Swiss Cooperation Strategy
Horn of Africa
2018–2021
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach to Security</td>
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<td>CH</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>CRRF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework</td>
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<td>CSPM</td>
<td>Conflict-Sensitive Programme Management</td>
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<td>DDLGN</td>
<td>Democratisation, Decentralisation and Local Governance Network</td>
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<td>DDP S</td>
<td>Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport</td>
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<td>DSI</td>
<td>Durable Solutions Initiative</td>
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<td>ESAD</td>
<td>SDC East and Southern Africa Division</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>FDFA</td>
<td>Federal Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>FGC/M</td>
<td>Female Genital Cutting/Mutilation</td>
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<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Federal Member States</td>
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<td>FS</td>
<td>Food Security</td>
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<td>GC</td>
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<td>Global Programme Food Security</td>
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<td>Global Programme Migration and Development</td>
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<td>GPs</td>
<td>Global Programmes</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid</td>
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<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative</td>
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<td>HoA</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>HSD</td>
<td>Human Security Division</td>
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<td>IC</td>
<td>International Cooperation</td>
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<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Internal Control System</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IPC</td>
<td>Integrated Food Security Phase Classification</td>
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<td>JPLG</td>
<td>UN Joint Programme on Local Governance</td>
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<td>MERV</td>
<td>Monitoring System for Development-Related Changes</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NPS</td>
<td>New Partnership for Somalia</td>
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<td>OMR</td>
<td>Office Management Report</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PVE</td>
<td>Preventing Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>SAFD</td>
<td>Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Sub-Saharan Africa and Francophonie Division</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>South Cooperation</td>
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<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
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<td>SEM</td>
<td>State Secretariat for Migration</td>
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<td>SoE</td>
<td>State of Emergency</td>
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<td>SteFS</td>
<td>UN Joint programme Support to Emerging Federal States</td>
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<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UN OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<td>VSF-CH</td>
<td>Vétérinaires Sans Frontières Suisse</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WoGA</td>
<td>Whole of Government Approach</td>
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Somali youth entertaining themselves
© CISP Somalia
The Horn of Africa has been at the centre of global attention for several decades because of protracted armed conflict, large scale displacement and severe food security crises. The persistently negative headlines often distract from positive changes taking place, as well as from the diversity of the region and its potential. On the political front, significant progress has been achieved in Somalia since 2012, when a new government took office. It prompted the international community to re-invigorate its engagement and to enter into a large scale state-building partnership, creating a new outlook for the entire region.

The Horn of Africa will certainly continue to face recurrent climatic shocks and political challenges that will require quick (emergency) responses. At the same time, the very young population in the Horn of Africa, the advanced mobile money and telecommunication systems, the globalized diaspora and the widespread entrepreneurship are potentials that need to be converted into assets, in order to contribute to positive change and to sustainable development in the region.

Switzerland has been engaged in the Horn of Africa since the 1990s in the areas of humanitarian aid, development, peace building and security. In 2013, after the Horn of Africa became one of Switzerland’s priority regions, the Swiss Agency for Development, the Directorate of Political Affairs and the State Secretariat for Migration at the Federal Department of Justice and Police combined their respective instruments into a “Whole of Government Approach” for the implementation of the first Regional Cooperation Strategy 2013–17 in the Horn of Africa.

The second Regional Cooperation Strategy 2018–2021 continues the Swiss commitment to the Horn of Africa with the long-term objective of reducing fragilities and strengthening the stability of the region by capitalizing on the existing (positive) dynamics. The four priority sectors are governance, peace and state building; food security; health; protection and migration. Given the shared challenges and opportunities across national borders and the transboundary character of population movements, instability and climate change, Switzerland continues to apply a regional approach. The strategy covers Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya with a focus on Somalia and the arid and semiarid areas in Kenya and Ethiopia.

The complex and dynamic context calls for effective partnerships at local, national, regional and international level. Therefore, Switzerland works towards its objectives in close collaboration with national and local actors, the regional mechanism IGAD, as well as bilateral and multilateral partners. These partnerships not only enable a flexible and quick adaptation to the needs of the context and the people. They also allow the combination of humanitarian and longer term development and peace/state building initiatives and a strategic link between international cooperation and migration. Switzerland is convinced that this approach, together with a long-term commitment, are critical to contribute to sustainable positive change and stability in the region.

The Whole of Government Approach will optimize Switzerland’s ability to create synergies and to improve its leverage in contributing towards an inclusive and peaceful trajectory for the Horn of Africa.

Manuel Sager
Director-General SDC
Pascale Baeriswyl
State Secretary FDFA
Mario Gattiker
State Secretary SEM
1. Context

The Horn of Africa (HoA) is a region of extremes. It continues to be one of the most conflict-affected regions and suffers from some of the direst and most protracted humanitarian crises worldwide. It is one of the main producers and hosts of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The main dimensions of fragility are the lack of state authority and/or legitimacy, weak governance, the poor quality or complete absence of public services (health, education, etc.), economic underperformance and the increasing negative effects of climate change (e.g. drought). However, the HoA is also distinctly contemporary, globalized, and full of potential. This is manifest in the spread of mobile telecommunications and money in Kenya and Somalia, as well as in the activism of an agile global diaspora. A generation of young, energetic and connected citizens is increasingly working together to create better prospects for the region.

Conflict, Governance and Political Fragilities

Armed conflict and other forms of violence are symptomatic of the HoA’s fragility. While military confrontations between Eritrea/Ethiopia and Eritrea/Djibouti remain frozen, armed conflicts involving South Sudan, Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya continue with major effects on social and economic stability. Armed conflicts, geostrategic interests and military interventions will continue to affect the HoA.

Economic conflicts over scarce natural resources (e.g. rangeland, water) are widespread and deeply affect Somalia and the entire (semi-) arid lowlands of Kenya and Ethiopia. They are often further fuelled by underlying ethnic/clan disputes, or between host and displaced communities. Recently discovered oil, gas and water resources in the three countries are additional drivers of conflict.

The current governance arrangements in the Horn of Africa can be considered as a source of political conflict. The transition towards democratic sys-
tems are relatively new achievements. In spite of their different governance trajectories Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia share similar challenges, yet to various degrees. They concern mainly the ongoing state-building processes, the necessity to integrate different, often marginalised population groups, the need to deliver basic public services and the essential obligation to strengthen the rule of law, respect for human rights as well as transparency and accountability in public administration.

After over two decades of civil war, Somalia resurfaced on the world map in 2012 with the promise of a more peaceful future. Steps of re-construction included the instatement of an internationally recognized federal government, the adoption of a provisional constitution stipulating a federal state, the re-engagement of the international community with the launch of the New Deal Compact in Brussels in 2013, the adoption of Vision 2016 spelling out ambitious peace- and state-building goals, and the establishment of the Integrated United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM). The unexpected election of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” in February 2017 can be seen as a reaction to his predecessor’s failure to meet the high expectations of the Somali population by getting drawn into blatant corruption, in-fighting, repeated cabinet re-shuffles and the inability to notably improve government outreach and security. This choice also demonstrated Somalia’s capacity for a peaceful transition of power, despite – or maybe due to – the fact that the deep-rooted power sharing formula between the clans was maintained. Nonetheless, the new government has been operating in an emergency mode ever since it took office. Drought, the competition for power and resources, along with the difficulty to make a still nascent administration constructively work together, are just a few examples of the manifold challenges. In addition, the long-standing armed conflict between the Federal Government, with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) at the forefront, and the Islamist militant group Al-Shabaab, which still controls large parts of South/Central Somalia, remains unabated. This conflict has significant spillover effects on Kenya’s and Ethiopia’s border areas, as Al-Shabaab regularly attempts/carry out attacks in order to pressure the involved governments to withdraw their troops from Somalia. Unresolved territorial claims (e.g. Somaliland/Puntland, Puntland/Galmudug) also continue to prompt violent clashes, while clan-nism, which lies at the heart of deep socio-political divisions, further perpetuates conflicts and political instability. Moreover, the unresolved status of Somaliland and its relationship with the federal government of Somalia, contributes to sustained political uncertainty/fragmentation.

On the positive side, progress has been achieved in political reconciliation, state-formation and federalisation processes, as well as in laying the foundations for long-term state-building. The delicate settlement of the final status of Mogadishu and the Benadir Region is the only remaining pending issue to conclude the state-formation process. The cases of Somaliland and Puntland also demonstrate how home-grown state-building can yield significant results. While Somalis remain divided over feder-
alism, the formation of federal member states has opened dialogue on power and resource sharing. Agreements still need to be negotiated on the final form of government and parliament, state formation, power and resource sharing. These issues will have to be addressed during the delayed revision of the provisional constitution now foreseen for 2018/2019. The review process will also have to take into account the stalled Somalia – Somaliland negotiations.

Since 2015/16, Ethiopia’s Federal Government has been facing its largest political challenge since the 2005 elections. The social contract – favouring economic growth, infrastructure and services over civil/political rights – has come to a turning point where ever-larger parts of the population are demanding alternative sources of political legitimacy, thereby questioning the current power-sharing arrangement between the centre and the ethnically-defined periphery. As a result, acts of civil disobedience and significant internal displacement have shaken growing areas of the periphery – with the potential to progressively spread towards the centre. If sustained, such developments – combined with ethnic conflict – could trigger a dangerous spiral of demonstrations and security response, with serious consequences far beyond the country’s borders. Against this backdrop, the government is increasingly challenged to de-escalate popular frustrations and re-balance its relationship with society – without undermining the development gains reached since 1991. All political and demographic factors considered, it is clear that Ethiopia’s stability over the coming years will remain a key determinant of aid delivery across the entire region.

In Kenya, the entrenched dominance of post-independence elites is a source of enduring instability and unaddressed grievances. Significant parts of the population are still excluded from the benefits of socio-economic development based on their tribal identity. Another deep-rooted driver of conflict is the troubled relationship between the central government and the Kenyan-Somali population. After the post-election violence in 2007/08, Kenya took a leap of faith towards a more equitable country by adopting a new constitution in 2010. The enshrined devolution has already yielded positive results, especially in the long marginalized North-East (e.g. improved public infrastructure). Yet, this process has also amplified the risks for conflict and devolved corruption, as well as destabilizing governance in the short and medium-term. Moreover, the 2017 elections have further deepened the rift along tribal lines to a level which requires significant changes to power and resource sharing in order to move towards true nation building.

These multi-layered conflicts, political and governance fragilities in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya continue to trigger forced displacement and serious humanitarian and protection needs and impede long-term economic and human development. In many areas of Somalia humanitarian access to the most vulnerable populations remains seriously restricted by insecurity (e.g. access to Al-Shabaab-controlled areas), as well as by the prohibition of contacts due to counter-terrorism legislation. A significant number of state and non-state actors also impose arbitrary access restrictions as a means of collecting taxes. The Ethiopian Government maintains tight control over aid delivery (e.g. refugee
assistance and responses to drought and IDPs, imposing stringent access restrictions in some areas.

**Socio-Economic Context**

Sustained macroeconomic growth in Ethiopia (11%) and Kenya (5.5%) has lifted more than 20 million people out of extreme poverty, and investments in health and education have visibly improved human capital in recent years. However, these developments mainly benefited urban areas and the more fertile highlands. Overall, Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya remain among the countries with the highest poverty rates and lowest Human Development Index (HDI) worldwide (i.e. over 55 million people below the poverty line of USD 1.99 a day; Poverty rates are significantly higher among the communities of the (semi-) arid lands, as well as among the growing number of IDPs and economic migrants to urban centres. The historical marginalization of the (semi-) arid lands in Ethiopia and Kenya, the long civil war and state collapse in Somalia, as well as the challenge of responding to high population growth (Somalia 2.9%, Ethiopia 2.5%, Kenya 2.6%), has deprived the mainly (agro-) pastoralist populations from accessing infrastructure and basic public services.

Public and private health services in these areas are of very low quality, often not affordable or simply non-existent (e.g. in remote pastoral areas). Consequences are a high prevalence of infectious and communicable diseases (e.g. tuberculosis, cholera, measles) – often aggravated by malnutrition – and extremely poor overall health indicators (i.e. low life expectancy, highest maternal and child mortality rates worldwide etc.). While some population groups are specifically deprived of access to health services (e.g. poor pastoralists, IDPs, urban poor, women and children), the majority of the population does not enjoy access to minimal and good quality basic health services.

In the HoA millions of people suffer from chronic and cyclic food insecurity due to the increasing frequency of droughts induced by climate change, the generally low productivity of (agro-) pastoralism and agriculture, weak post-harvest management, protracted conflicts and governance weaknesses (incl. land governance) to comprehensively address food insecurity. The 2011/12 famine in Somalia caused the death of 250,000 people. Since 2015, the ongoing drought has been severely affecting the region with about 3.1 million Somalis, 8.5 million Ethiopians, and 2.6 million Kenyans depending on external aid. (Agro-) pastoralist dryland communities in Somalia and the (semi-) arid lands of Kenya and Ethiopia are hit the hardest, with women and children suffering most. A large-scale international response (circa USD 2.5 billion in 2017 alone) has so far prevented famine. However, the below-average rainfall forecast for the 2018 rainy season indicates that the region is likely to suffer a fifth consecutive drought season. Hence, enormous efforts to avert famine will have to continue.

As much as the (semi-) arid lands face multilayered challenges, they also have the potential to boost regional economic development. Their pastoralist populations produce 80% of the livestock in the member countries of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which amounts to an estimated USD 1 billion in trade per year.

Gender disparities in the HoA are significant, particularly in (agro-) pastoralist contexts, but also as a result of protracted armed conflicts. Women’s lives are generally governed by patriarchal beliefs and customary laws which often prevent them from accessing services (e.g. health, education, etc.) and from making their own decisions. Female genital cutting/mutilation (FGC/M), involving very serious health risks, is still widely practised in the HoA, with prevalence rates of 27% in Kenya, 74% in Ethiopia and 98% in Somalia. About one in ten marriages occurs before a girl is 15 years old, and about half before the age of 18. Domestic, sexual and gender-based violence remains a significant protection concern. While both men and women suffer from the effects of conflict, men face specific challenges due to the risk of being forcibly recruited by armed groups and the loss of their role as bread-winners.

