16.11.2015

Zurigo, 16.11.2015 - Allocuzione del Consigliere federale Didier Burkhalter in occasione del «Forum for Economic Dialogue 2015 - The Economics of War and Peace» - Fa stato la versione orale

Oratore: Didier Burkhalter

Herr Bundesrat, lieber Kaspar
Professor Fehr, Professor Zilibotti (dear hosts)
Excellencies, distinguished guests

We are gathering here after a weekend of sadness, shock and pain. The dreadful terrorist attacks in Paris have hit us all. These attacks were not only against Paris and France but against all of us – against our freedom and the values of humanity. We have to stand firm and work ever harder to prevent violent extremism.

The Federal Council has condemned these barbaric acts by the so-called Islamic State in the strongest possible terms. Our thoughts are with the victims’ families and with the people of France. Switzerland grieves with France – our neighbour, friend and close partner. We will not give in to terrorist intimidation and are determined to work with France and other partners to protect our peoples and our way of life – and to address the terrorist challenge with steadfast resolve.

The Paris attacks have tragically brought home to us just how topical the theme you are discussing today is. There is a resurgence of armed violence – of violent conflicts and of terrorism – that affects us all. The increase of armed violence has caused enormous human suffering. It is having a negative impact on security and prosperity around the world. It has prompted a massive refugee crisis that Europe is struggling to cope with. Crisis has become the new normal in our world. The need for diplomacy has reached a scale not seen in many years.

But it is not just conflicts and terrorism that keep foreign ministries busy these days. There is a second development that has come to the fore, namely the return of geopolitics. These two trends together – geopolitics and armed violence – are leaving a deep mark on our world.

The megatrend shaping the world has been, and will remain, globalisation. But – to put it in the terms of your conference – geopolitics and the resurgence of armed violence are reframing globalisation and the economics of war and peace. This has an impact on foreign policy agendas – including Switzerland’s foreign policy agenda.

If you invite a foreign minister to talk about these issues, he or she cannot but tell you that the situation has become grim – we live in times of great uncertainty.  But I have not come here to make you feel gloomy. I have come here because I believe that creative diplomacy and cooperation can make a difference; that the enormous transformations the world is confronting can be managed; and that Switzerland can make useful contributions to this end.

This is what I wish to discuss in this ‘keynote lecture’ – how the world is changing, and how Switzerland is responding to these changes. I will take a broad approach – we must look beyond terrorism to understand the forces at work. I will end by applying my main points specifically to the Ukraine crisis, so as to build a bridge (in good Swiss tradition) to the discussion on Russia and the West that follows. 

So let us start with the megatrend – with globalisation.
Globalisation has changed the world more than anything else since the end of the Cold War. The growing economic, social and technological interconnectedness of the world has empowered many actors. This is true for non-state actors such as NGOs, multinational companies and megacities. But power has also been shifting among states, away from developed economies to emerging and developing economies in the South and East.

Global development gaps have been shrinking. The number of people living in extreme poverty in developing countries has fallen from 47% in 1990 to 14% today. Hundreds of millions of people are benefitting from growing income, better education, and wider access to modern technology.

The spread of economic wealth and economic activity is reducing global inequality. It provides opportunities for people, businesses, and states alike. According to several rankings, Switzerland figures among the ten most globalised countries worldwide. With its export-oriented, competitive, and innovative economy and its open society, it has benefitted significantly from the opportunities provided by globalisation.

But there is obviously also a more negative side to all this. Globalisation has also spurred new inequalities. Economic progress remains uneven. China and India account for the lion’s share of poverty reduction, and Sub-Saharan Africa still lags behind. The rapid diffusion of ideas, goods, capital and people can deepen social, economic and political instability. In Switzerland as in other countries, many people are worried about immigration and growing job competition. Identity issues have become a major political topic.

