SNPEV), currently in the process of being adopted. The primary role of the Beninese Integrated Border Area Management Agency (ABéGIEF) is to tackle crime and combat terrorism in border areas. Development also lies at the heart of its preventive action: by responding to the infrastructure needs of communities based in border areas and developing a sense of belonging in the process.

In **Burkina Faso**, four prominent frameworks specifically refer to terrorism, starting with the 2021 National Security Policy Document. In view of the volatile socio-political context and fragile national security situation, these frameworks and their content are designed to eradicate acts of terrorism and give very little consideration to the concept of prevention. However, in 2016, the authorities introduced a community policing policy. In 2021, a process was initiated to develop a national VE prevention strategy (SNPEV) and the corresponding document was formally adopted in August 2022. Meanwhile, two fundamental texts governing the organization of national security, which are also in the process of

being developed, refer to human security. But they are all hesitant to fully commit to PVE and integrate it into the mandate of DSF.

In **Côte d'Ivoire**, three frameworks explicitly refer to VE and terrorism, starting with the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its action plan (awaiting adoption). The strategy primarily sets out to structure the response and its preventive dimension is reduced to anticipation, notably through the organization of intelligence gathering. Introduced in 2018, *Malette pédagogique* refers to the psychosociological process of radicalization experienced by those who carry out acts of terrorism. The emphasis is therefore placed on the terrorist and the role of early identification. The ideas behind the prevention of violence by addressing its root causes, and the role that DSF can play in that process, have not yet been fully developed.

**Ghana** has also established a general counter-terrorism framework based on five key instruments, including the National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET, 2019). They all refer explicitly to counter-terrorism and some also mention VE. The originality of the NAFPCVET lies in the fact that, while its concept is essentially geared towards counter-terrorism, it also makes explicit provision for a PVE-orientated approach and its implementing mechanism is based on the state's security structures at central, departmental and district level, and involves civil society and state peace architecture. However, this new approach has not been adopted by many DSF units, and the implementation process is still very much at an early stage.

In **Niger**, four prominent frameworks refer explicitly to terrorism and VE, including the recently adopted National Domestic Security Strategy (SNSI, reviewed in 2022); the only framework to address PVE is the National Strategy on the Prevention of Radicalization and Fight against Violent Extremism (SNPRLEV) of 2021. In Niger, there is increasing awareness of the need for holistic and community-orientated solutions. The experiences acquired and the tools developed by Niger in the interests of maintaining peace, such as the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace, or the local peace and security committees, will facilitate the implementation of this approach. However, the process may be obstructed either by the fact that responsibility for SNPRLEV implementation seems to be assigned to more than one structure, or that the involvement of DSF in these new policies is limited or non-existent. As such, there are two parallel approaches rather than a single common vision.

**Senegal** has notably established six frameworks, including the 2014 Domestic Defence and Security Concept (CDSN), and rolled out a number of operating mechanisms (not least CLAT and CICO). They explicitly address terrorism and counter-terrorism. DSF are charged with the task of eradicating acts of terrorism and, from the perspective of "prevention", to use intelligence to prevent the commission of terrorist acts. The political agenda and security strategy fail to consider the concept of PVE. While the political frameworks geared specifically towards DSF have not yet embraced the PVE-orientated approach, or formally disregarded its operational implementation, it appears, at the same time, that some DSF practices are being adapted to accommodate this concept (for instance, civil-military action) and that the recurring reference to the concept of Army-Nation is also opening the door to PVE. Senegal must therefore endeavour to render the implicit explicit and effectively integrate this PVE-orientated approach into the mandate of defence and security forces.

As for **Togo**, it has essentially established five frameworks, including the 2021-2025 Military Programming Act and the 2019 Domestic Security Act (LSI). The approach of political and legislative frameworks places an emphasis firmly on security and corrective measures. However, in light of the adoption of the 2022-2026 National Strategy on the Prevention of and Fight against Violent Extremism (SNPLEV) in July 2022, the direction of political travel has altered course and the policy now combines an approach of *mano dura* with a degree of flexibility sensitive to "internal dynamics". It is noteworthy that the principal body responsible for PVE, the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism (CIPLEV), is also decentralized, especially as no other country to which the study relates has structures organized in this way. However, it remains to be seen whether the objectives of community policing and intelligence will be redefined to such an extent that a common vision and practical PVE-orientated approach will be instilled, particularly in defence and security units.



## General observations

The difficulties of adapting to this new context, and the fragmented nature of the responses of the aforementioned prescriptive frameworks **whose emphasis fundamentally remains on control and not so much on transformation**, have highlighted **the need for a new strategic framework** capable of balancing, guaranteeing the consistency, and optimizing the effectiveness of domestic responses.

Moreover, this situation has highlighted the **need for a paradigm shift in security sector governance** based on a holistic approach capable of i) factoring in the increasingly complex nature of these hybrid, diffuse and asymmetric threats, ii) acknowledging that violence is perpetrated by many different parties in complex relationships, iii) adopting a human security approach that prioritizes the protection of civilian populations, and consequently iv) placing civilian populations at the heart of this strategy.

As such, a new vision begins to take shape but faces a number of **structural obstacles**, which is to be expected given the current gaps in cultures and operating procedures of the institutions. For instance, one country seeks to consolidate its hard-line response while formulating a soft policy in respect of PVE, by allocating "security" and "civil" roles accordingly. This approach fails to create the unified strategy that is needed in pursuit of the common objective of collectively promoting human security as a solution to the root causes of violence. Another example is whether or not defence and security units are given the platform to question the often-obsolete mandate under which they operate, or to engage in this debate with political leaders and other relevant senior figures in the country.

*"After considering the causes of domestic and regional conflicts more carefully, it became more and more apparent to me that all so-called security-driven strategies, directly based on the use of military force, are failing, and that other approaches should be adopted."<sup>29</sup>*

Another observation is that the approach of the countries to which the study relates depends on the presence or proximity of the threat. On the one hand, in countries that have been blighted by the scourge of VE for a number of years, such as Niger and Burkina Faso, the race to reform defence and security frameworks suggests that they are adopting a reactive strategy to violence which is, nevertheless, becoming a more prominent feature of the fabric of society. The combination of counter-terrorism and prevention strategies is useful if, and only if, they specify the role of key actors, not least DSF members, in a way that determines their structure, identifies their sector, makes clear that everyone is pulling in the same direction, and indicates that they are acting in pursuit of a common goal that does not set out merely to stabilize. Investment is needed for a large-scale training programme designed to raise the awareness of PVE among DSF units. It is also **imperative to impress upon the various individual actors that they are involved in a collective effort** and to create political and operational coordinating mechanisms to give PVE actors the spaces and resources they need.