**Migration**

The HoA is marked by complex and dynamic mixed migration movements. Forced displacement has continued to increase over the past 5 years. Conflicts and natural disasters have produced about 50% of the 18 million refugees and IDPs on the African continent. People “on the move” include asylum seekers, refugees, IDPs and other migrants including unaccompanied minors, victims of trafficking and stranded persons. They partly move on the same routes, use services of the same smugglers and face similar dangers such as lack of food and water, physical and sexual abuse, exploitation, extortion, kidnapping and often death.

The vast majority of the people on the move remain in their region of origin, where many end up stuck in protracted situations in Kenya and Ethiopia, with very scarce opportunities for self-reliance and local integration (i.e. camps, out of camp situations). The comparatively few migrants who leave the Horn of Africa, do so along one of three main migration routes: the “southern route” to South Africa, the “eastern route” towards the Arabian Peninsula and the “northern route” through Sudan to North Africa (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia) and in some cases further across the Mediterranean to Europe. The exact routes and pathways are constantly shift-
ing according to the migration policies and risks in transit and destination countries.

Somalia, with an estimated 2.1 million IDPs, is at the epicentre of one of the largest protracted displacement crises worldwide which has resulted in an extremely rapid urbanization process\(^\text{13}\). Ethiopia has seen a 50% increase in its IDP population to 1.7 million following the escalation of ethnic conflicts between the Oromia and Somali regions. Due to a lack of better opportunities, IDPs are often forced to settle in informal housing thus facing exclusion, deplorable living conditions, and are vulnerable to exploitation by local clans and “gatekeepers”\(^\text{14}\). The risks women and girls face are particularly high in situations of mass displacement, due to the lack of access to adequate shelters, safe drinking water, latrines and health.

The limits of conventional responses (i.e. encampment, short-term humanitarian assistance) to cope with forced displacement in the HoA are evident. The political discourse on migration management in the region\(^\text{15}\) and in Europe is increasingly politicized and often dominated by short-term and hard security approaches. In this context, additional efforts to attain durable solutions for the displaced and their host communities are urgently needed. However, state restrictions on refugee rights (esp. freedom of movement), as well as the mandates and protocols of international humanitarian organizations, often hamper innovative responses such as access to vocational training or socio-economic integration. In 2016, the Kenyan Government started taking steps to implement its plans to close Dadaab Refugee Camp. This triggered strong pressure on Somali refugees to return. As the conditions for safe, dignified and sustainable voluntary returns are often not met\(^\text{16}\), this decision has led to an increase in new IDPs across the border. Returns under such circumstances are not a solution to migration problems and not compliant with international refugee law.

In this context a stronger engagement from both governments in the region and the international community is indispensable. The adoption in 2017 of the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees by the IGAD Heads of States\(^\text{17}\) is a noteworthy development, as it recognizes the significance of addressing displacement as a key factor for peace, security and development in the HoA. Another positive step is the inclusion of IDPs in Somalia’s National Development Plan (NDP).

Since the adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants\(^\text{18}\) in 2016, the HoA has played an increasingly important role in the international dialogue on global migration governance. With regard to the development of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and its practical implementation through the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), several states in the region have been selected as pilot countries\(^\text{19}\). In addition, the adoption and implementation of the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) presents an important opportunity to strengthen regional and global migration governance, such as encouraging measures to find long term solutions for refugees and migrants in the HoA region and beyond.
Regional Cooperation

A number of major challenges facing the HoA transcend state borders. Tackling root causes of the vicious cycle of conflict, political and governance fragilities, food insecurity, weak economic integration, poor service delivery and forced displacement therefore require closer and comprehensive regional collaboration in order to attain longer term sustainable development in the Horn. Acknowledging this fact led to the establishment of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1996, with the objective of promoting regional collaboration in the areas of food security and environmental protection, peace and security, economic development and migration. Although IGAD still has difficulties in advancing a common agenda, the organization yields significant convening power and has at times been able to align the interests and policies of its member states, resulting in progressive initiatives (e.g. the IGAD Drought Disaster, Resilience and Sustainability Initiative and the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees). IGAD has also managed to attract considerable donor support to overcome the numerous shared challenges which beleaguer the region.
2. International and Swiss Cooperation in the Horn of Africa

Position and Influence of the International Community

The HoA’s geopolitical importance has continued to increase due to regional security and stability challenges, unabated mixed migration movements, as well as its natural resources and economic potential. While Somalia’s proximity to the Gulf Region positions the country as an important hinge between Africa and Asia, Ethiopia, with its large population and territory, remains the most sought-after regional power. At the same time, Ethiopia also faces increasing pressure from European countries to improve cooperation regarding the return of its own citizens. Kenya retains its position as regional hub and continues to attract sizeable support due to its economic potential and role in stabilizing the region. In view of the various foreign policy interests at stake, aid flows to and interventions in the region have become more global, competitive and fragmented. This trend is particularly visible in Somalia, where a multitude of traditional donors and stakeholders are present (e.g. US, UK, EU, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, etc.), as well as the majority of UN agencies, the World Bank and the African Development Bank, which implement large programmes. More recently, Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and China have emerged as important actors. The HoA countries are among the largest recipients of aid worldwide (Somalia USD 1.3 bn, Kenya 2.5 bn and Ethiopia 3.3 bn). In Somalia, numerous diaspora-based groups continue to play an important role in small-scale humanitarian and rehabilitation work. While Somali remittances (estimated to amount to USD 0.6–1.3 bn annually) have always significantly contributed to Somalia’s budget and to its response to drought crisis, they have been targeted recently by US/UK anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism legislation.

Larger donors in the HoA invest in humanitarian assistance, development, security/stabilization and economic collaboration, with varying prioritization between sectors. Stabilization, counter terrorism and violent extremism agendas, as well as restricting migration towards Europa, are increasingly shaping the intervention rationale of donors and negatively impacting humanitarian principles and good donorship. The EU-funded AMISOM peacekeeping mission, for instance, is mandated to combat Al-Shabaab, ensure security and build the Somali National Army, but also serves the interests of certain troop-contributing countries. The fact that AMISOM receives logistical support from the UN and escorts their humanitarian and development agencies highlights the blurred mandates.

In Somalia, contrary to the broad-based international commitment, less than 20% of development assistance is actually provided through multilateral channels established under the New Deal. The lack of access to South-Central Somalia limits the presence of international actors on the ground. Implementation is therefore generally sub-contracted to local partners.

High-level fora to review the partnership between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the international community have taken place on a semi-annual basis since the 2013 Brussels Conference. In an attempt to make the New Deal more Somali-owned, the government formulated its first National Development Plan (NDP) after almost 30 years, which was endorsed in London in May 2017 together with the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS). The New Partnership for Somalia (NPS), which replaced the New Deal Compact, is now built on the basis of the first NDP (2017–19). It commits the new government to a set of ambitious reforms focusing on economic recovery, governance and public financial management, in return for sustained international support and maintaining the main components of the New Deal aid architecture.
Switzerland’s Development Policy  
Objectives in the Region

Switzerland has a long history of engagement in the areas of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding assistance to the region. The devastating 2011/2012 drought and famine, along with Somalia’s conflict, prompted Switzerland to step up its commitment and begin a long-term engagement in the HoA. The objective was to contribute to state building, poverty reduction and improved human security, and to address migration challenges. Switzerland also increased its engagement for the protection of migrants in their region of origin, in particular in Ethiopia, as well as for improved migration management of IGAD member states.

Switzerland designed its first whole-of-government (WoGA) Regional Cooperation Strategy Horn of Africa for the period 2013–16/17. In doing so, WoGA partners (SDC, SEM, HSD, SAFD, DDPS) jointly responded to the main regional fragilities with the complementary use of political, humanitarian, development, peacebuilding and foreign migration policy instruments. Switzerland has thus contributed to improved food security and health service delivery, supported governance, state- and peacebuilding and addressed migration challenges. The decision to adopt a regional approach was informed by the transboundary nature of displacement/migration, the peace and security challenges (i.e. spill-over effects of conflict), the regional implication of climate shocks as well as the socio-economic inter-connectedness and shared ecosystem of the (agro-) pastoralist populations of Somalia, north-eastern Kenya, and southern/eastern Ethiopia.

In line with the Federal Constitution, the Swiss Foreign Policy 2016–2019, as well as the Dispatch on International Cooperation 2017–2020, Switzerland’s future contribution to positive change and “out of fragility” in Somalia and the neighbouring, arid and semiarid areas in Kenya and Ethiopia will increasingly support accountable, inclusive and legitimate state functions and services on the one hand, and contribute towards violence-resilient community building on the other. In parallel, Switzerland aims to establish effective migration dialogues with the countries in the region. Switzerland will therefore continue to use the various instruments of the WoGA partners in a coordinated and complementary manner and link migration and international cooperation in a comprehensive and more effective way (annex 5).

Switzerland’s engagement will be closely aligned with the FDFA’s Human Rights Strategy 2016–2019, as well as with the FDFA’s Strategy for the Protection of Civilians, and is oriented to contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda.
3. Results Achieved and Lessons Learnt

Results Achieved

In spite of this highly complex and fragile context, Switzerland successfully established a programme in 4 sectors, during the first phase of the strategy.

In Somalia, Swiss support to the governance and peacebuilding sector has focused on state-building, federalism/decentralization, and peacebuilding. In alignment with the New Deal Compact and Somalia’s state-building priorities, Switzerland joined the World Bank Fund for Effective and Accountable Government, Economic Growth and Infrastructure, the UN Joint Programme for Local Governance and Service Delivery (JPLG) as well as the UN Joint Programme Support to Emerging Federal States (StEFS). Major achievements so far are the re-establishment of some key state functions at federal and member state level, instituting a transfer mechanism between the FGS and Federal Member States (FMS) for recurrent costs and the adoption of key policies which have laid the foundations for accountable and transparent service delivery at federal, municipal and district level. In addition, service and infrastructure projects executed by local governments are providing services to 2.9 million people, while the adoption of sound public financial management systems is steadily increasing tax collection at local and federal level. The WB’s support also enhances Somalia’s capacity to eventually meet the IMF requirements for debt relief under the ‘Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), which is a pre-condition to access IDA funds. Swiss expertise on federalism and decentralization created a trust-based partnership with IGAD, as well as with the Ethiopian and Somali governments and the North-Eastern Counties in Kenya, for continued collaboration and policy dialogue. In addition, international NGOs were supported to facilitate reconciliation and state-formation/federalization processes. Considering the magnitude of the task at hand and the challenging environment, state-building in Somalia will continue to be a slow and risky endeavour. So far, the influence of civil society in Somalia on shaping the state-building agenda, and demanding accountability and transparency is still very limited as the majority of Somalis have been excluded from political processes and decision making. To date, agreements have exclusively been reached between political elites supported by the international community.
Switzerland has contributed to the **food security sector** with a humanitarian programme since 2009 and started building up a larger integrated humanitarian/development portfolio in 2013. Following a vision for more sustainable and regionally anchored development, the focus has been on strengthening the capacities of agro-pastoralist dryland communities to cope with food security shocks and at the same time to build long-term resilience. With the 2011/2012 famine and the recurrent drought situation in mind, this focus has proven effective and will be continued. During the strategy period, Swiss supported partners (i.e. WFP, ICRC, UN-OCHA, IOM, VSF-CH) contributed to maintain minimal food security for more than 10 million people living in a protracted food security crisis in Somalia and Ethiopia. By seconding specialists to UN agencies, Switzerland was also instrumental in scaling up cash-based transfer systems, which have proven to be a timely and cost-effective mechanism in the crisis response. In addition, five resilience-building programmes have been launched since 2014 and have laid the foundations for more sustainable (agro-) pastoralist resilience to food insecurity through better access to key productive resources (rangeland and water) and services. The promotion of improved post-harvest management and agro-ecological practices (within the framework of the African Union Ecological Organic Agriculture Initiative) further contributed to enhanced food security of people in rural areas in Ethiopia and Kenya, particularly enabling women and farmers with limited means to invest in production inputs. Thanks to the integrated humanitarian/development approach, Switzerland was also able to timely and effectively respond in a timely and effective manner to the regional drought which has been ongoing since 2015 by immediately scaling up emergency assistance through existing multilateral and bilateral resilience programmes, thus helping to avert famine in the region. The design and activation of an in-built humanitarian contingency fund in resilience-building programmes in southern Ethiopia and Somalia are good examples of this practice. In summary, the increasing recurrence of climate shocks unequivocally underscores the importance of integrated programming and the need to maintain overall emergency preparedness.

Switzerland started its engagement in the **health sector** in 2014. With its 3-year contribution to the UN Joint Health and Nutrition Programme, it contributed to increased access to primary healthcare for over 3.4 million Somalis, while gaining a good understanding of the sector. The portfolio was further developed with four bilateral health programmes prioritizing primary health service delivery in underserved pastoralist areas of Somalia and Ethiopia, including system-building elements at federal and sub-national levels (in 2016, more than 30,000 patients, incl. IDPs, accessed treatments at Merka and Bodhere hospital in South Central Somalia). In Ethiopia, the Swiss support resulted in the installation of the first laboratory in Somali Region able to perform advanced investigation on specific animal and zoonotic diseases. It contributed to the development of the first One Health Programme in the (semi-) arid lowlands (through the establishment of a Centre of Excellence in pastoralist health at the University of Jigjiga). In addition, innovative research and pilots were launched to inform the sector (e.g. pastoralist health in Ethiopia, pharma industry and private sector in Somalia) and to catalyze new approaches.
Switzerland has worked in the migration/protection sector since 2009. In 2013 the first WoGA strategy was developed by the SDC (HA, SC, GPMD), the PD (HSD, SAFD), the SEM and the DDPS. Switzerland’s sustained support to the UNHCR and WFP contributed to provide basic services and protection to approx. 500,000 Somali and 850,000 South Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya and Ethiopia. By providing technical expertise (secondments), Switzerland also contributed to enhanced protection and emergency response capacities of the UNHCR and UNICEF. Emergency assistance was provided to 3 million IDPs in Somalia and Ethiopia through country-based emergency pooled funds (i.e. Somalia and Ethiopian Humanitarian Funds). Support to the ICRC in Somalia has played a crucial role in advocating for the respect of international humanitarian law (IHL) and providing key basic services in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas. The Swiss supported skills development project for refugees and host community members in Kakuma Refugee Camp (Kenya) has gained wide recognition as an innovative example to promote socio-economic integration of refugees and to reduce conflicts between refugees and the host community. More than 2,000 male and female participants have so far gained improved income and employment opportunities through market-oriented skills training. The inclusive approach contributed to an increased acceptance of the refugees by the host community and local government. Swiss support to the UN Durable Solutions Initiative (DSI) in Somalia enhanced coordination among all stakeholders, promoted an “area-based” versus a “status-based” approach and helped the government formulate policies to achieve durable solutions for its displaced population. Through the migration programme with IGAD, National Coordination Mechanisms were established at Member States level, which facilitated regional coordination. Switzerland also contributed to the EU Trust Fund for Africa and became a member of the Khartoum Process. In parallel to these interventions, Switzerland has constantly worked on improving cooperation in the field of readmission and return as well as on establishing a migration dialogue with Ethiopia, which has not yielded satisfactory results. Overall, the sector portfolio gained in programmatic coherence and thanks to effective coordination within the Interdepartmental Structure for International Cooperation on Migration (IMZ Structure) the WoGA approach allowed for complementary interventions around migration and protection.