The subprime crisis, the public debt crisis and the euro crisis have revealed the risks of financial interdependence. And while the globalisation of information is set to advance a liberal international agenda in the long run, it has also opened up opportunities for the expansion of state propaganda and for recruitment activities by terrorist organisations. The rise of transnationally active terrorist and criminal groupings is closely related to globalisation. The Paris attacks, together with other recent attacks in Beirut, Baghdad and the Sinai, have painfully demonstrated that there is also a dark side to globalisation.

The bottom line is that globalisation can be a positive force and provide major opportunities for humankind. But it must be shaped in ways that maximise the opportunities and minimise the drawbacks. Advancing the globalisation agenda is about maintaining a just and peaceful international order, about effective and legitimate institutions and about defining common answers to the many common challenges – whether they concern transnational threats or global issues such as climate change, water security, and migration.

Implementing this globalisation agenda has always been a major challenge. But it has become ever more challenging as a result of the two current trends I mentioned at the beginning: geopolitics and armed violence.

The return of geopolitics is a by-product of globalisation. Although a multipolar world does not necessarily stand in the way of effective multilateralism, collective action has become more difficult to accomplish. Major powers appear to be defining their interests more against one another than with one another. Different visions are colliding – of global and regional order, of governance, and of development.

International norms and international law have come under increasing pressure. Geopolitical competition has become more pronounced not just at the global level but also in regional contexts. The status quo has been challenged in several regions, including in East Asia (with the tensions in the South China Sea), in Europe (with the Ukraine crisis), and in the Middle East (in many ways). In my own contacts with colleagues in these different contexts, the sense of distrust between some of these countries was palpable. There is great reluctance to iron out differences through dialogue.
 
It remains to be seen to what extent geopolitical competition will reshape the global economy. We can observe a regionalisation and fragmentation of global trade and an uncertain future of WTO negotiations, but the implications are still murky. For example, there are mega-regional free trade projects like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Whether these projects will become building blocks of multilateralism, as some claim, or stumbling blocks, as others fear, is unclear. There is also China’s strategic initiative of a New Silk Road. While some see it as a win-win strategy to promote regional connectivity, others regard it as a tool to advance political influence.

Similar questions have been raised as to whether the New Development Bank of the BRICS countries and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank initiated by China are complements or alternatives to the existing Bretton Woods institutions. In the case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 57 countries, including Switzerland and more than a dozen other European countries, have decided to become founding members. Acknowledging the immense infrastructure needs in Asia, Switzerland expects the bank’s participatory process to allow for the joint development of policies that are in line with high standards of good governance and with the Sustainable Development Goals.

Overall, the multilateral system is no doubt under growing strain. It is also true, however, that the system has turned out to be fairly resilient and is still supported by many. Economic instruments – whether trading arrangements or sanctions – may be increasingly used for geopolitical purposes. Rules may come under increasing challenge from those who did not make them. Geopolitics has indeed the potential of spurring de-globalisation. But this is not an irreversible trend.

Geopolitics is a political choice made by governments, not a given. It is up to us to demonstrate that we will all be better off if we choose cooperative solutions over exclusionary schemes. Re-establishing such a consensus and rebuilding a just and peaceful order may require acknowledging that there are limits to Western universalism and that globalisation is evolving from a Western-driven to a multipolar project.

The resurgence of armed violence is the second impediment to advancing development and reaping the benefits of globalisation. Although peace researchers remind us that statistically the number of violent conflicts is actually declining in the long-term trend, we must note two phenomena:

First, a stark increase in the number of victims. According to one estimate, while there were 56,000 fatalities from violent conflicts in 2008, the number rose to 180,000 in 2014. The Syrian war alone caused 70,000 fatalities last year. The UNHCR estimates that by the end of 2014, around 60 million individuals had been forcibly displaced worldwide, more than at any time since the Second World War.

Second, instability and violence in Europe’s neighbourhood have increased dramatically. In the East, the Ukraine crisis has brought war back to Europe.