On the other hand, coastal countries (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, Togo), which still consider the threat to be predominantly exogenous, have several counter-terrorism mechanisms that largely operate according to conventional approaches to military and security mandates, the objective of which is to contain the spread of the threat. While the limitations of such a strategy taken in isolation have been shown, not least by the recent experience of countries in the Central Sahel region, that may prove to be strategically significant for coastal countries, **provided that the reality of the situation observed during these operations is used as a basis to formulate and implement PVE policies** that promptly address the underlying causes that potentially pave the way for the threat to engulf the national territory. Mechanisms dedicated to PVE, such as the Permanent Secretariat for Countering Radicalization, VE and Terrorism (CNLCREVT) and ABÉGIEF in Benin, or CIPLEV and its units in Togo, could actively contribute to that effort.

**Will current efforts, tentative though they are, be enough** to actually devise and integrate a new vision into the operating procedures and training programmes of DSF? In light of the findings of the study, it seems that initial foundational stones are in place, coupled with vital examinations, which will need **unwavering political support** to ensure **the work of the various DSF is developed and sustained**.

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<sup>29</sup> A DSF representative interviewed for the purposes of this study, Dakar, Senegal, October 2020.

#### 4.1.2. Training mechanisms

In every country to which the study relates, DSF require special training in counter-terrorism and PVE. The training referred to by many participants belonging to DSF units concerns human rights and international humanitarian law. As part of these programmes, participants are shown how to interact with civilian populations or to manage social relationships. But most point out that their training relates to the propriety of their actions in combat situations, but **in terms of prevention, the programmes leave an awful lot to be desired.**

Before any units are deployed for action, they ought to understand VE followed by the concept of prevention.

*"There is no special mechanism dedicated to VE [and its prevention]. Besides, "extremism" is not a term commonly used in military circles. [...] We still call it "terrorism". That's why we need to understand the concept of VE. I'm a soldier, I understand some things, but I don't have access to all the data. **I need access to social and other types of information.**"<sup>30</sup>*

In each of the countries in question, the same **skills development needs** were identified: the **need for support in the consideration of conceptual and political aspects connected with DSF mandates**; the need to roll out a **training programme that seeks to develop the knowledge and expertise** of DSF; and the need to establish **platforms where researchers, civil society and DSF are able to conduct analysis** with a view to developing a more standardized understanding of issues and appropriate solutions.

*"DSF tend to be resistant to change. When you understand their psychology, you realize that they set out exclusively to achieve the objectives of their mission and only perform effectively in tasks for which they have received training. **According to DSF, there is considerable room for improvement in training.** Modules dedicated exclusively to prevention have not yet been added to the programmes of training centres."<sup>31</sup>*

National police and gendarmerie academies, military schools and training centres for officers of varying ranks represent the ideal environment in which to introduce new concepts and operating procedures, and these institutions should set about developing and integrating the concept of PVE without delay. This task can also be undertaken by specialised centres, such as the International Counter-Terrorism Academy (AILCT) in Côte d'Ivoire or the National Armed Forces Training Centre (CNI) in Togo. Moreover, autonomous public institutions, such as the National Strategic and Security Study Centre (CNESS) in Niger, the National Strategic Study Centre (CNES) in Burkina Faso, or the Centre of Advanced Defence and Security Studies (CHEDS) in Senegal, can help bridge the gap between civil society and the academic community, on the one hand, and DSF, on the other; and can actively facilitate the progressive integration of PVE.

These centres can also draw upon a number of resources to meet training and skills development needs. Such as, for instance, the expertise available across the region, PVE courses or publicly accessible teaching materials.<sup>32</sup> However, for this plan to be effective, DSF units will have to welcome such external actors who have the necessary expertise.<sup>33</sup>

#### 4.1.3. Institutions and mechanisms acting in the interest of PVE

In the interests of PVE, various institutional frameworks or "civil" mechanisms transcend the explicit provisions of political or legislative frameworks. They are active in most of the countries of the study and predominantly distinguished by the fact that multiple actors contribute to the success of their specific project or they are able to adopt multi-actor approaches. Several examples are provided below. There were often referred to during interviews on an "anecdotal" or "marginal" basis (as they are too far-

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<sup>30</sup> A DSF representative interviewed for the purposes of this study, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, February 2020.

<sup>31</sup> A DSF representative interviewed for the purposes of this study, Cotonou, Benin, December 2020.

<sup>32</sup> Examples of these resources include the programme of PVE courses devised jointly by the African Union and Switzerland, and the PVE Manual they have produced. This report is another example as its comparative analysis proposes a series of devices by which DSFs can factor PVE into the work they carry out across the region.

<sup>33</sup> It was not easy to access DSF training programmes in the context of this study.

removed from the mandate and routine operations of DSF) until in-depth discussions shed light on the **useful role they can play in integrating PVE into the mandate and tasks of DSF**. They are therefore justifiably referenced in this study and will benefit from the consideration of those whose responsibility or desire is to promote the role that DSF can play in PVE — precisely because they are or may be **platforms for multi-actor dialogue without which PVE would find it difficult to flourish**.

### **National defence and security councils (and their branches)**

Every country of the study has **national defence and security councils**. These bodies have oversight of all areas of authority, from the very highest to decentralized levels, and are also operational in the field, such as, for instance, in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Niger. They are uniquely placed to incorporate PVE into security responses. In this capacity, they are able to define new approaches based on new challenges, help to shape public defence and security policies in the process, and, finally, ensure that the approach takes account of local community needs, especially when the mechanism has the input of infra-national committees.

But the study has showed that these committees tend to insular as far as matters of security are concerned. **To become the standard-bearers of PVE, they must embrace new approaches** focussing on human security, collaborative efforts to guarantee security, and the shared governance of security. They must also be willing to work alongside several social actors who help to build peace and develop the kind of solutions that DSF aspire to deliver.

### **Independent and supervisory state institutions**

**National human rights committees, ombudsman's offices, or even anti-corruption authorities** have also been cited as public and independent bodies that can promote PVE. Wrongful convictions and abuse of power (such as rackets and embezzlement), or acts of violence perpetrated by DSF, figure prominently among the issues that they may be required to address. Many bodies of research have revealed that individuals are pushed into armed VE groups by a number of factors including acts of abuse perpetrated by DSF, the miscarriage of justice and impunity.<sup>34</sup> In this context, such mechanisms can help to address the causes of VE. These independent institutions may therefore work alongside the **judiciary** and various **defence and security inspection services**, and their collective efforts ought to be prioritized by all PVE strategies for the reasons outlined above.

They can also enhance DSF training programmes to alter the principles, action and approach of their engagement with the civilian population. Practices involving — or training in — **respect for human rights**, which represents an integral part of any PVE strategy, have frequently been cited as an example of the willingness of DSF to adopt new strategies. However, participants acknowledge that this training is superficial in most cases and the approach adopted by all DSF units must be underpinned by PVE.

**National commissions to control and combat the proliferation of weapons** (known by a number of different names) have been cited by interviews, emphasizing that they can tackle the proliferation of illegal weapons, thereby restricting access to instruments of violence, while also sparking debate on the culture of violence within societies.