At overall programme level, the following results can be mentioned:

- The promotion and systematic application of an integrated humanitarian and development approach (nexus) has positioned Switzerland as a credible and innovative champion in policy, donor and partner dialogues.
- Significant investments to accurately analyze and document the complexity of the context have enabled Switzerland to establish a coherent programme portfolio and to identify a number of innovative entry points (e.g. market-oriented skills development for refugee and host communities, promotion of the one health approach in pastoralist contexts).
- Swiss leadership in humanitarian and resilience coordination bodies (e.g. Informal Humanitarian Donor Group for Somalia,
Humanitarian and Resilience Donor Group for Ethiopia have contributed to ensuring a more coordinated/effective drought response, while keeping the centrality of protection and humanitarian principles, as well as integrated responses, high on the agenda.

» The signature of various framework agreements has paved the way for a well anchored portfolio and local/regional ownership as conditions for more sustainable results (e.g. “Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia concerning Humanitarian Assistance, Technical & Financial Cooperation”; “Agreement between the Inter-governmental Authority on Development and the Swiss Confederation on Partnership and Cooperation”).

Lessons Learnt

The first strategy phase 2013–2016/17 highlighted the importance of a thorough understanding of this complex context for sound programming and steering. The originally envisaged linear increase in development aid and simultaneous decrease in humanitarian assistance could not be realized due to recurrent humanitarian emergencies, as well as cuts to the development budget. It also rapidly became clear that multiple fragilities require sustained flexibility and more systematically integrated humanitarian and development programming in order to meet protection needs and safeguard minimal development gains.

Major lessons learnt are:

» The flexible use of humanitarian and development instruments proved effective and must be continued in the food security, migration, and health sectors (i.e. contiguum instead of continuum, nexus and joint programming instead of linear progression).
» Coordination and collaboration between WoGA partners is indispensable to respond in a coherent and effective manner to this complex context. Within the SDC, close cooperation between Global Programmes (GPFS, GPW, GPMD), South Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid is necessary in order to amplify synergies.
» The protracted emergency situation has entrenched the application of humanitarian approaches in the region. The shift towards more resilience building / development programming has proven to be more demanding than expected. This is, on the one hand, due to the fact that large-scale emergency responses are still required, and on the other hand, caused by the fact that most implementing agencies continue to be primarily humanitarian actors. As a result, steering the portfolio towards more developmental approaches has been slower than planned.
» Public administrations in the main target areas of the strategy – particularly at local level – are either still nascent (e.g. Somalia) and/or largely bureaucratic and inefficient (e.g. high staff turnover, low standards of public financial management, limited capacity of government counterparts and other relevant local stakeholders, etc.). Effectively managing a consistent partnership therefore requires substantive efforts on both the governmental and the donor side.
» The fundamental lack of data, analysis and research (especially in Somalia) will remain a major constraint on planning, steering and monitoring development for all actors (i.e. government institutions, implementing agencies). Although this is a broadly acknowledged challenge and efforts to address these significant gaps have increased, achieving the required improvements is a long-term endeavour.
» The distance from the embassies in Nairobi and Addis Ababa to the areas of intervention, along with access challenges, are important obstacles to programme monitoring. Continued efforts to develop monitoring tools which are adapted to the context are required (e.g. third party monitoring, partnerships with other donors).
» Bilateral cooperation in the field of readmission and return remains a challenge. Therefore, readmission and return need to be more strategically integrated in the political dialogue between Switzerland and the countries in the region, notably Ethiopia and Somalia.
» The regional approach is highly relevant, but challenging to implement (i.e. large number of interlocutors, weak cross-border collaboration, IGAD capacity challenges, etc.). More targeted initiatives to strengthen this approach are required.
» Approaches to address gender issues in a systematic way still need to be identified.
» In spite of all context challenges, the remarkable commitment of local interlocutors and partners and their willingness to enhance their capacity and to constructively engage with Switzerland is very promising.
4. Implications for the Swiss Cooperation Strategy 2018–2021

The HoA will remain highly fragile, complex and dynamic. Large-scale humanitarian needs, development gains, political progress and relapse, economic growth and multiple conflicts will continue to overlap. The new strategy will capitalize on the lessons learnt to better address these uncertainties and build more closely on the potential this region bears.

The four sectors of engagement proved relevant and will be maintained as they respond to the most urgent needs of the population, address the key drivers of fragility in the region and correspond to Switzerland’s areas of technical expertise and policy priorities. However, in order to enhance effectiveness, the thematic intervention focus within the sectors will be sharpened and additional synergies between them will be developed (e.g. improved mainstreaming of migration and governance).

The integrated approach (nexus) will be further promoted in overall programming and policy dialogue. While humanitarian assistance for people in emergency situations will continue, an enhanced systemic perspective to address root causes of fragility and forced displacement as well as a stronger systems-building focus will be applied in all sectors. This includes more systematic capacity development support for government institutions (incl. for service delivery), implementing partners and other stakeholders as required.

Cognizant of the crowded and politicized donor landscape, Switzerland will further sharpen its profile by concentrating on its comparative advantages and niches (piloting and disseminating innovation, promoting federalism, bridge-building, flexibility, long-term vision, close partnerships), as well as by capitalizing on reputation as an impartial partner. Switzerland will invest more in policy dialogue, including the establishment of migration dialogues, locally owned institution building, inclusive power and resource sharing negotiations and improved accountability mechanisms within its sectors of
intervention, thereby pursuing the objective of reducing fragility and supporting peacebuilding. Doing so requires increased joint political analysis and messaging among WoGA partners (e.g. humanitarian principles, aid effectiveness principles, challenges to access, violations of IHL or human rights, return). Sustained support to political processes and the readiness to take calculated risks are conditions for a successful implementation of the strategy.

The regional approach will be strengthened by jointly identifying and implementing (Nairobi and Addis Ababa offices) additional regional programmes (e.g. durable solutions, One Health). The partnership with IGAD will maintain the focus on capacity development of the organization’s core institutional functions, while engaging in a more strategic way with its key departments and specialized institutions (migration, drought resilience, governance).

Due to the lack of revenues and limited capacities, the ability of the authorities to equitably deliver public services to its populations remains very distant. In order to increase the health and agriculture/livestock production-related service coverage, more innovative and pluralistic financing and delivery approaches will be identified, tested and scaled up (e.g. public-private or private sector solutions).

Finally, continuous high investment in conflict and gender sensitive analysis remains key in this context, as programmes need to be designed to better address the political, social, economic and other root causes and to strengthen conflict resilience. While prevention of violent extremism will not be a specific focus of the strategy, community building and the positive change of governance perception bear the potential to reduce the push and pull factors for religious radicalization.
5. Priorities of the New Cooperation Strategy

The overall objective of the new strategy is to respond to humanitarian needs, while contributing to poverty reduction, conflict transformation and inclusive state-building in support of participatory and sustainable socio-economic development. Switzerland – by helping to ensure that basic needs are covered (i.e. food, health, protection), supporting the emergence of legitimate and accountable state institutions, and promoting more inclusive socio-economic and political processes for improved power and resource sharing – will help reduce the drivers of fragility and the root causes of poverty and forced displacement. This will result in framework conditions which are more conducive to improving the well-being of HoA citizens.

A holistic approach to migration/protection will be established by combining humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, human rights and migration policy instruments. This includes the implementation of the mandate to establish a "strategic link between international cooperation and migration policy when this serves Switzerland’s interests" (annex 5).

The new strategy builds on the current context situation with projected limited progress in the near to medium term. “Still a long way to go to reach the summit, but steady progress on a bumpy road”. The context calls for modest, but achievable outcomes, as well as nimble programme adaptation procedures and innovative monitoring processes. While governance sector interventions primarily focus on system building outcomes, the interventions in the food security, health and migration/protection sectors will continue to maintain their dual focus of directly benefiting the people while at the same time focusing on system building outcomes.

**Governance**

Switzerland’s overall objective in the governance sector is to contribute to more legitimate, accountable and transparent state institutions, which provide better public services and framework conditions which are more conducive to inclusive socio-economic recovery and sustainable development.

In Somalia, Switzerland will maintain its support to state-building by focusing on the establishment of core state functions at federal, member state and local level through its continued engagement
with the World Bank and the UN JPLG and STEFS programmes. Expanding the support to other UN state-building programmes is planned (e.g. constitutional review, parliamentary support) in order to combine the ongoing programmes with additional components which also address inclusive politics, federalism, and power and resource sharing issues.

Moreover, bilateral partnerships that can leverage Switzerland’s objective to support, develop and implement country-owned solutions to power and resource sharing will be identified. Building this programme component is also geared towards broadening platforms and diversifying the range of actors that can join the debate and benefit from knowledge exchange (e.g. civil society groups, research institutes, authorities etc.). Areas of collaboration between the diplomatic, human security and development units to work in a coherent manner on federalism and peacebuilding, while engaging at different levels (e.g. Office of the PM, line ministers, parliament etc.), will be identified. Switzerland will continue dialogue with political key actors and continue to build its network in Somalia. Support to federalism at regional level (e.g. through IGAD) will continue. In Ethiopia, considering the political context, governance will mainly be addressed through technical entry points with reasonable leverage potential (e.g. natural resources management). Mainstreaming governance into other sectors will be further pursued to support the achievement of the sector specific objectives. Bearing in mind that Switzerland will remain a comparatively small donor, it is important to shape a distinct profile, based on a strong WoGA approach, solid expertise and flexibility. Switzerland will support women’s political participation, and gender-responsive approaches in local and national governance and peace- & state building processes.

**Food Security**

The objective of the food security sector is to make dryland communities more resilient to shocks triggering food insecurity and violence. To achieve this objective, the programme will continue to apply a threefold approach by a) delivering emergency assistance to people in immediate and protracted crisis/emergency situations, b) improving sustainable and longer term access of (agro-) pastoralists to relevant services and resources (e.g. access to sustainably managed water and rangeland resources, access to advisory services, and production and post-harvest technologies/innovations), c) building the capacities of institutions relevant to the food security sector to provide sector framework conditions conducive to improved resilience. Addressing improved natural resource management and governance (incl. land governance) questions will be an important aspect in achieving these objectives. The humanitarian-development nexus will be applied.

To improve sustainable access to services and production means, the programme will enhance efforts to further test and promote options for public-private or purely private solutions. In addition, the programme will start to capitalize on synergies and complementarities between the SDC-financed resilience programmes in the border areas of Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia to enhance cross-border planning. Moreover, strategic secondments to UN agencies to enhance effectiveness and outreach of the cash-based assistance approach will be continued. Efforts to improve food security through the reduction of crop postharvest losses in Ethiopia as well as through the mainstreaming of resilient ecological organic agriculture into national policies, strategies and programmes in Ethiopia and Kenya will also continue.

**Health**

The objective of the health sector is improved access of the most vulnerable population (poor pastoralists, IDPs, urban poor, women and children) to affordable high-quality health care. To achieve this objective, the programme will continue to focus on both primary health care service delivery and system building, with a stronger engagement in health system governance. Support to service delivery will be done through (I)NGOs and national institutions (Somali Red Crescent) in areas accessible to Swiss partners and in line with the sector’s priorities. In parallel, partnerships with the private/informal sector will be tested to complement public health efforts in service delivery. Capacity development components for authorities at national and sub-national levels will be in-built in all interventions. In terms of system building, Switzerland will support processes and research that promote knowledge creation and exchange on different health system models for federalized, Somali-owned solutions, with special emphasis on the specific needs of the pastoralist populations (e.g. One Health approach). Experiences obtained in Ethiopia to promote the One Health approach will be assessed for potential cross-border interventions addressing pastoralists’ health. In Somalia, specific interventions focusing on provision of maternal health services and prevention and response to GBV will be maintained.

**Migration and Protection**

Switzerland’s objectives in the migration and protection sector are to contribute to the protection of civilians, to support durable solutions and to improve migration governance. Firstly, Switzerland will focus its engagement on protection and assistance for displaced persons by contributing to a more protective environment through multilateral organisations (UNHCR, WFP, ICRC, UNICEF), country based pooled funds, deployment of second-
ments, and by promoting more protective political and legal frameworks. Secondly, support to durable solutions will concentrate on local socio-economic integration of displaced populations through skills development programmes and longer-term, development oriented approaches to protracted displacement (incl. through IGAD at regional level). In addition, options to work on the eastern migration route are being explored. Thirdly, the strategic engagement with IGAD in the field of migration governance will be pursued. This engagement will build on the achievements of the first phase of the cooperation strategy. Swiss engagement will continue to strengthen national and regional migration governance capacities including registration of migrants and refugees, readmission, return and reintegration policies, as well as border control. It will promote free movement of people within the IGAD region in line with the IGAD protocols and further improve framework conditions for South-South mobility as well as address disaster-/climate-induced displacement. Swiss engagement in the field of regional migration governance in the HoA is in line with the international dialogue on global migration governance. In this framework, the ongoing national, regional and global processes addressing migration and refugee situations (GCR/CRRF, GCM, EUTF/JVAP, Khartoum Process, IGAD Nairobi Declaration) will be supported by promoting a comprehensive approach to migration/protection. Humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, human rights and migration policy instruments will therefore be combined.

Given the strategic importance of the region as a source of irregular migration towards Europe, Switzerland will pursue fruitful cooperation and political dialogue with the countries of the region. Addressing the challenging situation in the field of return, in particular with Ethiopia, needs to be based on the internationally accepted principle of readmission of nationals in an irregular situation.