In the South, the situation has further deteriorated in many places. Old unresolved conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, more recent wars like those in Syria, Yemen, and Libya that resulted from the so-called Arab Spring, and jihadist terrorism that advances as states fail and borders erode have thrown the region into ever deeper crisis.

There is no simple explanation for this resurgence of violence. Specific drivers vary, depending on conflicts. But the general trend is evidently related to the lack of a stable international order and global leadership.

The effects of the resurgence of armed violence are immense. They are felt above all in the conflict-affected regions where human security is declining, economic activity is being stifled and development gains are being undone.

But the effects of the resurgence of armed violence are also being felt in Europe. First, there is the vast influx of refugees seeking to escape the violence. Developing an adequate response to this refugee crisis has become one of Europe’s biggest challenges in recent decades.

And then there are the jihadist terrorist attacks, which must be addressed separately from the refugee issue.  ISIL terrorism in Europe has taken on a new dimension with the Paris attacks. Insecurity in the Middle East and Europe are increasingly interlinked. The threat of terrorism is bound to persist on our continent for years to come, even if we make every possible effort to diminish it.

To sum up what I have said so far: We are confronted with a resurgence of violence and a multitude of crises. This is unlikely to change anytime soon, and few of these crises will be confined by borders. With crisis as the new normal, international diplomacy is forced to work in a quasi-permanent crisis-management mode. Geopolitics makes the task all the harder, rendering the UN Security Council unable to adequately deal with the crises in Syria, Ukraine and also in Africa (eg., in Burundi and South Sudan). Implementing the broader globalisation agenda under these circumstances is not impossible. But it has become more challenging.

Ladies and gentlemen

Where does Switzerland stand in this greater scheme of things?

I already mentioned that we are a globalised country that has benefited from a stable and open global economy. This also means that our prosperity and security depend on a stable and open international environment. Switzerland’s economy is vulnerable to international disruptions to supplies of goods, services, and resources. Our country is no less exposed to the many challenges I have outlined than our European partners.
Switzerland therefore has a strong interest in contributing to the search for cooperative solutions to these challenges. Our way forward lies in a continuing willingness to act, create and shape rather than in immobility born of fear and self-confinement.

In the emerging multipolar world, Switzerland does not belong to one of the power centres. We are a European country promoting European values, and the EU is our most important partner. But Switzerland conducts its own foreign policy.

This independence is a challenging position in today’s world, but it is also one full of opportunities. Our independence enables us to build bridges, to work with a broad range of partners, and to develop our own initiatives. The more than 170 Swiss representations worldwide are a good basis for this.

Our particular role in international diplomacy is shaped by our non-adherence to a bloc, our non-colonial past, and our credibility. We do what we say, there is no hidden Swiss agenda. We are reliable and deliver on time. This may sound like stating the obvious, but the fact is that I am regularly approached about this by colleagues who appreciate these Swiss qualities.

In today’s world, Switzerland is not a small but a middle power. We are not so big as to frighten others. We are not part of any geopolitical power play. But neither are we too small to be heard and make an impact. Switzerland belongs to the 20 biggest economies worldwide and ranks as number seven in Europe – and this despite a small population of eight million! Switzerland is the15th biggest contributor to the UN regular budget.  And we are leaders in innovation, not just in technology and business but also in our foreign policy.

Swiss foreign policy mirrors characteristics of our domestic political culture – this is its inner strength. We promote dialogue and a culture of compromise. We stand for inclusive solutions, for power-sharing arrangements, for human rights and humanitarian principles, for taming the powerful through law. These topics and values are more relevant than ever.

The solid domestic foundation of Switzerland’s foreign policy is reflected in recent opinion polls. In the annual “Security” survey conducted by ETH Zurich, a record 78% of Swiss voters said this year that Switzerland should mediate more frequently in conflicts and should play a more active role at international conferences. 68% favour a strong engagement in development cooperation. This confirms my own experience when people talk to me on the street: There is a broad recognition that our country should engage in international efforts to shape the world – and that our active and creative foreign policy can make a difference.