However, the interviews of this study have revealed that there is little awareness of the role that these institutions can play in PVE, especially among the institutions themselves. They are very rarely referenced in public defence and security policies and are frequently disregarded by national PVE strategies. This is one potential avenue to explore.

### **State peace and social cohesion architecture**

In some countries to which the study relates, the state has developed peace architecture for the benefit of one or more particular institutions, or as an integrated security and peace management model. This is the case of the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace (HACP) in Niger, or the National Peace Council (NPC) in Ghana, or even the Office of the High Commissioner for Reconciliation and Strengthening National Unity (HCRRUN) in Togo. Moreover, they all have representative units or

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<sup>34</sup> See for instance: A Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment, UNDP, 2017 - <https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/en>

committees within the country. As long as they remain multi-actor mechanisms, or their operations involve multiple actors, particularly, though not exclusively DSF, they will undoubtedly serve to promote PVE.

### State strategic research institutions

Reference was also made to the role that state strategic research centres can play in the development and implementation of PVE. They are present in virtually all the countries to which the study relates (including CNART in Benin, CNES in Burkina Faso, CNESS in Niger, and CHEDS in Senegal). As independent public institutions, they help to devise public defence and security policies, and several of them have already shaped the PVE policy of their country. They can also provide a platform for various public and civil actors to discuss matters of defence and security. Finally, they can further enhance the skills and expertise of DSF.

### Parliamentary defence and security committees

In each country of the study, **parliamentary defence and security committees** are recognized as important forums in which matters of defence, security and PVE can be discussed. They are responsible for assessing all matters connected with domestic defence and security and their powers include the authority to ratify public policies, exercise the right of initiative, scrutinize the executive's action in that field (defence and security), oversee budgetary matters, approve the procurement of defence and security equipment, and mobilize the army in a state of emergency. However, the challenges faced by parliamentarians adversely affect their ability to effectively undertake these different roles in respect of DSF. These challenges include government interference, a lack of technical expertise in relation to matters of defence and security, and the pressure of national security concerns in light of investigations into DSF operations — which frequently coincides with the parliamentarians' ignorance of the PVE approach. However, parliamentarians are in a position to promote PVE given their ability to mobilize the population, by deploying the necessary resources to highlight the causes of VE and, finally, by exercising their power of oversight and acting as law-makers to bring about the reforms that the governance of defence and security sectors' needs. While the practice of staging hearings remains rare, it has huge potential. Parliamentary defence and security committees may summon various DSF representatives to appear at hearings held in public or behind closed doors. Committees can also arrange field trips to inspect operations on the ground.

### Platforms for dialogue

DSF units have a limited understanding of the concept of dialogue in the context of PVE. As far as they are concerned, it often boils down to the idea of establishing a functional link with the civilian population in order to facilitate the flow of intelligence. The civilian idea of the concept is quite different. For civilians, it involves defining the nature of their security, regarding DSF not as enemies but as agents of public protection. In other words, for them, dialogue between DSF and civilian populations is essential to the PVE approach. All countries concerned by the study provide spaces in which actors can discuss inter-community matters, peace and security; they pave the way for constructive dialogue between DSF and civilian populations. Occasionally, responsibility for these spaces' rests with public authorities. At times, they are created by independent state bodies or civil society structures. There is potential scope to make them multi-actor spaces, if this is not already the case. Côte d'Ivoire has the Ethics Advisory Committees (CCE) and Departmental Security Committees (CDS). In Burkina Faso, the decree of 2016, outlining the procedures by which civilian populations can facilitate the roll-out of community policing programmes, sets out the conditions under which coordinated security initiatives are undertaken, for the purposes of fostering dialogue between elected officials, citizens and DSF. In Benin, the National Peace Coalition operates on a decentralized basis in every commune and department. In Ghana, peace mediation committees, or the National Youth Authority, strive to raise awareness and serve as a citizen watchdog in respect of matters of peace, social cohesion and PVE. In Togo, CIPLEV and its various divisions seek to foster dialogue between DSF, local communities and other relevant actors. **Ultimately these mechanisms can provide a space in which citizens and DSF can discuss the participatory nature of the public security service.**

## 4.2 How can DSF contribute to preventive action in practice?

In the seven countries to which the study relates, it seems that the success of any PVE-oriented action depends on the ability of DSF to build trust and foster cooperation. To this end, several approaches and measures have been adopted. While some are **political** (involvement of relevant actors in the formulation of public defence and security or PVE policies), others are **operational**, including: community policing programmes; civil-military action; concerted action to secure borders; supervision of self-defence forces; inclusion of women and young people in matters of defence and security; and cooperation with civil society actors. The challenges and methodologies remain the same, whether the measures are political or operational: their success hinges on the inclusive and participatory nature of the processes. The interviews also make clear that every measure has advantages and disadvantages and that operational measures must be underpinned by meticulous coordination, management and monitoring plans if they are to make a meaningful impact at local level. But above all, the **guiding principles of these actions are yet again fundamental to their success**; they will define the objectives being pursued: the **security-driven objectives**, which seek to bring a situation under control, or the **preventive objectives**, which seek to overhaul relations such that they can be added to the mix of factors that help to guarantee human security.

### 4.2.1. Participatory public policy formulation processes

As confirmed by the study, matters of defence and security are not only the prerogative of the state, but are also universally treated in the strictest confidence. The forums in which decisions about these matters are made are only accessible to the most senior politicians and personnel of defence and security units. The task of executing these decisions is subsequently carried out by units organized into strict hierarchical structures. Moreover, attitudes to the management of matters of defence and security tend to be overwhelmingly conservative. They prioritize action that places an emphasis exclusively on security, meaning that it is not easy for states to adopt an overarching PVE-orientated approach that brings together all actors from complementary fields. Does that mean it is a lost cause to consider the life-sustaining nature of PVE by stressing the importance of multi-actor dialogue and calling for "security conceived for and by us all"?

This matter lies at the heart of the study which set out to determine the prominence of the role played by DSF in PVE. This study is therefore open to new ideas and strives to underscore both this need for a paradigm shift and change of culture in security sector governance, and the initiatives that can be undertaken to integrate PVE into the mission of DSF. For this viewpoint, the study has identified three fundamental practices to show how meaningful progress can be made while maintaining a realistic perspective.

Firstly, during visits to the seven countries of the study, in order to collect base data, interviews were arranged with various political leaders and the senior officials of units, and in-depth discussions were held with them all. While this summary report does not bear out the extensive nature of the topics covered during these discussions, it should be noted that **participants were willing to meet and engage in dialogue; participants were frequently and genuinely enthusiastic about taking part.**

Secondly, although practices in the countries concerned show that **DSF are involved in the formulation of PVE policies**, and that DSF are expected to be involved in the implementation of these policies, they are still few and far between. For instance, Burkina Faso and Niger have formulated their PVE policy on the basis of an extensive consultation process and have set up a special coordination committee and technical committees, organized prior workshops and field studies, etc. These initiatives have involved DSF representatives as well as other stakeholders. During interviews, a number of participants remarked on the innovative nature of this approach. Moreover, in their PVE policy implementation roadmaps, some states have incorporated pre-existing cooperation or peace mechanisms (e.g., in Niger and Ghana), while others have also centralized implementation, although significant responsibilities have also been assigned to decentralized bodies in which DSF are also stakeholders (e.g., in Togo).