Geographic Focus and Target Groups

The geographic focus remains on Somalia and the culturally and socio-economically interlinked marginalised (semi-) arid lowlands in south and south-eastern Ethiopia and north-eastern Kenya. It is planned to increase the current engagement in Somalia, provided the framework conditions are favourable (security, progress in state-building). With regard to emergency aid, as well as migration- and protection-related issues, the strategy continues to cover the entire region.

The target groups in the four sectors of intervention will remain the same as during the previous strategy period. Overall, the population of Somalia will benefit from an improved performance of national and local state institutions and better access to basic services. (Agro-) pastoralist communities in Somalia and north-eastern Kenya and south/south-eastern Ethiopia will be the target population of enhanced food security. Refugees, IDPs and migrants will better cope with their displacement and restore livelihoods thanks to better protection and framework conditions. Gender-based analysis will be strengthened to improve the response to disparities in all intervention sectors and to support women’s rights, their economic empowerment as well as their political participation in local and national governance and in peace and state building processes.
6. Managing the Strategy and Programme Implementation

To achieve the objectives of the strategy, a mix of partnerships and modalities will be applied (i.e. bi- and multilateral partnerships, core and earmarked contributions, mandates, expert deployments, locally-managed development, and emergency funds). Country-based programming under a regional umbrella will continue, while further initiatives with an explicit regional outlook will be identified. In Somalia, multilateral partnerships will continue to be prioritized, as the three funding channels under the NPS remain the UN, the WB and the AfDB. Switzerland will evaluate the ongoing efforts undertaken by the FGS and its multilateral partners to enable the increased “Use of Country Systems”, and depending on the assessment, at a later stage, test their use. In parallel, options to support the localization of aid, as well as bilateral engagements with the government may be chosen, provided the financial and operational risk level is acceptable. Overall, a more systematic and structured sectoral policy dialogue with government counter-parts at national and FMS level will be established. INGOs are other important partners in the entire region. Additional partnerships in support of peacebuilding, improved service delivery (e.g. PPDP), knowledge generation with national and regional impact will be identified. Humanitarian assistance will be channelled through the traditional multilateral partners (ICRC, OCHA, WFP, UNHCR), as well as pooled funds and consortia. Multi-bi contributions and secondments will complement the strategic engagement to promote cash-transfer programmes, durable solutions and coordination.

In order to ensure an optimal combination of all instruments and to shape a coherent policy dialogue, the strategy will be implemented in a synergetic and complementary manner by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Directorate of Political Affairs/Human Security Division) and the Federal Department of Justice and Police (State Secretariat for Migration). The respective divisions are responsible for the implementation of their parts of the Cooperation Strategy according to their man-
dates (incl. financial and human resources, monitoring etc.). The thematic coordination among the different offices responsible for migration/protection is ensured through the Interdepartmental Structure for International Cooperation on Migration (IMZ Structure) and the corresponding IMZ Working Group Migration Horn of Africa / Yemen, which is chaired by the HSD.

The Embassies in Kenya and Ethiopia coordinate the actors of the Swiss Government responsible for the implementation of the strategy. The Embassy in Ethiopia acts as the main interlocutor with IGAD.

Operating in such a fragile, partly inaccessible, insecure and conflict-affected context demands continuous security management and CSPM. In collaboration with the regional security adviser, the situation will constantly be evaluated and the protocols adapted accordingly (incl. awareness raising and training for staff members). Improving CSPM competencies of staff members and partners will remain a priority.

The indicative average budget per year amounts to CHF 41.75 million (SDC/SC 24.1 million, SDC/HH 14.5 million, SDC/GC 2.5 million, SEM 0.4 million, HSD 0.6 million). Financial means and human resources will increasingly be allocated to activities in Somalia if conditions allow (Annex 3).

Port in Mogadishu
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7. Strategic Steering and Monitoring (Risks)

The HoA Steering Committee, under the coordination of the Directorate of Political Affairs (Sub-Saharan Africa and Francophone Division SAFD), comprising representatives of all contributing offices, meets on a semi-annual basis to guide the strategy and ensure coherence in accordance with Switzerland’s domestic and foreign policy objectives. The HoA Steering Committee safeguards the alignment and effective coordination of all instruments and actors, and the strategic monitoring. Project steering as well as control of human and financial resources lies with the respective units.

In the HoA, flexible programme adaptation to the changing context is crucial for effective steering. Multiple risks stemming from the volatile environment marked by armed conflict, as well as fiduciary fraud and mismanagement exposure are likely to increase as engagement expands. Therefore, the diligent identification and assessment of reliable partners, sound context analysis, and frank dialogue with all stakeholders to jointly identify and manage risks will be a priority.

Risk mitigation will be done through regular risk and context analysis, the flexible and adaptive use of development, humanitarian, peacebuilding and foreign migration policy instruments as well as improved/alternative remote monitoring and controlling tools. The monitoring system comprises three dimensions:

The first dimension – country context – will be monitored through a semi-annual MERV process systematically linked to the uncertainties identified in the context analysis and to additional fields of observation for the humanitarian and development space. Scenario planning (Annex 4) will guide the programme adaptation.

The second dimension – programme portfolio results – assesses progress towards expected outcomes defined in the sector result frameworks, as well as the contributions towards country-level development outcomes, including transversal themes (gender and governance). Innovative approaches to better monitor programme progress will be explored, especially in less accessible areas (e.g. joint third party monitoring, remote monitoring). Annual reports, jointly developed by WoGA partners, are the main instrument for communication and accountability.

The third dimension – management – will be monitored by four instruments: (1) the Internal Control System (ICS); (2) the Office Management Report (OMR); (3) the SDC East and Southern Africa Division (ESAD) Gender Equality Mainstreaming Plan (GEMP); (4) the financial reporting system.
## Annex 1: Results Framework

### Domain of intervention 1: Governance

**Domain objective:** Legitimate and accountable state institutions provide framework conditions and public services conducive to inclusive socio-economic development in an effective and transparent manner.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Swiss portfolio outcomes</th>
<th>(2) Contribution of Swiss Programme</th>
<th>(3) Outcomes at Country level</th>
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</table>
| **Outcome 1** Federal, state and local Somali government institutions have started delivering core state functions | The strengthening of effective, efficient and accountable government institutions enables the public sector to provide services to its citizens and to establish the necessary framework conditions for socio-economic recovery and sustainable development. | **Outcome 1** Somalia

“To align, improve and strengthen organizations, working and operational capabilities of all government institutions at the national and sub-national level.” (Somalia National Development Plan, 2017–2019)

**Factors that influence positively the Swiss contribution:**
- Gradually increasing capacity of government to lead and coordinate expansion of core state functions.
- Gradual establishment of constructive working relationship between FGS and FMS.
- State-building agenda shaped at Federal and Member State level.

**Factors that influence negatively the Swiss contribution:**
- Insufficient alignment and coordination among actors supporting state-building (donors, WB, UN, government, NGOs).
- Ongoing armed conflict and restricted access.
- Renewed emergency response diverting attention from state building efforts.

**Risks (mainly country risks):**
- FGS cannot fulfil high expectations resulting in loss of support.
- Lack of continuity due to high key staff / ministerial turnover.
- Negative influence of elites and interest groups (nepotism); corruption.

#### Indicators

1. Proportion of government concurrent expenditure as proportion of annual budget.
2. Number of relevant laws, policies, strategies formulated and adopted for public sector institutions.
3. Number of ministries, institutions with clear organization structures, rules of business and terms of reference in place.

Baseline: not available
Target: not available

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1 Outcome 1 is focusing on Somalia only. In Ethiopia and Kenya no direct government related programmes are planned to be implemented. However, governance and government targeted components for Ethiopia and Kenya are integrated in and related to the other priority sectors (food security, health, migration).

2 In the context of Somalia, the priorities for the next four years in terms of building up core state functions are: 1) at federal government level to establish a functioning public finance management system; 2) to establish federal member state and local government institutions where not yet in place (e.g. through the provision of hard- and software to different ministries); 3) to enable federal and member state institutions to develop favourable macro-economic framework conditions (e.g. strategies, policies, legislations); 4) to enable government institutions to deliver public services. However, outcome 1 refers primarily to priorities 1–3. Being able to deliver public services is a much longer term objective.

3 In Somalia Switzerland is contributing to multi-donor and larger scale UN and WB state-building programmes. Specific baselines and targets for the Swiss contributions are therefore not available and the indicated baselines/indicators correspond to the overall country performance. However, by giving the ratio of the Swiss share in the overall budget, an estimate of the Swiss contribution towards the overall achieved results will be possible.
### Outcome 2

Inclusive and participatory processes at local, regional and national level lead to country owned solutions to power and resource sharing.

**Indicator 2.1**

Number of Swiss supported initiatives/processes that substantially contributed to achieving more inclusive power and resource sharing arrangements.

Baseline: na

Target: 2–3 relevant initiatives/processes at local, regional or national level

**Indicator 2.2**

Number of Swiss-supported initiatives/processes outside the governance portfolio which addressed power and resource-sharing issues as a transversal theme (incl. number of them that contributed to reducing conflicts).

Baseline: na

Target: 2–3 relevant initiatives/processes at local, regional or national level

In Somalia, the technical understanding of federal principles needs to be strengthened as well as the relevant public discourse. This is among the most significant challenges in the state-building process. The societal buy-in to the government agenda is still limited and conflicts over power and resources are recurrent. Constructive relations between the central government and emerging member states, as well as with the wider society, are crucial for the emergence of a stable, democratic and accountable state and a government agenda that is broadly supported by its citizens. By enhancing the capacity/expertise of key government and civil society stakeholders with regard to power/resource sharing and peaceful political settlements, and by supporting them to translate these into the Somali context, an inclusive and Somali owned state-building process is supported.

**Factors that influence positively the Swiss contribution:**

- Broad support of the newly elected president and cabinet of the FGS
- Federalism is high on the agenda, as is the constitutional review process. Relevant ministries and parliament are highly engaged.
- More positive stance of the FGS towards the inclusion of NGOs into NDP implementation framework (compared to New Deal architecture)
- Active and vocal civil society keenly interested in engaging.

**Factors that influence negatively the Swiss contribution:**

- Somaliland continues to be largely absent from all the relevant political processes
- Continued ongoing power struggles (FGS – FMS, elites, clans)
- Competition between donors for visibility and pushing for interest-based agendas

**Risks (mainly country risks):**

- FGS cannot fulfil high expectations resulting in loss of support
- Lack of willingness to take a long term perspective to find locally adapted and accepted solutions (imposing external models)
- External influences

---

4 Several Swiss supported projects in other sectors deal with aspects of power and/or resource sharing questions (e.g. access to natural resources)
### (4) Lines of intervention (Swiss Programme)

#### Outcome 1
- Technical assistance through larger scale state-building and local governance programmes (UN Joint Programme on Local Governance; World Bank Multi-Partner Trust Fund - Rebuilding of Core State Functions and the Socio-Economic Recovery in Somalia; UN Joint Programme Support to Emerging Federal States (StEFS))
- Engagement in the overall Somalia aid architecture (PWGs and SDRF) to contribute to constructive dialogue between government (FGS and FMS level) and donors.
- Support to improved working relationship between government and NGOs and localisation of aid (Somalia)
- Demand-driven and tailor-made Swiss expertise

#### Outcome 2
- Support to federalism/constitutional processes (e.g. provide technical assistance and expertise, research and knowledge sharing, support to platforms, establishment of IGAD federal-decentralized governance network)
- Support to initiatives to enhance civil society participation in political processes (e.g. through provision of support to NGO and civil society platforms in organising interests)
- WoGA advocacy/policy dialogue for more inclusive processes, incl. in potential overall political dialogue
- Support to peace promotion/conflict resolution and transformation initiatives, upon request of the parties involved (HSD)
- Support to IGAD’s institutional reform (ISAP) in the areas of (1) overall institutional performance, (2) interactions with member states, (3) interactions with development partners, (4) interactions with other stakeholders to strengthen IGAD’s regional function to promote inclusive politics (e.g. migration, peace mediation etc.)

#### General
- Continue mainstreaming of governance aspects in all intervention sectors, e.g. natural resources governance (water and rangeland management), health sector governance.
- Continue and expand project/programme in-built capacity development components for government institutions (e.g. in the health and food security sectors).