So, what is Switzerland’s response to the current global changes? How do we engage?

Let me make four points:

- We are addressing the refugee crisis;
- We are stepping up our efforts to resolve conflicts, fight terrorism and promote peace and security;
- We factor the need for peace into our development agenda;
- And, for all the preoccupation with crisis management, we preserve space and capacity to contribute to efforts to advance the implementation of the globalisation agenda.

First, the refugee crisis: It has taken on dimensions unimaginable just months ago.  This has become another major crisis that must be urgently dealt with – on top of everything else. The challenge is both political and moral. While it is telling that the refugees seek to flee to liberal democracies in the North, these liberal democracies – we in Europe – must now demonstrate our ability to come up with a joint response based on solidarity, the Geneva Conventions and effective implementation of the measures we have agreed.

The only way forward is through cooperative migration governance, with countries of origin, transit, and destination. Burdens and responsibilities must be shared.

Switzerland has given shelter to more than 9,000 Syrians since the outbreak of the war. We are working with the UNHCR to resettle Syrian refugees in our country. And we are working closely with the EU on addressing the refugee crisis on our continent. Switzerland participates in the relocation scheme. We are also contributing to EU efforts to better secure Europe’s borders, providing both financial and personnel resources.

The deficits of the Schengen/Dublin system that have come to the fore in the current situation must not induce us to put into question our bilateral ties with the EU. Given our mutual interests with the EU, we must confirm our successful bilateral way. We must find common solutions to our common challenges relating to both forced and legal migration. The continuation of the Swiss success story depends on a reliable partnership with the EU and an outward-looking posture vis-à-vis the world.

Reflecting Switzerland’s humanitarian tradition, a priority in recent months has been to rapidly make available more humanitarian assistance for refugees in the conflict-affected regions – before winter sets in. The Federal Council has allocated an additional 70 million Swiss francs to help meet needs related to the Syria and Iraq crisis, the greater Horn of Africa, and transit routes. But we are also addressing the causes of migration through comprehensive peace promotion and development efforts.

This brings me to the second point: Switzerland is stepping up its commitment to peace and security. This will be reflected in the Federal Council’s Foreign Policy Strategy for the coming four years. Containing, de-escalating and resolving the many crises and reducing the level of armed violence has become one of the key tasks of our time.
 
Over the past fifteen years, Switzerland has developed a unique set of instruments to transform conflicts and advance human security. Our country is currently involved in more than 20 mediation activities around the world. And mediation is indeed one of the fields where we want to expand our capacity.

Mediation is what Switzerland is particularly good at, and mediation is what is particularly needed on the international stage these days. We will broaden and further professionalise our pool of mediators and experts to consolidate our leading role in this field. And we will continue to offer our services to facilitate peace talks, in International Geneva or elsewhere.

Another key field is evidently terrorism. Two months ago, the Federal Council approved a national strategy to counter terrorism, which is based on the four pillars of prevention, law enforcement, protection and crisis management. As I mentioned earlier, prevention is a major focus, and we are strengthening it in two main ways:

First, a new Intelligence Service Act has been approved by Parliament (but may still be put to a popular vote). This Nachrichtendienstgesetz provides our security services with much-needed means to uncover and prevent terrorist plots, and insists that counter-terrorism activities must strictly comply with national and international law.

Second, we have made the prevention of violent extremism a priority for Swiss foreign policy. Providing those vulnerable to violent extremism with alternative opportunities is a tremendous task. Development and peace promoting measures must be also applied to further counterterrorism efforts – from youth employment and vocational training to the promotion of political participation by actors who can speak credibly to young people at risk. We are currently drawing up our first action plan on preventing violent extremism. Working with the UN in this field will be an important part of this effort. We are also a strong supporter of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund in Geneva, which enables local, community-level initiatives aimed at strengthening resilience against violent extremist agendas.