**Approaches are developed in this way to take on board the needs of stakeholders**, ensure shared governance, and promote a culture of closer cooperation and dialogue, which are identified by all participants as responses that the state is expected to pursue. There is a sense that a major step forward

has been taken by involving DSF representatives in these processes; it leaves interested parties and other actors in no doubt of the meaningful progress that can be made.

Thirdly, other progress has been made by **integrating PVE into defence and security policies**, although the practice remains rare, as indicated in the systematic live audit produced in the previous chapter. This approach has been adopted, for instance, by Ghana within its National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET), and is based on a holistic model comprising four core concepts: prevention, anticipation, protection and response; it presents DSF as stakeholders in the implementation of each of these concepts. Another example is Burkina Faso's National Security Policy (PNS) adopted in 2021. It is the strategic framework for the country's security sector governance and is marked by a strategic paradigm shift based on a holistic approach, which aims to cast off the sector-based defence and security model, and on a participatory and inclusive methodology. Its core concepts comprise human security and its sector implementation mechanism notably includes the national PVE strategy. These examples show that it is possible to lay the political groundwork. All that remains is the challenge of practical implementation.

#### 4.2.2. Community policing

Community policing is essentially underpinned by the principles of inclusion, dialogue and trust between security actors and local communities, especially those who are marginalized and most likely to face vulnerability and experience violence.<sup>35</sup> It should be noted that community policing does not involve the creation of new units; its rules of engagement set out to promote closer links between domestic security forces and the civilian population.

*"Our aim is to show the police forces operating among civilian populations that a paradigm shift is needed. Civilians should be made to feel that they can talk to the police without the fear of being extorted. Officers should be trained to interact and take part in activities with civilians so that we can break down these barriers. We want a police force that is integrated into the community. This will encourage civilians to report any suspicious activity."<sup>36</sup>*

The study revealed a **clear trend that national community police policies are being developed** to foster cooperation between security sector actors, local authorities, and civilian populations, and especially in border areas, to fill the void that is often left by the state. One example was identified in Niger which adopted its National Community Policing Strategy (PNSP) in 2022. Another in Togo where a standard community policing guide was produced in 2014 for training instructors of national police and gendarmerie academies. The concept was embraced even earlier than that by Senegal when it set up the Community Policing Assistance Agency (ASP) in 2013. As for Burkina Faso, the Domestic Security Act (LSI) of 2003 makes provision for community policing. Finally, in the case of Ghana, the Community Policing Unit (CPU) was established in 2002.

However, community policing is **by no means the panacea for the problem of VE**. Unless it is integrated into a holistic approach designed to address the root causes of VE, its beneficial effects will remain limited. Some conditions are essential. Firstly, information gathering should form an integral part of a collaborative relationship fully and unequivocally supported by local communities; it should not be the primary reason for establishing such a relationship. Secondly, police forces should engage with community leaders in a transparent manner and attempt to include all groups of the population, particularly women and young people. Thirdly, civilians should be encouraged to air their views without fear of reproof or attack. As such, DSF need to adjust their approach with a view to building trust and protecting those who divulge information. And finally, the fourth, essential point concerns how community policing can help to prevent violence: by interacting with civilian populations, police forces can effectively take on board their needs and the solutions they propose, and subsequently add them to the mix of factors that will help to guarantee the security and peace of the communities to which they belong.

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<sup>35</sup> Africa Centre for Strategic Studies. <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/2020-11-CVE-Syllabus-FR.pdf>

<sup>36</sup> An official interviewed for the purposes of this study, Cotonou, Benin, December 2020.

### 4.2.3. Civil-military action

As indicated by one of the interviewees, DSF must adopt an open and collaborative approach in order to effectively build trust between those forces and civilian populations. There is a general consensus that civil-military action (CMA) geared towards the improvement of the living conditions of communities, especially in the most vulnerable areas, **would make it possible to keep VE groups at bay** and diminish their capacity to entice new recruits.

*"You can't fight fire with fire. The root causes must be addressed. What entices young people to join up? Because death is preferable to a future without prospects. I am a member of parliament for three border areas and they all have their own problems. No one comes to the borders in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The areas are devoid of infrastructure and basic services."<sup>37</sup>*

The concept of CMA refers to the civil action undertaken by armed forces in an external setting. On top of that, it requires actors to come together in a spirit of cooperation to promote a new form of collective intelligence between military, diplomatic, business and humanitarian communities.<sup>38</sup> This consensus is underscored by the creation of special bodies such as the Civil-Military Cell (CCM) set up in Côte d'Ivoire by each departmental security committee (CDS). They are tasked with preventing conflicts that may arise between DSF and civilian populations, as well as rebuilding trust and cooperation between them. They also aim to make the population aware of security issues and to prevent or resolve community conflicts.

Another example is found in Benin where the Beninese Integrated Border Area Management Agency (ABéGIEF) is charged with the particular task of countering and preventing VE in its border areas. Benin shares over 2,000 km of borders with four countries, three of which (Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria) are blighted by the scourge of VE. The communities based on both sides of these borders are generally from the same ethnic background and share family links. Since 2012, the agency has taken action to foster the sense of belonging and citizenship among these populations by building schools, empowering women through income-generating activities and promoting cross-border cooperation. Moreover, the agency is also responsible for the special border surveillance unit launched in 2016. The link with DSF was established by this initiative and by the fact that the agency is based in the ministry of the interior and public security. It is therefore a hybrid CMA actor.

In situations where instability reigns and basic public services are often unavailable, the value of free medical care, almost invariably administered via mobile clinics operated by the medical services of armies, or other basic services, such as the repair of damaged infrastructure by military engineers, cannot be overstated. There were numerous examples of these initiatives in each of the countries to which the study relates.

But they require appropriate resources. Participants assert that these initiatives are primarily inhibited by a lack of resources. Indeed, despite the general awareness of the urgent need for these initiatives in marginalized communities that are most likely to face the threat, budgets fail to provide the necessary funding. Another drawback is that while the urgent action, which relies on the skills and expertise of DSF, is clearly appreciated in so far as it improves the living standards of civilian populations, it is not the responsibility of DSF to provide basic services; that responsibility rests with other state entities, particularly decentralized bodies. Responsibility for these services should eventually pass to these bodies.

### 4.2.4. Operations to secure borders

As the transnational phenomenon slowly edges its way towards the Gulf of Guinea, regional states have, for the most part, taken action to secure borders either internally or as part of concerted intelligence sharing operations. Often cited as a benchmark for these actions is Operation *Koundjoare* undertaken by Togo and Burkina Faso, and Operation *Koudanlgou*, the first phase of which was launched in November 2021, involved Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo, and mobilized in excess of 6,000 men. Some of these operations are carried out under the Accra Initiative launched in 2017.