### (5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss Programme)

- Financial resources: CHF 31.8 million
- Partners: WB Multi Partner Trust Fund, Joint UN Programmes (ILO, UNDP, UNCDF, UNICEF, UN-Habitat); Somali Government Institutions (Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, Office of the Prime Minister etc.); research and policy institutes, think tanks, civil society platforms, NGO Consortium Somalia

### (6) Management/performance results, including indicators (Swiss Programme)

- Outcome 1 with Indicator 1.1 and 1.2 also contributes to the two Conflict and Human Rights Thematic Reference Indicators “Governmental Functions” and “Provision of high-quality public services”. Indicators and baselines will be integrated into the cooperation strategy monitoring and selected partner programmes.
- Gender-specific obstacles, as identified in the programmes’ gender analysis, are reduced. Specific fields of observations include 1) the equal access of men and women to public service delivery, 2) representation of women in federal and local government institutions and 3) participation of women in political processes negotiating power and resource sharing arrangements.
- In the policy dialogue with Somali government representatives, Switzerland is perceived as a credible, supportive and critical partner.
### Domain of intervention 2: Food security

**Domain objective:** Dryland communities are more resilient to shocks triggering food insecurity and violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Swiss portfolio outcomes</th>
<th>(2) Contribution of Swiss Programme</th>
<th>(3) Outcomes at Country level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1</strong></td>
<td>Dryland communities have enhanced longer term capacities to cope with drought and other incidents triggering food insecurity</td>
<td><strong>Somalia</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.1</td>
<td>Number of (agro-)pastoralist men and women or households with improved access to relevant products and services (e.g. animal health services, seeds, sustainably managed water and rangeland, advisory services etc.) (also contributes to ARI W3 Basic Services – Water: number of f/m gained new access to safe and affordable drinking water)</td>
<td><strong>Outcome 1.1</strong> Improve resilience through promoting food and nutrition security, strengthening disaster preparedness and sustainable management of natural resources (Somalia National Development Plan, NDP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline: aggregated projects’ baseline to be established</td>
<td><strong>Indicator</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indicator</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: significant increase in number of (agro-)pastoralist men and women with improved access according to a reasonable intervention input/outcome ratio.</td>
<td>1. Number of animal health facilities</td>
<td><strong>Somalia Outcome 1.2</strong> To develop a vibrant and commercially competitive livestock sector that contributes to sustainable livelihoods, inclusive economic growth and delivery of essential services. (Somalia National Development Plan, NDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1.2</strong></td>
<td>Number of (agro-)pastoralist men and women or households that apply improved natural resource management and agriculture/livestock production practices. Baseline: traditional extensive natural resource management and production practices are no longer able to guarantee food security and livelihoods of (agro-)pastoralist communities (climate change, recurrent droughts, overstocking)</td>
<td><strong>Indicators</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: a critical number of (agro-)pastoralist men and women in the programme regions apply improved practices which have led to improved natural resource utilisation and enhanced productivity (according to a reasonable intervention input/outcome ratio).</td>
<td>2. Annual value of livestock and livestock products exported. Baseline: export figures 2017 (FSNAU)</td>
<td><strong>Target:</strong> 20% increase until 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1.3</strong></td>
<td>Number of men and women reached in food security emergency situations. (ARI HA2 – Emergency situations) Baseline: number of people in food security crisis or emergency as defined by periodical needs assessments (FSNAU, FEWSNET, WFP etc.) Target: substantial contribution of Switzerland to achieve 100% coverage of food/nutrition needs (in collaboration with other national and international stakeholders, donors etc.).</td>
<td><strong>Ethiopia Outcome 1.1</strong> Increase in Livestock Productivity: (Growth &amp; Transformation Plan II 2015/16 – 2019/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ethiopia Outcome 1.2</strong> To develop a vibrant and commercially competitive livestock sector that contributes to sustainable livelihoods, inclusive economic growth and delivery of essential services. (Somalia National Development Plan, NDP)</td>
<td><strong>Indicator</strong> % increase in productivity. Baseline: not available. Target: 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethiopia Outcome 1.3</strong></td>
<td>“To reduce the proportion of drought-prone population in need of humanitarian assistance and food aid by 50% over the next 15 years” (Ethiopia Country Programming Paper (CPP) to End Drought Emergencies in the HoA).</td>
<td><strong>Indicator</strong> Area brought under sustainable management. Baseline: not available. Target: not available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators</strong></td>
<td>1. % of households below the acute and chronic food insecurity levels. Baseline: not available. Target: not available.</td>
<td><strong>Kenya Outcome 1.1</strong> Resilience of ASAL livelihoods to the effects of drought and climate change enhanced” (Republic of Kenya Ending Drought Emergencies Common Programme Framework, April 2015).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Average annual income of households in drought-prone areas (CPP). Baseline: not available. Target: not available.</td>
<td>3. Financial resources spent on investments in development versus the resources spent on emergency response (CPP). Baseline: Not available. Target: Not available.</td>
<td><strong>Indicators</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. % improvement in economic gains from livestock. 2. % decrease in incidence of malnutrition. Baseline: to be defined in accordance with Kenya National Bureau of Statistics - Household economic surveys; Target: to be defined.</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Outcome 1.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5 The given target description defines the parameters the target value has to comply with. The concrete value will be defined ones the baselines are established. With access constraints and limited data availability especially in Somalia, the establishment of improved baselines and information collection system is a continuous process during programme implementation.

6 The Somalia National Development Plan 2017–2019 defines only very broad outcomes for food security, resilience, livestock and agricultural production. Accordingly indicators are few and are partly focusing on sector aspects the Swiss Regional Programme HoA is not considering the 1st priority of intervention focus in Somalia to achieve the overall goals (e.g. enhanced livestock production for export). For almost all indicators in the NDP baselines and targets are missing. There are also no UN proxies available.
### Outcome 2
**System relevant local institutions** contribute more effectively to framework conditions conducive to enhanced resilience/food security of dry land communities.

**Indicator 2.1**
Number of nutrition relevant policies, research studies, laws, strategies and plans developed/adopted/implemented at regional, national or local level\(^7\)

(ARI FS3 Access to resources – Nutrition)

Baseline: while a few policies, research studies and agricultural and livestock sector plans for the ASAL regions exist in Kenya and Ethiopia, they are far too limited and scattered to effectively address the challenges of the sector. In Somalia, institutions are partly non-existent or extremely weak; hardly any sector data, policies, research studies with operational relevance are available.

Target: 2–3 good quality and relevant sector products per year

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**Somalia Outcome 2**
Improve resilience through promoting food and nutrition security, strengthening disaster preparedness and sustainable management of natural resources; To develop a vibrant and commercially competitive livestock sector that contributes to sustainable livelihoods, inclusive economic growth and delivery of essential services; To ensure food and nutrition security and to pursue economic growth through sustainable agricultural development.” (Somalia National Development Plan)

**Indicator**
Number of relevant laws, policies, strategies formulated and adopted

Baseline: not available
Target: not available

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**Ethiopia Outcome 2**
To ensure that improved technologies and policies aiming at enhancing household resilience in drought-prone areas and communities are generated, promoted and successfully adopted. (CPP)

**Indicators**
1. Number of Pastoral Training Centres/PTCs and Pastoral Field Schools being strengthened in the ASALs of Ethiopia.
Baseline: not available
Target: not available
2. Quality of extension strategies in addressing (agro-) pastoralist communities’ needs and priorities.
Baseline: not available
Target: not available

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**Kenya Outcome 2**
“Institutions, mechanisms and capacities that build resilience to drought and climate change developed and strengthened” (Republic of Kenya Ending Drought Emergencies Common Programme Framework, April 2015).

**Indicator**
Number of counties with policy and legal frameworks in place that support achievement of the EDE goal.

Baseline: Integrated Financial Management System (IFMIS); county governments’ legal documents.
Target: not available

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7 The term “institutions” includes a broad array of different possible organizational entities on micro, meso, and macro level from the private sector, civil society, and government (e.g. business associations, governments, universities, parastatal organizations, CBO’s, communities etc.). System relevant refers to local institutions that are indispensable to ensure a sustainable and longer term performing agricultural/livestock sector (e.g. research stations that provide the required knowledge.

8 This indicator also includes research, baselines, sector planning/management data and other sector relevant knowledge etc. developed, disseminated, endorsed and enforced by existing or newly created Swiss supported regional, national or local sector institutions.
(4) Lines of intervention (Swiss Programme)

Outcome 1
- Facilitate technical capacity strengthening support to government, civil-society, and private sector institutions (hard- and software) to improve service delivery.
- Community based capacity strengthening to improve natural resource management and production practices through agro-pastoralist field schools, training of trainers for community based animal health workers etc.
- Identification, piloting and scaling-up of public-private and/or private sector based solutions to enhance access of people/livestock to water and livestock/agriculture production means/services.
- Contribute to the provision of food, cash and production means in emergency situations through WFP, ICRC, and programme in-built emergency components (e.g. animal fodder, seeds, animal health services etc.)
- Cash for work to rehabilitate small scale productive infrastructure (water points etc.)

Outcome 2
- Technical capacity strengthening support to enable government, civil-society, and private sector institutions (hard- and software) to continuously provide relevant sector products improving the general framework conditions towards enhanced food security (policies, research etc.)
- Policy dialogue and advocacy to promote and support favourable sector framework conditions for (agro-)pastoralists (including through reinforcing accountability mechanisms to ensure that norms and policies on food security and nutrition are formulated and implemented in a way that contributes to sustainable development and inclusion).
- Promotion of national food security and natural disaster management policies and related legal and institutional frameworks (that are conducive, for instance, to innovative agricultural insurance approaches) i.e. Africa Risk Capacity, GPFS.
- Support the implementation of the African Union Declaration on Land and the Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa, in order to facilitate access to land and security of land rights for all land users in the IGAD region, especially vulnerable groups such as pastoralists, women and youth. (GPFS --> IGAD Land Governance)
- Mandating government, civil-society, and private sector institutions to produce and disseminate immediately required sector data/knowledge/tools for more effective and needs-based sector planning, management and monitoring (including more systemic analysis of the underlying causes of sector failure).

General
- Partner, donor and policy dialogue to promote an integrated humanitarian and development approach (system building, while ensuring that basic needs are covered).
- Participation in national and regional (IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative) donor and government coordination fora.

(5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss Programme)

Financial resources: CHF 65.4 million
 Partners: WFP; FAO; IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (ICPARD); north-eastern Kenya county, south/south-eastern Ethiopian woreda and Somalia government institutions; (I)NGOs (Helvetas, GIZ, SomRep consortia, Millenium Alliance); Kenyan Pastoralist Parliamentary Group; research and policy institutions; private sector companies (e.g. IBM, Sweet Sense); UN emergency pooled funds (Somalia and Ethiopian Humanitarian Fund)

(6) Management/performance results, including indicators (Swiss Programme)

- CSPM: “Swiss programmes have contributed to the reduction of disputes over natural resources” is a sub-objective under Outcome 1. A corresponding indicator will be integrated into the CS monitoring system (e.g. TRI CHR Resource conflicts / conflict resolution: Number of programmes or initiatives/mechanisms in Swiss supported programmes that contribute to reducing conflict over access to natural resources). Indicative measures to achieve the objective are to enhance SDC staff and implementing partners’ capacities to identify underlying conflict dynamics and to define measures to address them.
- Gender: Swiss programmes have contributed to women’s empowerment in terms of equal access to livelihood relevant natural resources and skills and training.
- The systematic capitalisation of experiences regarding the application of an integrated humanitarian and development approach (nexus) in the Swiss supported food security portfolio, as well as the proactive advocacy for the approach in the donor and policy dialogue with government authorities, has contributed to an enhanced joint learning process and ultimately the enhanced application of the approach in the sector.
- In spite of the challenging and fragile context, Swiss supported programmes increasingly reflect realistic options to apply more sustainable (systemic) approaches to address food insecurity in their programming (e.g. service delivery through local public or private sector stakeholders). Options are tested and, if successful, scaled up. To achieve this objective, the cooperation office will strengthen the dialogue with implementing partners and support possible necessary joint measures (e.g. enhancing backstopping capacities, promote joint learning, etc.)
## Domain objective: The most vulnerable population has improved access to affordable, good-quality health care

### (1) Swiss portfolio outcomes

**Outcome 1**

**Domain of intervention 3: Health**

**Swiss contribution: The current public health system in the region is far from being able to ensure universal health coverage for its population, particularly in remote areas. By making EPHS accessible and affordable to population in our targeted areas, the SDC will contribute to ensuring minimal basic health conditions are covered for those in need, thus expanding geographical health coverage, while using the existing health system.**

**Factors that influence positively the Swiss contribution:**

- Somalia: New MoH (new government since April 2017), some improvements in access.
- Improved coordination among health donors (Somalia Health donors group established in 2017).
- Ethiopia: National government showing increased interest in support to pastoralist (emerging economies) communities.
- Opportunity for increased regional dissemination on One Health.

**Factors that influence negatively the Swiss contribution:**

- Somalia: Militarisation of the international agenda, access might be worsening over time.
- Humanitarian operations not harmonized with development efforts deployed.
- Poor or no regulation of private health providers (no proper accreditation and control system).
- Continued low capacities of the Somali health authorities to steer/manage the sector and to allocate sufficient funds.

**Risks:**

- Persistent excessive out-of-pocket expenditures despite development of public health system; lack of sustainable health financing strategies.
- Low uptake of public health services (lack of trust by communities).
- Limited access to conflict-affected areas.
- Chronic recurrent emergencies (droughts).
- Unknown extent of private/informal mechanisms of health service provision.
- Poor documentation of determinants of health.
- Diversion, misappropriation and extortion of funds.

### (2) Contribution of Swiss Programme

**Indicator 1.1**

Health service utilization at facility and community level/number of primary healthcare facility/outpatient department visits per person per year.

Baseline: Known general health service utilization in areas covered by SDC-supported programmes in 2016/17 (aggregated baseline to be established).

Target: increase in number of concerned population using available health services in areas covered by SDC-supported programmes compared to 2016/17 (target values to be defined).

**Indicator 1.2**

% of <5 boys and girls receiving the standard immunisation for common diseases.

Baseline: Somalia 46% of <5 boys and girls immunized; Bari region project 30% of <5 immunized.

Target: 80% of <5 boys and girls immunized (70% in Bari region) by 2019.

**Indicator 1.3**

Number (and %) of births attended by skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses and midwives) in areas supported by SDC projects (ARI H2)

Baseline: to be established in programme region.

Target: to be defined.

### (3) Outcomes at Country level

**Somalia Outcome 1**

- Improve the quality and increase the use of the EPHS, with a focus on women and children.
- Building on and strengthening the existing health system, particularly Health Centres and Primary Health Units implementing the EPHS, (Second Phase Health Sector Strategic Plan, HSSPII 2017–2021, NDP).

**Indicator**

- Institutional delivery (nationwide, in comparison with indicator 1.3, which focuses on areas supported by SDC projects).

Baseline [2016]: 33% of total national deliveries

Target value [2021]: <60% of total national deliveries

**Ethiopia Outcome 1**

- By 2020, improve equitable access to good-quality health services (in particular for women, newborn, children, adolescent and youth, including vulnerable groups) (GTP II pillar 6, HSDP IV – strategic objective P1, UNDAF 2016–2020 pillar 3 outcome 6).

**Indicator**

- Improved health service utilization and/or coverage measured in increase per capita outpatient utilization rate (Performance measure 5.a, chapter 4.6.4):

Baseline: 0.48 (2016)

Target value: 2 (2020)

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9 Currently children under five years of age often receive incomplete vaccination and not as a routine intervention. Therefore an increase in vaccinations according to the correct standards is seen as a quality indicator.

10 This is the joint UN-produced 5-year development plan for Ethiopia, in line with the HSTPIV. It describes UN endeavours and achievements, rather than the governments’. Although it should not be used as a reference for national outcomes by the SDC, it is much more detailed in offering baselines and target values to measure national outcomes against (within the strategic priorities stated by the government in the HSTP), and it is commonly used by international stakeholders as a working reference document for aligning indicators, hence its mention in this RF.
Outcome 2
Relevant regional or national health institutions/ stakeholders more effectively contribute to improved health sector planning, management and service delivery.

Indicator 2.1
Number of initiatives/processes initiated or products (e.g. policies, research, management tools etc.) developed by Swiss supported programmes and used by relevant health sector stakeholders.