It is clear that the effects of such measures, just like the expansion of our mediation capacities, will mainly come into play over the medium and long term.  By far the most important short-term priority to reduce armed violence and advance security is to end the war in Syria. This would give Syrians a chance to rebuild their country and those who have been displaced the prospect of returning to their homeland. It would also improve the prospects of defeating ISIL.

Switzerland supports the efforts of UN Special Envoy de Mistura to foster intra-Syrian dialogue with expertise and, if required, with financial resources and Geneva logistics. While any political transition must be Syrian-led and Syrian-owned, it is important that the regional and international powers create an enabling environment. In this regard, it is encouraging that the US and Russia, despite all their differences, have now established a Syria Support Group, with Saudi-Arabia and Iran sitting at the same table.

Switzerland calls on all actors to translate their shared expressions of solidarity in the wake of the Paris attacks into a concrete common effort to stop the violence in Syria. Only then is there a chance to make progress towards the declared objective of credible, inclusive, non-sectarian governance, with a new constitution and free and fair elections.
Our third field of response to the current global changes concerns the ever more obvious nexus between armed violence and development. There can be no development without peace, and no peace without development.

The nexus between peace and development has been acknowledged by the new multilateral framework for international cooperation, the Agenda 2030, which features “peaceful and inclusive societies” as one of 17 Sustainable Development Goals. Taking account of this nexus will be a guiding principle of Switzerland’s own new strategy for international cooperation.

This means that the Federal Council will for the first time submit to Parliament a joint report about its development and human security strategies for the coming years.  It also means that within the framework of our development strategy, Switzerland’s engagement to reduce poverty and exclusion in fragile and conflict contexts is more important than ever.

Switzerland was among the first donor countries to address the negative consequences of armed violence and state fragility for development. Today, almost half of the poor people worldwide live in fragile contexts – that is, in states that are unable or unwilling to perform basic functions in the areas of security, the rule of law and basic social services. According to OECD estimates, this figure could rise to two thirds of all poor people in the next 15 years.

In other words: If we want to further reduce poverty, advance sustainable development and prevent violent extremism, we must transform fragile states into peaceful, inclusive and stable states. This in turn requires complementing traditional development activities with peace- and state-building measures.  Today, already half of Switzerland’s development partners are fragile states. Addressing the causes of their fragility, increasing their crisis resistance and improving their human rights situation will be an ever more important objective in the years ahead.

This brings me to the fourth and final point of Switzerland’s response to the current developments: While our country can and must contribute to managing the many current crises, advancing the globalisation agenda and the more structural issues of foreign policy must remain a Swiss priority.
 
I am thinking of our contributions to the debate on reforming the United Nations and of our ideas to strengthen the OSCE’s capacity to act; of our efforts to promote cooperative security in East Asia and the Middle East; of our engagement for non-proliferation and disarmament; of our joint initiative with the ICRC to strengthen compliance with international humanitarian law; of our active and prominent role in shaping normative processes like the 2030 Agenda and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction; or of our Global Programmes to address cross-border themes such as climate change, food security, migration, and water. International Geneva provides us with a huge asset to make our voice heard in debates on such issues.

Ladies and gentlemen

Let me wrap up and now lead over to the following discussion round by applying what I have said so far to the Ukraine crisis.

While the Ukraine crisis has many drivers, it reflects above all a world of growing economic and political polarisation.  It is the violent culmination of a strategic estrangement between Russia and the West which has gradually led to an erosion of pan-European partnership and security. The crisis is about one country, Ukraine, seeking to position itself between two poles – a country that is confronted with competing integration schemes that also stand for different political alignments.

The crisis is also about another country, Russia, which perceives a western orientation of its neighbours as a threat to its own identity and security, and which uses geopolitical means to draw red lines in the sand and buttress its claim to be treated as a great power. The annexation of Crimea was a violation of international law and an attack on Europe’s post-Cold War order and its normative foundations.