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<sup>37</sup> A member of the national assembly, Niamey, Niger, August 2021.

<sup>38</sup> Christophe Garda, *Le rôle de la coopération civilo-militaire dans la reconstruction de la paix*, Paris, 2002.  
[http://www.irenees.net/bdf\\_fiche-analyse-1\\_fr.html](http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-analyse-1_fr.html)

DSF undertake these operations to **act as a military deterrent**, create corridors with a view to limiting the expansion of armed groups, and enhance cooperation between the army and civilian populations in the process. In addition to these operations, DSF take part in civil-military actions in the interests of social cohesion, with a view to building trust, eliminating fear and tackling negative perceptions of DSF activities.

#### 4.2.5. Supervision of self-defence forces

The vulnerability felt by some civilian populations is so acute that they set up self-defence forces. However, participants in the interviews regularly spoke of the ambiguity of the role and the legitimacy of these groups. Some consider them to be a **potential response** to security threats in remote and vulnerable areas of national territories **where the state is absent**.

Self-defence forces operate in several of the countries to which the study relates. These forces are usually assembled from within a single community on account of reasons related to: self-protection, defence of property, ethnicity, political affiliation, lifestyle, etc. They are active in Niger, Ghana, and even Burkina Faso. However, in 2020, Burkina Faso resolved to institutionalize Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), giving them the status of DSF auxiliaries.

As asserted by many interviewees, these forces operate as militias and **act on behalf of the state and civilian populations to address immediate and long-term risks**. What steps are taken to ensure that they do not invoke the prerogatives of the state, not least the legitimate use of force? That they do not fuel violence on the basis of ethnicity, gender and religious freedom? That they abide by the same combat rules as DSF? That the weapons in their possession are not eventually used against ordinary forces?

*"Nothing can be left to chance in the security domain. Militias are suited to some tasks while domestic security forces are suited to others. [...] Tactically speaking, it's a disaster waiting to happen. It's an ethnic tragedy because young people [...] are used as cannon fodder. And there's an issue with supervision, as they act as auxiliaries to gendarme officers. They're going to get themselves killed and [armed groups] will seize their weapons."<sup>39</sup>*

As there is no authority to control the formation of these groups, some believe that the state must supervise them by passing legislation to determine the scope of their remit, or by assigning DSF the task of supervising or even controlling their operations. Some take the view that the matter should be included in security sector reforms so that all bases are covered.

#### 4.2.6. Involvement of women and young people in matters of defence and security

The study has revealed that **women and young people are absent from the forums in which decisions about security are made**, from the upper echelons of DSF units and even, more often than not, from permanent or temporary platforms for dialogue between DSF and civilian populations. Their absence was confirmed by interviewees who make very little reference to this dimension.

Both women and young people are scarcely represented in the local or national forums in which public defence and security policies are formulated and their role in preventive strategies is substantially limited. Young people are often regarded as being part of "the problem" (on the basis of being the contingents of armed groups), rather than "the solution". And the situation is even more deplorable for young women.

Nevertheless, women and young people have **their own ideas about security** in their local communities or their country, and aspirations for peace that cannot be overlooked. Yet, access to the platforms they need to air their particular views is often restricted at a local level and all but denied in decision-making forums.

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<sup>39</sup> An official interviewed for the purposes of this study, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, March 2020.



One of the **cornerstones** of PVE should be the **absolute and unequivocal inclusion of women and young people** at every stage and every level of the process to formulate and implement defence/security and PVE policies.

#### 4.2.7. Cooperation with civil society actors

There seems to be a general consensus among interviewed civil society actors that **DSF have a long way to go in their efforts to build bridges with civilian populations**. They also believe that the lion's share of prevention assignments is developed and carried out by national CSOs and international NGOs, with the support of external partners.

*"From time to time, initiatives pop up in the absence of any official policy. For instance, military personnel hold discussions with civilian populations, although it's not certain whether DSF have the formal resources they need to organize their interaction with civilians."<sup>40</sup>*

During our discussions, members of these CSOs spoke of **a number of obstacles**, such as a lack of coordination between state institutions, which diminish the potential for cooperation between those institutions and CSOs and, consequently, reduce the potential scope of the impact. Others remarked on the tensions that arise when they, as civil society members, attempt to document the root causes of VE, notably those related to the conduct of DSF, or when they seek to contribute to the formulation of public defence and security policies. In addition, it should be noted that very few CSOs have the skills or inclination to become actively engaged in security and defence sectors, and largely remain unfamiliar with the modus operandi of those sectors.

Indeed, **neither DSF nor CSOs have yet developed a clear understanding of this interaction**. This undermines efforts to build trust which is, according to so many actors, vital. However, as both sides are aware of the importance of trust, several initiatives have been launched to embrace PVE and the paradigm shift towards human security, and they may, in turn, give rise to many others. For instance, in Burkina Faso, the National Security Forum of 2017 invited all actors to address the inclusive nature that has crept into the formulation of recent national security and PVE policies. As for Niger, it has devised a national PVE strategy which emphasizes the collaboration between DSF and CSOs at every stage of the process. These security strategies or policies have been developed on the basis of multi-actor assessments in virtually all the countries of the study.

Interaction between DSF and the media is also stymied by the fact that the concept of classified information is at variance with the *raison d'être* of the media. However, that undermines the important role that the media could play in bridging the gap between DSF and civilian populations, in challenging the discourse of radicals, and in sounding early warnings.

### 4.3. Relationship between national, regional and international frameworks

At an international and regional level, which is not dissimilar to the domestic situations of the seven countries considered under the study, while **counter-terrorism is undoubtedly top of the political agenda**, the role of prevention is limited in the contractual, political, or operational frameworks implemented by the United Nations, the African Union, and various West African sub-regional organizations.

States have implemented approximately ten international conventions or global political instruments in respect of particular acts of terrorism (financing, cyber-security, etc.). Many other similar frameworks have been adopted at a regional or inter-state level and have also been implemented at a national level.

The benchmark is the **UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy**, adopted in 2006 by virtue of Resolution 60/288 of the General Assembly. This global instrument sets out to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism.<sup>41</sup> As a living document adaptable in line with the counter-terrorism priorities of member states, its 7th review was carried out in 2021; under paragraph 16 (one of only a few dedicated to prevention), the review document "*calls on all member states and the United*

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<sup>40</sup> A civil society member interviewed for the purposes of this study, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, March 2020.

<sup>41</sup> <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.pdf?OpenElement>

*Nations system to form a united front against the violent extremism that can lead to terrorism; prompts leaders to discuss with their electorates the drivers of violent extremism that lead to terrorism; and to develop strategies with a view to eliminating those drivers; while highlighting that states, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, religious bodies and the media have an important role to play in encouraging tolerance and fostering understanding, inclusive dialogue, respect for religious and cultural diversity, and human rights".* This aspect of the global strategy was underscored by the UN Secretary-General's launch of the **Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism** in 2015<sup>42</sup>. The plan represents an appeal for the international community to redefine their approaches to development, peace and security, mainstreaming of women and young people, etc., with an emphasis placed on PVE.