Baseline: In Somalia, very weak institutions; lack of sector information and baselines; service delivery through NGOs and private sector suppliers. In Ethiopia: better functioning health system, however limited inclusion of specific needs of pastoralists populations.

Target: 2–4 specific initiatives supported (one Health, 1–2 additional ones); 2–3 sector relevant policies, research management tools etc. developed and implemented/used.

Indicator 2.2
Number of employees of public health institutions with increased public health management or service delivery related knowledge that they effectively apply in their work.

Baseline: 0 (2016).

Target: number to be defined according to reasonable input/output ration (relative target: 80% of employees identified in SDC-funded programmes and included in capacity building programmes).

A sustainable and inclusive/equitable functioning health sector that provides affordable and good quality services requires capable institutions (government, civil society, private sector) with well-defined roles and responsibilities in support of the duty bearers to ensure universal health coverage. In this sense, by developing and strengthening capacities of key stakeholders, the SDC will help to improve health governance functions, thus leading to better performance of the overall health sector.

Factors that influence positively the Swiss contribution:
Somalia:
• New MoH (new government since April 2017) provides renewed opportunities for policy dialogue, also at subnational level
• National government showing increased interest in support to pastoralist communities (emerging economies); creation of a Ministry for Agriculture and Pastoralist Affairs (with the new GTP, in 2015) putting the pastoralist issues on the national agenda and resulting in renewed opportunities for policy dialogue
• Increased interest in One Health

Description of factors that influence negatively the Swiss contribution
Somalia
• Security agenda increases politicization of other areas of intervention, including health.
• (Recurring) humanitarian operations are not harmonized with development efforts deployed in the country. Failure to build on existing efforts in the health sector might lead to further challenges for the MoH once the emergency situation is over.
• Politicization of the debate around One Health (support to pastoralism vs. sedentarization).
• Somali regional state is not a priority of the government.

Risks (mainly country risks)
• Limited technical capacity and accountability of national and local government
• Poor inter-sectoral coordination
• Lack of trust in the State authorities
• Absence of regulation for quality control and enforcement in health services
• Somali Regional Authorities likely to be reshuffled in 2017 with unknown political consequences for the JOHI programme.

Somalia Outcome 2
“Plan and manage the health system based on better quality up-to-date information, analysis and reporting’’; “Strengthen leadership and governance to better manage the core functions of the MoH.” (Second Phase Health Sector Strategic Plan, HSSPII 2017–2021, NDP).

Indicator
Existence of annual work plans and budgets linked to HSSPII priorities
Baseline (2016): 0
Target value (2021): 1 (national level)

No reference to research in the draft HSSP, but any research allowing the MoH to better document the health status of the population (creation of baseline), to identify viable models to implement, fund and sustain health service delivery and HRH management, etc. is welcome, given the overall lack of reliable data in country’s health sector.

Ethiopia Outcome 2
“Enhanced national health system capacity to plan, mobilize domestic, external resources, implement, monitor and evaluate health programmes towards universal health care and quality of health care services”
“Improve research and evidence for decision-making” (GTP II pillar 6, HSDP IV- strategic theme 4, UNDAF 2015–2020 pillar 3 outcome 6.6)

Indicators
1. Proportion of woredas with available essential drugs (including MNCH commodities) in health facilities
Baseline: - (2015)
Target: - (2020)

2. Proportion of health facilities providing notification of births
Baseline: 0% (2015)
Target: 100% (2020)

3. Increase in stock of health work
Baseline: 0.8/1000 (2016)
Target: 1.6/1000 (/2020)

4. Expected reports received from reporting units complete and on time (performance measure 1)
Baseline: none
Target (2020): 100%
**Outcome 1**

Somalia:
- Support to (I)NGOs and national institutions for the delivery of primary health services (EPHS) in areas accessible to SDC partners in favour of marginalized population groups.
- Develop and test innovative partnerships to tap into the private/informal sector mechanisms aiming at complementing public health efforts in EPHS delivery and facilitating the development of a self-regulatory environment for managing quality in health.

**Outcome 2**

- Capacity/system building components at subnational levels will be inbuilt in all EPHS interventions under outcome 1.
- Increasing support to bilateral partnerships in selected areas to strengthen systems at subnational level (Somalia).
- Promote/mandate knowledge exchange and research on sector-relevant topics for consumption of key health-related stakeholders (entry points for public-private partnerships, integration of humanitarian and development instruments, intra- and inter-sectoral coordination, health governance in fragile contexts, integrated health service delivery, e.g. One Health).
- In Somalia, identify options for putting federalism principles into practice in the health sector (synergies between the governance and health sectors).
- Promote One Health approach in ASAL regions as complementary to national flagship programmes to increase access and improve quality of health services among pastoralist communities. This includes the creation of a Centre of Excellence in pastoralist health within Jigjiga University (Ethiopia).

**General**

- Coordinate with other donors/national authorities to ensure coherence and complementarity of interventions (e.g. Somalia health donors group, NDP pillars)

**Resources, partnerships (Swiss Programme)**

Financial resources: CHF 40.5 million

Partners:
- Existing bilateral partnerships (SDC-only support): MdM-F (Bosaso district, Puntland); Cardno/Hode Consulting: Mogadishu (private sector initiative).
- Existing bilateral partnerships in co-funding mode: Joint One Health Initiative (Somali Region of Ethiopia) – with contributions by Swiss TPH and Jigjiga University; Save the Children International (3 regions in Puntland and South Central Somalia), co-funded by Sweden.
- Existing multilateral partnerships: ICRC/SRCS (integrated primary health care programme). This programme is under study for exploring a bilateral SRCS-CH partnership from 2018 or 2019 onwards.
- Public and private research institutions
## Domain of intervention 4: Migration/Protection

**Domain objective:** Displaced populations (IDPs, migrants, refugees) are better protected and benefit from durable solutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1</strong> Displaced populations and migrants enjoy better respect, protection and services relating to their fundamental rights.</td>
<td>Having basic needs (health, education, shelter, food) covered and being protected from abuses and violence is a key condition for refugees, IDPs and migrants to cope with their displacement situation and to restore their livelihoods.</td>
<td><strong>Somalia Outcome 1</strong> To protect, respect and ensure the social, economic, cultural, political and civil rights of IDPs and refugee returnees, reversing social marginalization and displacement-related discrimination through enhanced governance and the rule of law, ensuring access to relevant offices and justice mechanisms at district, municipal, state and federal levels. (Somalia National Development Plan 2017–2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1.1</strong> yy displaced persons (M/F) have access to protection and basic services (health, education, shelter, food) (also contributed to HAA ARI - yy persons reached by XX organizations that contribute to the reduction of violence (including forced displacement) and HAA AR - yy persons (m/f) reached in emergency situations) Baseline (2017): National figures of persons of concern (see outcome at country level) Target value: substantial contribution of Switzerland to achieve 100% coverage of protection and basic needs (in collaboration with other national and international stakeholders, donors etc.).</td>
<td><strong>Factors that influence positively the Swiss contribution:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indicator 1.1:</strong> Number of IDPs reached, successfully reintegrated and provided with a better quality of life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1.2</strong> Number of frameworks, policies/ initiatives supported contributing to a more protective environment</td>
<td><strong>Factors that influence negatively the Swiss contribution:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indicator 1.2:</strong> Number of migrants and refugees repatriated through formal mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline (April 2017):</strong> Although the centrality of protection in humanitarian assistance is widely acknowledged, there is a limited common understanding of how to operationalize protection (lack of strategies, policies) and limited funding (STAIT report 2016 on Somalia, HRP 2016 Somalia, protection cluster 16% funded (USD 15.5 m out of USD 90 m); 8% SFH/CERF funding (Somalia) allocated for protection sector). Target: 2–3 initiatives contributing to better protection mainstreaming in humanitarian assistance and government policies</td>
<td><strong>Risks (mainly country risks):</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indicator 1.3:</strong> Number of houses constructed for displaced returnees. No baseline and target defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline: 2017:</strong> National figures of persons of concern (see outcome at country level) Target value: substantial contribution of Switzerland to achieve 100% coverage of protection and basic needs (in collaboration with other national and international stakeholders, donors etc.).</td>
<td><strong>Protracted and new conflicts in the region.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Somalia Outcome 2</strong> “Reinforce the protection of the displaced, and other vulnerable groups at risk, and enable durable solutions”; “To reduce acute malnutrition levels in settlements for internally displaced and host communities through integrated multi-sectoral emergency response. (Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan 2017). Baseline: number of persons of concern (April 2017): 25,238 refugees and asylum seekers in Somalia and 1.8 m IDPs in Somalia. Target: 100% coverage (people of concern vs people reached)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kenya Outcome 1</strong> Refugee Act of Kenya 2006 (Act of Parliament that makes provision for the recognition, protection and management of refugees); UNHCR Kenya comprehensive refugee programme (annual overall framework for the management and delivery of assistance and protection services in refugee camps) Baseline (April 2017): Population of concern 496,150 refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya Target: 100% coverage (people of concern vs people reached)</td>
<td><strong>Severe drought and famine in the HoA causing reduced to increase affected community protection and resilience</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ethiopia Outcome 1</strong> &quot;International treaties/conventions relating to the protection of individuals, including those at risk such as IDPs and refugees are promoted, ratified and implemented; Vulnerabilities resulting from factors such as gender, age, religion, ethnicity and disability are reduced to increase affected community protection and resilience&quot; (EHCT Protection Sector - strategy 2016–19): Baseline: Population of concern (April 2017): 843,367 IDPs (DTM), 843,171 refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR); approx. 400,000 labour migrants (IOM); Number of joint assessments (i.e. inter-agency protection field missions; mid-term reviews by the HCT and GoE) Target: 100% coverage (people of concern vs people reached)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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12 More specific protection outcomes are spelled out by the Protection and Shelter clusters within the Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan: “To improve protection, risk prevention, response and access to services for IDPs and other civilians affected by conflict, violence, human rights violations or natural disaster”; “To improve the protective environment for IDPs and other vulnerable groups in particular through enhanced protection interventions to support durable solutions for IDPs” ; “To improve operational response capacity through capacity development, strategic advocacy and humanitarian dialogues”; “To contribute to the protection of newly displaced people and those affected by natural hazards”; “Improve the living conditions of the protracted internally displaced persons”

13 Figures from OCHA and UNHCR

14 While there are regional frameworks that guarantee the protection of displaced populations in the region, there is no action plan or regular reporting on progress.
### Somalia Outcome 2.1
To create opportunities for IDPs and refugee returnees to participate in public affairs and most importantly in decision-making pertaining to their own future, such as local and urban development processes, and remove obstacles to such participation. “To systematically enhance the absorption capacity of basic services for IDPs and returning refugees, enhance access to affordable housing and land as well as to vocational skills and professional development and facilitate and diversify access to employment sectors and the labour market.” (Somalia National Development Plan 2017–2019)

#### Indicators:
1. Number of IDPs reached, successfully reintegrated and provided with a better quality of life;
2. Number of migrants and refugees repatriated through formal mechanisms;
3. Number of houses constructed for displaced returnees
   - No baseline and target defined.

### Kenya Outcome 2.1
Refugees in camps who can live without aid (UNHCR Kenya comprehensive refugee programme; annual overall framework for the management and delivery of assistance and protection services in refugee camps)

- Baseline: only available for Kakuma refugee camp (2016): less than 10% of refugees can live without aid in Kakuma refugee camp and only 7% adults are employed
- **Target:** not available

#### County (Garissa, Turkana) integrated development plans 2013–2017 (Overall socio-economic development frameworks for the counties hosting refugees. No specific indicators/targets for the refugee population included)

### Ethiopia Outcome 2
“Amendments to the 2004 Refugees Proclamation for the expansion of the out of camp policy to all refugees and the enhancement of the basic and essential social services for refugees, as per pledges made at the 2016 Leaders’ Summit.”

#### Indicators
1. **Number or % of refugees that benefited from the out of camp policy:**
   - **Baseline (April 2017):** Number of persons of concern (843,171 refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR)
   - **Target (GoE):** 70,000, equal to c. 10%.

2. **Number or % of refugee children enrolled in the education system (primary and secondary schools, higher education):**
   - **Baseline (April 2017):** number of refugee children registered with UNHCR
   - **Target (GoE):** 120,000

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1. As part of the HRP, the protection cluster spells out an additional outcome: “Facilitate access to durable solutions for IDPs that are willing to locally integrate or return”
### Outcome 3:

**Displaced populations and migrants benefit from improved national/regional/global migration policies; their effective implementation contributes to sustainable development.**

Indicator: YY national, international (regional) norms, global policies and political processes developed in the field of migration and development (ARI).

Baseline (2017): start of the implementation of the protocol of the free movement of people in the IGAD region (2021): 1–2 policies being implemented

Facilitating safe, orderly and regular migration within the region, notably through an IGAD protocol of free movement of people and by strengthening the migration governance capacities at national level in order to implement the protocol, and between the IGAD member states and other regions of the world, will enhance the protection of the human rights of migrants and the contribution of migration to sustainable development.

**Description of factors that influence positively the Swiss contribution**
- Fostering the contribution of migrants to sustainable development is a priority for several IGAD member states;
- Increased concern also by several IGAD member states about the protection of the human and labour rights of their citizens abroad;
- Well-established partnership with IGAD Secretariat in the field of migration and establishment of National Coordination Mechanisms for better migration governance in the IGAD member states;
- Increased intra-regional (e.g. Valetta) and global (e.g. Global Compact for Migration) attention to migration management and migration and development;
- A well-functioning mobility framework within and between regions will also positively affect the challenges of forced displacement

**Description of factors that influence negatively the Swiss contribution**
- New area of cooperation at the national level, which will require an initial phase of identifying partners, objectives and means of implementation;
- Multiplication of initiatives and actors, with limited coordination;
- Finding an appropriate balance between activities addressing displacement and initiatives in the field of migration and development;
- Cooperation challenges in the area of readmission and return.

**Risks**
- Lack of political will to cooperate regionally;
- Lack of institutional capacity of IGAD as well as of member states;
- External factors such as political decisions in countries of destination impacting migration flows in and from the region;
- Limited engagement by other development actors to upscale successful models;
- Regional instability.

#### Regional

Further implementation and consolidation of the regional migration policy framework of IGAD with a view to supporting the political process towards a regional framework for the free movement of persons. Further consolidation of the national coordination mechanisms for efficient migration management at the national and regional level.