The Ukraine crisis has led to a terrible war and a humanitarian disaster. It has rendered Ukraine fragile. Economic and financial sanctions have weakened Russia’s economy, along with other factors such a structural slowdown and the falling oil price. Sanctions have also had a negative effect on Western economies.

Elements of de-globalisation can be observed not only in relations between Russia and the West, but also between Russia and Ukraine. Economic ties are shrinking. The ban on flights between Kiev and Moscow has interrupted one of the busiest flight routes in the world.

Great powers are playing a key role in managing the Ukraine crisis, especially through the Normandy Format that brings together Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine. But Switzerland has, through a variety of measures, made useful contributions to de-escalating the crisis and paving the way for a political solution.

As an independent and credible chair last year, Switzerland managed to position the OSCE as a major forum for inclusive dialogue and the principal international operational responder to the crisis on the ground. Let me just recall the Trilateral Contact Group with Swiss Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini and her Austrian successor Martin Sajdik as facilitator and mediator on behalf of the OSCE. Or the Special Monitoring Mission, which has done a tremendous job in helping to de-escalate the situation in eastern Ukraine ever since.

Complementary to our efforts to revitalise the OSCE, Switzerland has also intensified its bilateral cooperation with Ukraine. We have doubled the budget of the new bilateral cooperation strategy, which seeks to strengthen Ukraine’s internal cohesion through democratic governance, sustainable development and peace promotion measures. And to date we are the only country to have provided humanitarian assistance to people on both sides of the contact line. The Swiss aid convoys crossing the contact line three times this year are a good example of our humanitarian tradition and of our credibility in this conflict. They have made me proud.

But, in this crisis too, Switzerland works not only to help end the violent conflict, stabilise the country and mitigate the symptoms of the crisis. We also pay much attention to addressing the broader, more structural issues. Our aim here is to identify ways forward to a common future.

One set of ideas we are working on concerns economic connectivity. This involves bridging dividing lines within countries and building trust among rival economic integration schemes. We want to come up with fresh ideas to break existing patterns of economic confrontation and allow for safe and secure economic exchange. In conflict-affected countries, trade is often relegated to the shadow economy – at a huge cost for the population. In Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova we have commissioned studies that reveal the impact of conflict and propose new approaches to regulating trade across political dividing lines. We will seek to establish the concept of economic connectivity in the OSCE.

Another issue we seek to address is the future of European security. The Ukraine crisis and the crisis of European security are closely interlinked. Neither can be resolved without the other. This is why Switzerland, together with our Troika partners Serbia and Germany, launched the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project. This Panel has already made useful recommendations on how to strengthen the OSCE. Its upcoming Final Report should spur broad debate in the OSCE on how to re-establish cooperative security in Europe based on partnership.

Incidentally, three members of this Panel are with us today: Ambassador Ischinger, who is skilfully chairing the Panel; as well as Professor Karaganov of Russia and the former President of Latvia, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, who will both participate in the discussion round that follows.

In this discussion round, you will likely see for yourself that finding a common way forward in overcoming the European crisis is a major challenge… We are in for the long haul. The same holds true for the Ukraine crisis. Although the security situation has improved in the conflict zone in recent weeks, the situation remains fragile. We are still a long way from implementing the Minsk arrangements.

Ladies and gentlemen

In our multipolar world, efforts to resolve conflicts, fight terrorism and find effective responses to our common challenges have shown the need for patience and perseverance. The challenges are huge, the crises numerous. But as I said at the beginning: I firmly believe that creative diplomacy can make a positive difference. We must all stay engaged and be willing to take responsibility.

Switzerland will continue to do its part. We remain committed to promoting dialogue and cooperative solutions, to building bridges for resolving conflicts, to preventing violent extremism and to shaping globalisation in ways that advance global prosperity and security. Our objective is to ensure a life in dignity for our generation, but even more so for future generations.


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Ultima modifica 29.01.2022

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