This global strategy is implemented at a regional level by virtue of the **ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy**, adopted in 2013, which not only firmly places the emphasis on counter-terrorism, but also considers the role of PVE. Some countries have drawn inspiration from this plan to develop their own domestic PVE strategies (e.g., Côte d'Ivoire).

By and large, international and regional frameworks are also characterized by the **dichotomy** observed in domestic plans. That is, they either address counter-terrorism and security matters without giving serious consideration to the integration of PVE into the mandate of DSF; or they focus on civil-based models related to democracy, governance, decentralization, and conflict prevention and management (numerous examples are provided in the table of section 3.8, such as the 2014 African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralization, Local Governance and Local Development), although, in this case, without linking the models explicitly to PVE and less still to the role that DSF can play in that respect. **Under international and regional strategies, which are comparable to those implemented domestically, various actors should therefore step in to actively establish this link between frameworks and available resources, since it is still all too often overlooked.** Not until this issue has been effectively addressed will strategies be driven by considerations of human security or the mandate of DSF seek to build peace.

Having said that, the threat of VE faced by the coastal states of West Africa **presents an opportunity for them to engage in a multilateral cooperative effort** with a view to resolving a common problem. The renewal of the social contract between states and their civilian populations, not least communities based in border areas, should be prioritized. That would involve redefining the approach adopted in response to emerging threats on the basis of the needs of the population, a reassessment of the role of — and connections between — multiple regional mechanisms, and the role of states and security institutions, **to such an extent that it is underpinned by the alternative consideration of prevention.**

Similarly, instead of a vertical approach whereby regional or even domestic strategies are required under international texts, efforts should be made to formulate strategies tailored to the specific needs of the region. The success of these strategies would depend on whether the needs of communities based in vulnerable areas are taken into account. **Cooperation between strategic research institutions**, such as the African Union's African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and other strategic centres operated by the state (such as CNESS in Niger, CNES in Burkina Faso, etc.) may facilitate the flow of information. Much the same applies to **multi-actor assessment processes launched across the region** to guarantee the active involvement of civilian populations and local communities; regional organizations and their partners are invited to play an active role in this respect.

In practical terms, regional joint military operations, to which reference was frequently made during interviews, including those undertaken as part of the Accra Initiative, of which participants seem to be in favour, continue to be viewed predominantly through the lens of counter-terrorism. However, one view commonly expressed is that they have two advantages. Firstly, they are deemed to exemplify the effective cooperation between states and, secondly, **these operations may enable, provide a framework for, or even integrate, civil-military action that seeks to promote PVE** at border areas where the risk is greatest; examples of these operations include *Koudanlgou (I-IV)*, or the civil and security initiatives undertaken by ABÉGIEF in the border areas of Benin.

Finally, the interviews revealed that **neither ECOWAS nor any other sub-regional organizations arrange cooperative initiatives or regular discussions to address PVE**; participants believe that no such mechanisms (or not enough of them) have been established for counter-terrorism either. However,

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<sup>42</sup> <https://undocs.org/en/A/70/674>

through the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), the African Union has produced a "Regional Guide on the Prevention of and Fight against Violent Extremism for Countries of the Sahel and West Africa" (with the G5 Sahel). The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) has, in conjunction with its Swiss partner, used the guide to develop a training programme for PVE and a PVE manual. The *Conseil de l'Entente* has also staged a series of regional PVE meetings since 2018. Organized not at a regional level, but by two states (Senegal and Switzerland), a cycle of dialogue focussing on the integration of PVE into the mandate of DSF has been ongoing since 2017 across West and Central Africa. It bears mentioning that the regional PVE initiatives indicated above target and specifically include DSF representatives and other actors. But, **under current international and regional texts, there is currently no political, regulatory, or even operational framework in place to promote the integration PVE into the mandates of DSF.**

As such, regional organizations **still have considerable challenges to overcome** in order to stimulate and unify PVE initiatives, enshrine the PVE approach, including the role that DSF can play in that regard, in regional political frameworks, or meet the capacity-building needs of states and various actors operating in the field of PVE.



# **Chapter 5**


**Challenges, recommendations,  
and courses of action**




The study identifies seven processes of action to be taken in order to **further integrate the prevention of violence into the mandate of DSF** and, generally, to **embrace the paradigm shift towards human security**, i.e., "security conceived for and by us all".

Dialogue underpins the **methodology** of this overarching approach and expertise is essential to its success.

### 5.1. Changing the focus of defence and security policies

 <p><b>CHANGING THE FOCUS OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICIES</b></p>	<p><b>CHALLENGE:</b> Need to shift the focus of security sector governance to such an extent that the containment of threats gives way to preventive responses based on the needs of civilian populations.</p>
	<p><b>RECOMMENDATION:</b> Integrate the concept of human security into defence and security policies.</p>
	<p><b>COURSES OF ACTION:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Update defence and security policies with a view to integrating the human security approach.</li> <li>• Integrate PVE into the mandates of DSF.</li> <li>• Make sure that multiple actors are involved in the formulation of defence and security policies.</li> <li>• Promote further dialogue between political leaders, defence and security sectors, and parliamentarians in the interests of this action.</li> </ul>
<p><b>ACTORS INVOLVED</b></p>	<p>Governments, parliamentarians, DSF, strategic and research centres, CSOs, representatives of the various sections and groups of civilian populations.</p>


### 5.2. Institutional integration

 <p><b>INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION</b></p>	<p><b>CHALLENGE:</b> The absence of clearly defined and established responsibilities prevents the institutional integration of PVE within DSF.</p>
	<p><b>RECOMMENDATION:</b> Make sure that that PVE is integrated into the mandates of the various DSF units.</p>
	<p><b>COURSES OF ACTION:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consider establishing PVE positions or units: command personnel would be responsible for integrating PVE into operational defence and security frameworks, and for staff training and awareness in relation to PVE.</li> <li>• Make sure that personnel responsible for PVE are able to respond to threats wherever they arise; or set up equivalent positions at a decentralized level to guarantee proximity to DSF operating in the field.</li> <li>• Determine the financing required to integrate PVE into the mandate of DSF.</li> </ul>
<p><b>ACTORS INVOLVED</b></p>	<p>Governments, particularly the ministries of defence and security, command personnel, the various DSF units, DSF training centres.</p>