#### National

Opportunities of strengthened cooperation with selected countries in the region have been identified and – within the limits of resources available – projects implemented. The areas of cooperation will vary and will be aligned also to regional and global frameworks of cooperation. They may include fair and ethical recruitment, framework conditions for diaspora engagement, migration management including readmission, return and reintegration.

Targets and indicators not available

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16 Outcome primarily related to initiatives of HSD, SEM and GPM
(4) Lines of intervention (Swiss Programme)

**Outcome 1: Protection**
- Advocacy for humanitarian access/humanitarian principles, respect of IHL and accountability to affected populations.
- Provide the displaced population with basic services (education, health, shelter, food) and protection.
- Support to the development of legal and policy frameworks and initiatives at national/regional levels to enhance the protective environment (policy dialogue, training on the normative framework, specific project support), including on SGBV.
- Support to the development of evidence-based protection-related policies and initiatives and programmes to combat human trafficking.

**Outcome 2: Local socio-economic integration**
- Advocacy for integration of the displaced population into national and regional development plans.
- Support (policy dialogue) to initiatives that promote durable solutions to protracted displacement and longer term approaches (humanitarian/development nexus) with focus on local integration (e.g. Durable Solution Initiative initiated by the RC office and the Federal Government of Somalia).
- Support to vocational education/life skills development programmes targeting displaced population and host communities, contributing to a reduction in conflicts between these two groups.
- Piloting of initiatives for improved livelihoods in context of protracted displacement (private sector development, market oriented skills); dissemination of good practices for improved livelihoods and self-reliance in protracted displacement situations.
- Initiate national and international discussions (through targeted programmes) on durable solutions for IDPs in Ethiopia.

**Outcome 3:** (GPMD, SEM, AMS)
- Strengthen national/regional capacities for improved migration governance (incl. free movement within the IGAD region, border management and addressing disaster induced displacement) and to influence the regional and global dialogue and policy development towards safe, orderly and regular migration (mainly through IGAD; possibly other relevant regional or national actor e.g. WB, IOM).
- Strengthen bilateral political migration dialogue with selected governments in the region (in particular Ethiopia) in order to improve cooperation on migration governance aspects, including readmission and return (SEM).

**Overall**
- Active participation in donors’ coordination fora with focus on protection, durable solutions, humanitarian/development nexus and humanitarian access/principles. Support capacities of partner organizations to deliver on their mandate through strategic secondments (protection, durable solutions); inclusion of host communities (area based programming).
- Mainstreaming of displacement in all sectors of intervention.

(5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss Programme)

Financial resources: CHF 29.2 millions.

Partners: IGAD, ministries in charge of humanitarian affairs and migration related issues, local authorities, ICRC and UN agencies (UNHCR, WFP, OCHA, IOM), INGOs, national NGOs, research and policy institutions, pooled funds.

Coherence and complementarity of WoGA actors: SDC Global/South Cooperation/Humanitarian aid, Human Security Division and State Secretariat for Migration; coordination at head office; (IMZ); synergies with initiatives supported in Eritrea (approaches, modalities, expected outcomes).

(6) Management/performance results, including indicators (Swiss Programme):

- Indicators of Outcome 1 and 2 also contribute to the TRI CHR “Freedom from Fear” and “Resilience: social fabric and trust”. Specific baselines and indicators are being integrated in the CS Monitoring and Partners. Possible field of observation: Number of area based vs. status based programmes or initiatives that contribute to a reduction in conflicts between displaced population and host communities.
- Through advocacy, Switzerland influences donors and governments to apply principled and rights-based protection.
- Swiss programmes contribute to the prevention and reduction of SGBV, specifically targeting women and children on the move, by mainstreaming awareness and possible measures into Swiss programmes (indicator to be defined).
# Annex 2: Financial Planning

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<tr>
<th>Budget RPHoA (in CHF million)</th>
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<th>2019</th>
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Annex 3: Scenario Summary

As fragility makes best/medium/worst scenario models not ideal for steering, 5 key uncertainties were selected. This structure is thus non-linear. The key regional assumption is a continued (yet slow) political and socio-economic improvement – with a high likelihood that one (or more) uncertainty(ies) may change to an extent that requires programme adjustments. In the HoA, it is assumed that (1) “business as usual” probably means “bad scenario” elsewhere, and that (2) volatility is likely to remain high.

A significant improvement of one or more uncertainty(ies) during implementation would enhance prospects for less conflict and a more democratic/inclusive future. Yet, such an improvement is only expected for one (or a few) uncertainty(ies) – most probably in parts of the HoA only (e.g. political breakthrough in one country). Simultaneously, a significant deterioration of one (or more) uncertainty(ies) during implementation could result in large-scale crisis, and potentially even a full collapse of an already very fragile context.

Programming is therefore flexibly designed to respond to the best possible progress in selected uncertainties while remaining ready for significant deteriorations in other uncertainties to occur. Based on the most significant changes expected, implications for programming were therefore assessed for each uncertainty. It is understood that (1) the variation of one uncertainty could potentially cause another uncertainty to vary as well (yet not automatically); and that (2) all uncertainties will be systematically linked to semi-annual MERV exercises.

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1 Only parameters having reasonable probability of change and requiring significant programme adjustments are considered.

### Significant deterioration
**Sliding towards the cliff**

**Continuity with limited improvement**

**Significant improvement**

**Long way to summit, but steady pace on bumpy road**

### Uncertainty 1 – Climate Shocks / Natural Disasters

**Areas of observation:** Climate & food security forecasts; early warning systems; coping patterns of populations; development indicators.

- Sustained rainfall failure or excess (floods), leading to large-scale production failures (agriculture, livestock), malnutrition and/or disease outbreaks.
- Large-scale conflicts due to poor governance and/or competition for natural resources (water, land) triggering large-scale forced displacement.
- Dysfunctional crisis response by lack of good governance and/or resources, amplifying the consequences of crises.

- Occasional rainfall failure or excess (floods), leading to small/medium-scale production failures (agriculture, livestock), malnutrition and/or contained disease outbreaks.
- Slow recovery from the 2016–17 drought, with medium-scale conflict/displacement, and slight productivity/resilience gains (agriculture, livestock).
- Gradual improvement of crisis response through better governance and/or more resources, reducing the consequences of crises.

- Stable rainfall patterns, leading to improved production (agriculture, livestock), food security and/or rare disease outbreaks.
- Fast recovery from the 201–17 drought, with small-scale conflict/displacement and strong productivity/resilience gains (agriculture, livestock).
- The agriculture and livestock sectors focus on longer term development thanks to fewer shocks, strengthening coping mechanisms.

### Programming Implications

- Reduce development programming and increase humanitarian response (incl. support to coordination systems), building on existing endeavours and partnerships.
- Strengthen context analysis capacity, in close coordination with partners.
- Early roll-out of appropriate preparedness measures (incl. contingency planning).

- Balance development programming and humanitarian response (incl. support to coordination systems), focusing on integrated approaches (nexus).
- Maintain capacity to respond to large-scale emergencies through in-built contingency funds in longer-term development programmes.
- Support locally owned disaster management systems.

- Reduce humanitarian response and increase development programming (incl. support to coordination systems).
- Maintain reduced emergency response capacity.
- Focus on resilience-building and institution-building approaches.
Uncertainty 2 – Conflict / Security Pact

Areas of observation: Conflict dynamics (incl. spillover from neighbouring countries); international/regional/national security agendas/engagements; elections.

- Increasing inequalities in the distribution of power and resources along political, ethnic, religious or other lines, leading to larger scale conflict.
- Increasing conflicts and spillover effects from neighbouring countries (South Sudan, Yemen, Eritrea).
- In Somalia, withdrawal of AMISOM and intensification of fighting between official military forces and al-Shabaab, compromising humanitarian access/principles in large areas.
- In Ethiopia, intensification of security response (SOE) and/or increasing inability of military/police forces to control political challengers, compromising humanitarian access/principles in large areas.
- In Kenya, intensification of cross-border attacks by al-Shabaab based on the country’s engagement in Somalia, combined with a destabilization of coastal areas leading to access challenges.
- Stable level of inequalities in the distribution of power and resources along political, ethnic, religious or other lines, with continued medium-scale conflict.
- Stable level of conflicts and spillover effects from neighbouring countries (South Sudan, Yemen, Eritrea).
- In Somalia, continuation of fighting between military forces and al-Shabaab which loses ground but cannot be fully defeated. Humanitarian access/principles remain challenged in selected areas.
- In Ethiopia, cyclothyic security response, with ability of the Government to keep the upper hand over political challengers, compromising humanitarian access/principles in selected areas.
- In Kenya, occasional cross-border attacks by al-Shabaab, combined with cattle rustling and tensions in border counties, yet without major destabilization and access challenges.
- Decreasing inequalities in the distribution of power and resources along political, ethnic, religious or other lines, with only small-scale, well mitigated conflict.
- Decreasing conflicts and spillover effects from neighbouring countries (South Sudan, Yemen, Eritrea) thanks to regional collaboration.
- In Somalia, decrease in fighting between military forces and al-Shabaab thanks to political arrangements and/or military defeat.
- In Ethiopia, the security response is progressively replaced by more genuine engagement in inclusive state-society dialogue, improving humanitarian access/principles in most areas incl. border areas.
- In Kenya, interruption of cross-border attacks by al-Shabaab, strengthening cross-border cooperation with Somalia and ensuring full access to programme areas.

Programming Implications

- Reduce development programming and increase humanitarian response (incl. support to conflict-affected populations), building on existing endeavours and partnerships (notably local or multilateral organisations in non-accessible areas).
- Strengthen security management, context analysis and other CSPM capacity (incl. remote monitoring), in close coordination with partners.
- Engage in mediation, policy dialogue and peacebuilding to mitigate conflict and promote political solutions.
- Balance development programming and humanitarian response (incl. support to conflict-affected populations), focusing on integrated approaches (nexus) with local partners in non-accessible areas.
- Maintain capacity to respond to large-scale emergencies through in-built contingency funds in longer-term development programmes.
- Maintain security management, context analysis and other CSPM capacity (incl. remote monitoring, possibly combined with Swiss presence in Mogadishu), in close coordination with partners.
- Reduce humanitarian response and increase development programming (incl. support to government and/or governance programmes at different levels).
- In Somalia particularly, use improved access to work more directly with local implementers and country systems. In parallel, setup a Swiss presence in Mogadishu.

Uncertainty 3 – Political Stability / State Building Processes / Regional & Inter-State Collaboration

Areas of observation: Elections, political processes, decentralisation/federalism processes, human rights situation.

- In Somalia, increasing government corruption, political fights and failed state-building efforts leading to illegitimacy, paralysis, weak services and numerous states/areas controlled by non-state actors.
- In Ethiopia, protracted non-inclusive politics leading to loss of government control over large areas, in a spiral of repression vs. stronger opposition.
- In Kenya, stalled devolution process, e.g. under securitization pretexts, leading to increased authoritarianism.
- IGAD, lack of political consensus/support from Member States and donors, triggering inability to mitigate conflict and promote regional agendas.
- In Somalia, preservation of reasonable credibility of the elected government through slow, yet steady progress in institution-building, power/resource sharing and services, leading to maintained donor support.
- In Ethiopia, preservation of political status quo through mix of tactical power-sharing with selected groups and firm grip on power through security responses to challengers as necessary.
- In Kenya, slow but steady progress in devolution processes, leading to counties gaining more competencies and legitimacy.
- IGAD, improved political consensus/support from Member States and donors, increasing ability to mitigate conflict and promote regional agendas.
- In Somalia, stronger credibility of the government through significantly improved institution-building, power/resource sharing and services, leading to access to IFI loans.
- In Ethiopia, meaningful government engagement in state-society dialogue and credible power-sharing through reform, leading to decreased or no conflict.
- In Kenya, deepened devolution process, allowing a number of counties to achieve considerable progress and serve as examples and inspiration for the broader region.
- IGAD, strong political consensus/support from Member States and donors (incl. funding), creating visible results in conflict mitigation and the promotion of regional agendas.

Programming Implications

- Decrease involvement with government (strictly selective approach) and increase collaboration with civil society, private sector and communities (with regular review).
- Enhance WoGA political dialogue and advocacy for human rights and international humanitarian law.
- Reduce engagement with IGAD.
- Maintain involvement with government with focus on local state-building, federalism (power/resource sharing) and decentralisation programming.
- Increase involvement with government with focus on (local) state-building, federalism (power/resource sharing) and decentralisation programming.
- Increase engagement with IGAD, focusing on the strategic level linked to the organization’s mandate to promote and support regional integration and collaboration.
**Uncertainty 4 – Engagement of international Community (Traditional or Non-Traditional)**  
**Areas of observation:** Aid flows; donor engagement strategies; donor/government coordination platforms.

- Donor fatigue (e.g. based on dissatisfaction with government performance) and conditionality leading to underfunding of programmes (donor or government), shorter-term approaches, insufficient or mistargeted responses.
- No/limited donor dialogue/alignment leading to mistrust, ideological and increasingly bilateral/fragmented aid.
- Restrictive counter-terrorism policies further limit access and needs-based aid delivery.
- Stable funding and limited conditionality allowing the consolidation of programmes (donor or government), longer-term, less insufficient and more targeted responses.
- Reasonable donor dialogue/alignment limiting mistrust, ideological and bilateral/fragmented aid, but with large donors not yet fully operating within international architecture (nexus).
- Counter-terrorism policies remain in place and donor priorities still partly defined by national migration/security interests (e.g. PVE).
- Increased funding and no/limited conditionality allowing the development of programmes (donor or government), long-term (e.g. systems-building), reasonably sufficient and targeted responses.
- Strong donor dialogue/alignment enhancing trust, more pragmatic and multilateral aid within international architecture (nexus, country-led development agendas).
- Limited counter-terrorism policies and donor priorities less defined by national migration/security interests (e.g. PVE).

**Programming Implications**

- Identify new alliances/approaches to joint programming, strengthening relationships with like-minded (neutral) partners, while reviewing those with partners non-compliant with good humanitarian/development principles.
- Identify funding gaps and intervention areas with highest impact, while adapting programme instruments to access challenges (e.g. remote monitoring).
- Maintain engagement in the most strategic coordination fora (showing leadership by chairing or co-chairing, when possible and relevant) to promote better donorship practices.
- Continue advocacy for more inclusive coordination fora (e.g. joint programming), reaching out to non-traditional donors and the larger traditional donors which partly/fully operate outside the international architecture.
- Increase engagement in the most strategic coordination fora (showing leadership by chairing or co-chairing, when possible and relevant) to consolidate good donorship practices.
- Continue advocacy for more inclusive coordination (e.g. for joint programming), reaching out to non-traditional donors and leveraging Swiss comparative advantages.