### 5.3. Coordination and consistency


 <p><b>COORDINATION AND CONSISTENCY</b></p>	<p><b>CHALLENGE:</b> DSF are largely absent from initiatives that promote coordination and cooperation in the implementation of PVE instruments and projects.</p>
	<p><b>RECOMMENDATION:</b> Enhance coordination between PVE actors, including DSF, to guarantee a more effective and consistent response.</p>
	<p><b>COURSES OF ACTION:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish a central unit to coordinate public PVE policies and frameworks, involving defence and security sectors, in order to ensure that PVE initiatives are complementary and the efforts of various actors, including DSF, are consolidated.</li> <li>• Promote regular discussions between sector officials, including DSF representatives, for monitoring/assessment purposes.</li> <li>• Engage in regular dialogue with DSF and civilian populations, especially in areas at risk, in order to adapt PVE strategies to their specific situation.</li> </ul>
<p><b>ACTORS INVOLVED</b></p>	<p>Governments, sector-based ministries (including those responsible for defence and security), DSF command personnel, CSOs, local communities, and regional and international organizations.</p>

### 5.4. PVE skills and expertise of DSF


 <p><b>PVE SKILLS AND EXPERTISE OF DSF</b></p>	<p><b>CHALLENGE:</b> Absence of PVE from the training programmes of DSF.</p>
	<p><b>RECOMMENDATION:</b> Ensure that DSF receive specific PVE training.</p>
	<p><b>COURSES OF ACTION:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incorporate PVE into the training programmes of DSF; include special modules showing how dialogue and respect for human rights can promote prevention.</li> <li>• Provide training courses for the training instructors of DSF (TOT - Training of Trainers) to establish a team of PVE experts.</li> <li>• Produce documents raising awareness of the role of DSF in PVE, make them available to local communities, and translate them into national languages.</li> <li>• Use teaching resources and specialist PVE materials available in the region or provided by partners.<sup>43</sup></li> </ul>
<p><b>ACTORS INVOLVED</b></p>	<p>DSF training academies or centres, schools of public administration, public, private or university-based strategic and research centres, and organizations or experts specializing in PVE.</p>

<sup>43</sup> Especially the framework PVE programme offered by the African Union, via the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and Swiss FDFA, as well as the PVE training manual that they have produced.


### 5.5. Link between DSF and civilian populations

 <p><b>LINK BETWEEN DSF AND CIVILIAN POPULATIONS</b></p>	<p><b>CHALLENGE:</b> Shortage of spaces and processes that bring together multiple parties, including DSF, to implement PVE policies.</p>
	<p><b>RECOMMENDATION:</b> Promote dialogue between DSF and other actors, especially at a local level, for the purposes of implementing preventive strategies.</p>
	<p><b>COURSES OF ACTION:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Involve civil society actors, public or otherwise, in security mechanisms (for instance central and local defence and security councils).</li> <li>• Provide further opportunities at a local level for DSF, local authorities, communities, and civil society to engage in dialogue.</li> <li>• Support civil-military initiatives, not only in the performance of military operations but also as a way of governing human security.</li> <li>• Integrate DSF into peace architecture.</li> <li>• Include dialogue in the missions and rules of engagement of DSF.</li> <li>• Train and raise awareness of civilian populations and CSOs in relation to matters of defence and security.</li> </ul>
<p><b>ACTORS INVOLVED</b></p>	<p>Governments, parliamentarians, DSF, decentralized platforms for dialogue, strategic and research centres, CSOs, and representatives of the various sections and groups of civilian populations, with an emphasis on areas at risk.</p>

### 5.6. Role of women and young people in matters of defence and security

 <p><b>ROLE OF WOMEN AND YOUNG PEOPLE IN MATTERS OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY</b></p>	<p><b>CHALLENGE:</b> Little or non-existent representation of women and young people in security decision-making forums, high-level decision-making of the various DSF units, and spaces for dialogue between DSF and civilian populations.</p>
	<p><b>RECOMMENDATION:</b> Make sure that women and young people are fully and unequivocally involved in the formulation and implementation of security/defence and PVE policies.</p>
	<p><b>COURSES OF ACTION:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Make sure that women and young people are involved in the formulation of security/defence and PVE policies.</li> <li>• Make sure that women and young people are systematically assigned significant levels of responsibility in the bodies and mechanisms responsible for implementing defence/security and PVE policies.</li> <li>• Take on board the needs of local women and young people and promote dialogue between them and DSF.</li> <li>• Train and raise awareness of women and young people in relation to matters of defence and security.</li> </ul>
<p><b>ACTORS INVOLVED</b></p>	<p>Governments, parliamentarians, DSF, strategic and research centres, CSOs, especially those promoting the empowerment of women and young people, and local women and young people.</p>

## 5.7. Regional dimension

 <p><b>REGIONAL DIMENSION</b></p>	<p><b>CHALLENGE:</b> Interaction between states and actors via regional mechanisms to develop a PVE approach and increase the involvement of DSF in PVE, leaves a lot to be desired.</p>
	<p><b>RECOMMENDATION:</b> Promote regional collaborative frameworks to increase the role played by DSF in PVE.</p>
<p><b>ACTORS INVOLVED</b></p>	<p><b>COURSES OF ACTION:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build a stronger network of regional PVE organizations (policies, skills and expertise, and mechanisms), including and explicitly relating to DSF.</li> <li>• Organize regular discussions so that DSF can share their experiences of PVE.</li> <li>• Provide regional PVE training programmes for DSF.</li> <li>• Develop regional multi-party spaces for dialogue in relation to PVE.</li> </ul> <p>Regional organizations, governments, DSF, civil society, partners, international organizations and international NGOs.</p>





# **Conclusion**

**Towards a new vision of human security**



While it is no easy task to change the philosophy, culture and principles that have long underpinned the defence and security policies of a country based in West Africa or elsewhere, it is, nevertheless, a necessary one.

Although the state remains the principal guarantor of security, state security is not sufficient to guarantee the well-being of its citizens. Developing a security agenda that transcends the traditional concept of state security does not mean that that concept is supplanted, but rather that it is supplemented by overarching responses that address the multi-dimensional causes and consequences of the complex challenges that currently affect or threaten this region. In the interests of human security, a network of public and civil stakeholders must take concerted action in order to deliver sustainable, prevention-orientated responses to the most complex security challenges. This approach addresses the root causes of vulnerabilities, places a spotlight on emerging risks, and allows action to be taken at an early stage to avoid a situation whereby states become embroiled in a security-driven response which is unable to overcome all these challenges. Defence and security forces (DSF) can break new ground by integrating the concept of prevention into their mission. In so doing, they supplement, rather than supplant, their traditional mandate with the addition of a peacebuilding dimension and the adoption of a collaborative approach to security. Dialogue is the key to success. By working hand in hand with civilian populations, DSF will be able to deliver solutions adapted to local needs and challenges, while pursuing a common goal of fostering social cohesion and dignity.

The scope and systematic nature of this study have given us an unprecedented and in-depth insight into the situation of West African countries in terms when preventing violent extremism (PVE) and the role that DSF play, or can play, in that regard. While this vision and its translation into concrete action remain a work in progress, there is a general consensus among all the decision-makers, DSF representatives, researchers, and CSOs involved in this project that the response cannot be viewed exclusively through the prism of security. We hope this paper will enable all stakeholders, especially DSF, to come together in pursuit of their common goal to advance the cause of PVE in their respective countries, and to continue to give voice to this concept and the implications of its implementation in their field of activity.

Just as it has been necessary for us to cooperate with others to conduct this study – by discussing, sharing views on, and learning from experiences in relation to the causes of violent extremism – so the same practices will be required to promote human security and establish a lasting peace



# **Annexes**



## Appendix 1 - Interview guide

The research questions put to interviewees were designed primarily to gain an insight into their understanding and perceptions of various domestic texts, policies and practices, and to systematize the analysis of these data and perceptions with a view to producing a live audit and identifying the needs of the region. The following questions enabled the researcher to structure the interview and systematize data collection.

### Questions:

<b>1</b>	<b>Strategic framework for PVE:</b>
1.1	o Do you know of any existing strategic frameworks for PVE? If so, please provide details.
1.2	o Do you think the strategic framework for PVE is in line with the conceptual approaches (international, regional, and national) of PVE? If so, why?
1.3	o Do you know of any domestic plans, global strategies, or other strategic/legal documents relating specifically to PVE? If so, please provide details.
<b>2</b>	<b>Implementation of PVE frameworks and resources, relevance for DSF, and links between DSF and political/justice sector actors:</b>
2.1	o What PVE resources are available to you?
2.2	o To what extent are PVE resources consistent?
2.3	o Do you know which mechanisms are responsible for PVE? If so, what are they?
2.4	o Does your institution have access to resources specially dedicated to PVE?
<b>3</b>	<b>Prominence of PVE in the mission of DSF:</b>
3.1	o How prominent a role do DSF play in PVE?
3.2	o In your opinion, how should aspects of PVE be integrated into DSF training?
3.3	o In your opinion, to what extent are DSF inclined to engage in PVE?
3.5	o Are you aware of any successful initiatives to integrate legal frameworks relating to PVE into the professional tasks of DSF?
3.6	o Do you know if DSF have any room for manoeuvre in relation to PVE? If so, in what respect?
<b>4</b>	<b>The extent to which DSF liaise with civilian populations in relation to PVE:</b>
4.1	o Do existing PVE frameworks promote cooperation between DSF and civil society/the private sector in respect of PVE?
4.2	o Do you think existing PVE frameworks build trust between civilian populations and DSF?
4.3	o Do you think existing PVE frameworks enable best practices and experiences to be shared between civilian populations and DSF?
4.4	o Do you think existing PVE frameworks promote, and support awareness programmes and sector-based training modules undertaken by DSF and intended for those operating on the front line and working in an administrative capacity?

## Appendix 2 - Participants in interviews

Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Office of the president</li> <li>o National defence and/or security councils</li> <li>o Ministry of defence</li> <li>o Ministry of the interior and public security</li> <li>o Ministry of territorial government</li> <li>o Ministry of justice</li> <li>o Ministry of finance</li> <li>o Sector-based police councils</li> </ul>
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DSF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Armed forces and support services</li> <li>o Police, law enforcement agencies, directorate for police</li> <li>o Gendarmerie</li> <li>o Presidential guard, executive protection units</li> <li>o National guard, civil defence</li> <li>o Intelligence services</li> <li>o Customs and border control services</li> <li>o Waters and forests</li> <li>o Military and police training academy</li> <li>o Department of human resources and training of defence and security forces</li> <li>o Defence and security units inspectorates</li> </ul>
Justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Judicial authorities</li> <li>o Councils for the judiciary</li> <li>o Standing committee for legal affairs, justice and administration</li> <li>o Supreme court</li> <li>o Office of public prosecution, legal counsel</li> <li>o Judicial services</li> <li>o Legal commissions</li> <li>o Tribunals, courts of justice, magistrates, practitioners of domestic law</li> <li>o Prosecution service, defence services</li> <li>o Penal institutions</li> <li>o Penal and correctional authorities</li> <li>o Military justice systems</li> <li>o Alternative state dispute resolution mechanisms</li> </ul>
Independent institutions, other bodies, parliamentary committees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Legislature/parliaments and defence and security committees</li> <li>o Ombudsman's office, mediation institutions</li> <li>o Human rights committee</li> <li>o Human rights bodies</li> <li>o Ethics and anti-corruption committee</li> <li>o Anti-corruption bodies</li> <li>o Independent complaints authorities</li> </ul>
Other government agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Representative of ethics and anti-corruption services</li> <li>o Representative of complaints procedure service</li> <li>o Other government agencies</li> </ul>
Other organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Strategic centres (public or otherwise)</li> <li>o Academic institutions</li> <li>o Representatives of women's networks</li> <li>o CSOs, civil society, international NGOs</li> </ul>

### Appendix 3 - About the partners

#### **Peace and Human Rights Division (PHRD), Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) of Switzerland - [www.dfae.admin.ch](http://www.dfae.admin.ch)**

Following the UN Secretary-General's presentation of the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE) at the end of 2015, the Swiss FDFA underscored its steadfast commitment to PVE by adopting the Foreign Policy Action Plan on Preventing Violent Extremism in April 2016.

In 2016, the Peace and Human Rights Division (PHRD), operating under the authority of the FDFA to implement the political priorities of Switzerland in these domains, launched a PVE-orientated initiative with a view to tackling the root causes of violence from the perspective of prevention.

The initiative draws on the division's expertise to create spaces for dialogue and undertake activities in concert with various partners. It promotes regional dialogue across West, Central, and North Africa, and has thus far organized approximately 40 events which have been attended by more than 2,000 participants from a range of professional backgrounds. The aim is to establish a forum where participants can discuss prevention, to build bridges between various actors, and to develop the initiatives undertaken by actors from these regions in so far as they propose alternative approaches to VE.

A cycle of dialogue aimed specifically at involving defence and security forces (DSF) in the task of preventing armed violence was launched in 2017 by the Swiss FDFA and its partner, the Senegalese Centre of Advanced Defence and Security Studies (CHEDS); they have since jointly staged four regional meetings (2017, 2018 2019, and 2022) which, in much the same way as this study, have helped to reinforce this new vision of human security conceived for and by us all.

#### **Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) – [www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch)**

DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance is dedicated to improving the security of states and their people within a framework of democratic governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and gender equality. Since its founding in 2000, DCAF has contributed to making peace and development more sustainable by assisting partner states, and international actors supporting these states, to improve the governance of their security sector through inclusive and participatory reforms.

It creates innovative knowledge products, promotes norms and good practices, provides legal and policy advice and supports capacity-building of both state and non-state security sector stakeholders. DCAF's Foundation Council members represent over 50 countries and the Canton of Geneva.

Active in over 70 countries, DCAF is internationally recognized as one of the world's leading centres of excellence for security sector governance (SSG) and security sector reform (SSR). DCAF is guided by the principles of neutrality, impartiality, local ownership, inclusive participation, and gender equality.

**DCAF - Geneva Center for  
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