**Uncertainty 5 – Migration & Refugee/IDP Policies**  
**Areas of observation:** Migration policies (national, regional, CH/EU); global compacts; displacement tracking matrix (IOM); RMMS/UNHCR updates.

- Massive increase in forced displacement regionally, leading to conflict with host communities and restrictive national policies vis-à-vis migrants, including in Gulf countries (e.g. deportations, encampment, disregard for durable solutions, etc.).
- Significant political pressure in CH/EU to reduce unconditional funding and design larger shares of aid programmes for "migration control" and short-term interventions (incl. PVE) – away from country priorities.
- Further increase in forced displacement regionally, leading to conflict with host communities and restrictive national policies vis-à-vis migrants, including in Gulf countries (e.g. deportations, encampment, disregard for durable solutions, etc.).
- Maintained political pressure in CH/EU to reduce unconditional funding and design selected aid programmes for "migration control" and short-term interventions (incl. PVE) – away from country priorities – but stable funding levels and growing interest by aid actors to address protracted displacement while dealing with new fluxes.
- Decrease in forced displacement regionally, leading to less conflict with host communities and more inclusive national policies vis-à-vis migrants incl. IDPs (e.g. local integration, return programmes), including in Gulf countries.
- Reduced political pressure in CH/EU to reduce unconditional funding and design selected aid programmes for "migration control" and short-term interventions (incl. PVE) – away from country priorities – with favourable funding levels and strong interest by aid actors to address displacement under existing frameworks.

**Programming Implications**

- Seek alliances with like-minded donors and multilateral partners (incl. IGAD) to advocate for increased funding and the respect of humanitarian principles.
- Seek alliances with like-minded donors and multilateral partners (incl. IGAD) to advocate for the respect of humanitarian principles, focusing on durable solution approaches, innovative/pilot initiatives with upsampling potential and “niches” (e.g. IDPs).
- Enhance support to multilateral (e.g. IGAD) and government-led initiatives (e.g. pledged by the Government of Ethiopia) to implement inclusive assistance, protection and durable solutions frameworks for all forced migrants, incl. IDPs.
- Increase collaboration with and support to existing coordination frameworks to address forced displacement, incl. protracted situations.
Annex 4: Establishing a strategic link between international cooperation and migration in the Horn of Africa

While approving the 2017–20 dispatch and related framework credits, Swiss Parliament requested a strategic link to be established between international cooperation and migration, as set forth in the following federal decree: “A strategic link should be established between international cooperation and migration policy when this serves Switzerland’s interests, by further addressing causes of conflicts and migration. Entering into agreements and partnerships in the area of migration should be encouraged” (BBl 26.09.2016/7875).

This political mandate is implemented within the Interdepartmental Structure for International Cooperation on Migration (IMZ). The SDC’s Global Programme Migration and Development (GPMD) has taken the lead and defined the strategic implementation framework, in collaboration with the Human Security Division (HSD), State Secretariat for Migration (SEM), and State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO).

It has been agreed that the mandate will be implemented within a coherent framework under which strategic linkages are realised at political, geographic and thematic level, based on four main messages: 1) to recognise the obligation to protect those in need of protection, 2) to acknowledge the need of the globalized economy for a mobile workforce, 3) to tackle the root causes of conflict and forced displacement with holistic and long-term approaches and 4) to recognise the need for global governance structures in the field of migration.

The Horn of Africa is marked by very high rates of forced displacement within the region and beyond. While most migrants and refugees remain within the region, the numbers of asylum seekers from the region, in particular from Eritrea and Somalia, rank among the top ten in Switzerland, positioning the region high on the Swiss migration policy agenda.

Migration has been one of the four priority domains of the regional cooperation strategy for the Horn of Africa since its inception in 2013. Applying a Whole-of-Government approach (WoGA), the SDC, the HSD and the SEM have coordinated their activities to reach the common objectives as defined in the cooperation strategy. The current cooperation strategy 2018–2021 has been jointly developed by all the offices concerned. The objectives have been defined together and actions will be implemented in close coordination (see Annex 2: Results framework). Moreover, migration is an area of cooperation explicitly mentioned in the Swiss-IGAD framework agreement signed on 4 July 2014.

Building on the achievements of the first Cooperation Strategy, the SDC, the HSD and the SEM will implement the mandate of Parliament in line with the above-mentioned defined framework.

At the political level, bilateral consultations between Ethiopia and Switzerland, initiated in 2014, included discussions related to migration. A dialogue on migration will be systematically pursued in future consultations.

Further concrete examples of implementation can be found in the following table:

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2 The activities of Switzerland’s foreign policy on migration are coordinated via the Interdepartmental Structure for International Cooperation on Migration (IMZ). Its participants are primarily: the FDFA’s Directorate of Political Affairs (DP), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Directorate for European Affairs (DEA); the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) and the Federal Office of Police (fedpol); the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP); and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) of the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (EAER). In 2017 the Federal Council also appointed a special ambassador for international cooperation on migration issues, who represents Switzerland in bilateral and international bodies. The IMZ structure comprises different thematic and geographical working groups (WGs). These are deployed where appropriate in terms of significance for foreign policy on migration and the number of federal agencies involved. The WGs ensure regular exchange among the federal agencies concerned, advance the activities in their field and therefore ensure coherent policy. The Swiss migration portfolio in the context of the regional cooperation strategy Horn of Africa 2018–2021 is coordinated within the IMZ structure.

3 Article 2.2. Migration: Cooperation will be guided by the implementation of the IGAD “Regional Migration Policy Framework” (RMPF), with a view to strengthening national and regional migration governance by contributing to the programme “Building Regional and National capacities for improved Migration governance in the IGAD Region”, in particular its “Regional Consultative Process” (RCP). Cooperation will also contribute to further strengthening knowledge among regional actors on migration and development and support-related activities, including with regard to the diaspora as development actors. It will furthermore contribute to enhancing protection and living standards for refugees, IDPs and vulnerable migrants in the IGAD region. Institutional and technical support will be provided to the IGAD Secretariat for migration policy forming, programming and programme implementation.

4 Please refer to the cooperation strategy for Sudan for further details.
1) Persecuted people need to be protected – either within their place or country of origin, or in a safe third country. Switzerland focuses its engagement on protection and assistance for (forcibly) displaced populations and increased socio-economic integration (as one aspect of durable solutions to protracted displacement). The work on protection is mainly done by supporting multilateral and international organizations (e.g. CHF 1.5 million contribution to UNHCR Kenya and CHF 2 million contribution to ICRC in 2018), the secondment of specialists (e.g. child protection officer to UNHCR Ethiopia) and the promotion of frameworks and initiatives that contribute to a more protective environment. The work on durable solutions focuses on skills development programmes and initiatives that promote more development-oriented and longer term approaches to protracted displacement (e.g. the Skills for Life project in Kakuma promotes socio-economic integration of refugees and the reduction of conflicts between refugees and the host community6). In order to increase the impact, Switzerland will, in addition to project support, promote policy changes and support newly launched initiatives at policy level, such as the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and support to the government of Somalia (through the UN) to address their high displacement rates (20% of the population) in a comprehensive way.

2) Sustainable economic development requires safe and regular migration of labour forces. The promotion of fair labour conditions and recruitment as well as of socio-economic cohesion has not been the focus of the Swiss strategy in the Horn of Africa until now. These aspects will be developed in the 2018–2021 strategy. Switzerland will support IGAD and its member states to work on improved labour mobility as well as the protection of migrant workers’ rights. Discussions are ongoing on the migration corridors from the Horn of Africa to the Middle East. Opportunities for Swiss support in this field will be further explored.

3) Reasons for forced migration need to be addressed holistically and sustainably. Root causes of forced migration will be addressed through the four complementary domains of the Cooperation Strategy: Swiss support to the governance and peace-building domain focuses on state-building, federalism/decentralization and peace-building in Somalia. In this second phase of the strategy, Switzerland will further contribute to the establishment of legitimate, accountable and transparent state institutions, which provide public services and framework conditions conducive to inclusive socio-economic recovery and sustainable development. Through the development of a common discourse on the benefits of political power-sharing, the risks of conflict are durably and sustainably mitigated. In accordance with the FDFA Human Rights Strategy, Switzerland will continue its engagement in the field of human rights, including in the Human Rights Council. Displacement will be mainstreamed in all four domains of intervention (e.g. inclusion of migrants, refugees and IDPs in sexual and reproductive health programmes and in youth employment schemes). In the spirit of the Nansen initiative and its follow-up mechanism the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), disaster and climate induced displacement in the region will also be further considered and addressed according to the opportunities, in order to enhance prevention of and preparedness for disaster displacement.

4) Global and national migration policies are based on functioning governance structures. Migration is first and foremost intra-regional. In line with the Swiss-IGAD framework agreement, Switzerland has been working with IGAD since 2014 in order to strengthen the national capacities of the IGAD member states and to improve coordination among them. In the context of the 2018–2021 strategy, Switzerland will increase its engagement with IGAD in this regard. The support of countries of the Horn of Africa in the implementation of the New York Declaration, through the Global Compact on Refugees (Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia are CRRF pilot countries), as well as the Global Compact for Migration, is a concrete example of how national and regional processes feed into global migration governance.

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6 This project jointly funded by the SDC’s Humanitarian Aid and South Cooperation departments is an innovative initiative to promote development solutions to displacement.
The three main challenges in implementing the mandate of establishing a strategic link between international cooperation and migration in the Horn of Africa are the following:

1) **Short term results vs. long term impact**: The instruments of international cooperation have long term objectives as they aim for structural changes. This can only partially be measured in the lifespan of the strategy 2018–2021.

2) **Complexity of migration**: The Horn of Africa is a typical region of mixed migration movements. A series of destabilizing factors are resulting in forced displacement and migration in the Horn of Africa. The phenomena of forced displacement and migration are complex and it is difficult to provide adequate protection to the population concerned.

3) **Striving for policy coherence**: In view of a strong domestic interest in the region of the Horn of Africa, policy coherence is a requirement as well as a complex task.

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7 Armed conflict, gross violations of human rights as well as disasters and climate change, poverty and resource scarcity, combined with a lack of prospects and the hope of a better life elsewhere, are driving migratory movements within and out of the region. Refugees, internally displaced persons and other migrants move partially on the same routes, use the services of the same smugglers, are often exposed to the same risks and show similar vulnerabilities (mixed migration). The vast majority of displaced persons seek protection in their region of origin. However, there are refugees and migrants who leave the Horn of Africa. The three main migration routes lead southwards to South Africa, eastwards to the Arabian peninsula and northwards through Sudan towards Egypt or Libya, and in some cases across the Mediterranean to Europe.
Annex 5: Map
1 The HoA includes Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea and Djibouti. The Swiss Cooperation Strategy HoA covers Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya, with a focus on Somalia and the arid and semiarid lowlands of North Eastern Kenya and South Eastern Ethiopia. Humanitarian needs can be addressed in the entire region. South Sudan, Sudan (incl. Eritrea) and Yemen are covered by separate strategies.

2 Somalia is ranked the second most fragile country in the world, Ethiopia 15th and Kenya 22nd (Fragility Index 2016).

3 Somalia and South Sudan have the lowest HDI worldwide. Kenya is ranked 146th, and Ethiopia 174th (out of 188 countries). 52% of 14 million people in Somalia, 33% of 102 million in Ethiopia, and 33% of 48 million in Kenya are living below the poverty line.

4 For Somalia little to no statistical health data is available. However continuous field assessments/studies by different actors (incl. UN) provide a good approximation with regard to the health indicators. According to OCHA (March 2017), one out of eighteen women dies during pregnancy in Somalia.

5 According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), these people are in IPC 3 (crisis) or IPC 4 (emergency). In addition, there are 3.1 million Somalis, 3 million Kenyans, and 8.5 million Ethiopians who are food security stressed (IPC 2) and require some kind of livelihood support so as not to drift into IPC 3. Famine is classified as IPC 5.

6 Women and girls bear more of the burden because of prevailing gender roles and practices, including domestic responsibilities. Travelling longer distances to fetch water, particularly during drought, puts women and girls at a higher risk of violence.

7 In Somalia, an estimated USD 1.5 billion was spent to respond to the drought in 2017. In Ethiopia, the required funds are estimated at USD 1.4 billion, of which 70% has so far been allocated to the Somali Region, i.e. the most affected region.

8 The member states of IGAD are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

9 According to UNICEF (November 2017).

10 UNICEF figures for women aged 20 to 24 years who were first married or in union before ages 15 and 18 (November 2017): Somalia (8% married under 15 years, 45% under 18 years), Ethiopia (14% married under 15 years, 40% under 18 years) and Kenya (4% married under 15 years, 23% under 18 years).

11 UNHCR appeal for 2018 states 13 million IDPs and 5 million refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa.

12 Ethiopia and Kenya respectively host about 890,000 and 490,000 registered asylum seekers and refugees, mainly from South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea. Women and children comprise 79% of the entire refugee and asylum seeker population in Kenya.

13 Figures as of end of 2017, including the approx. 900,000 newly displaced due to drought in 2016/17. Mogadishu alone hosts approx. 400,000 IDPs.

14 More than 90,000 cases of forced evictions recorded by the end of July, the majority in Mogadishu.

15 E.g. in the Kenyan political discourse, the Somali refugees in the camps have systematically been made responsible for terrorism without providing evidence.

16 Since 2014, 74,000 Somali refugees in Kenya have been assisted by UNHCR to return. They face limited access to land, basic services, social reintegration and livelihoods restoration. Many of them also did not return to their place of origin and became IDPs (e.g. return to Kismayo and Mogadishu instead of Somaliland).

17 The IGAD Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refuges and Reintegration of Returnees endorsed a comprehensive regional approach to deliver durable solutions for Somali refugees, maintaining protection, promoting self-reliance in countries of asylum, and calling for greater international solidarity.

18 The “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants” adopted by the UN General Assembly on 19.11.2016 (A/RES/71/1), represents a commitment by Member States to strengthen and enhance global migration governance. It paves the way for the adoption of two new global compacts in 2018: a Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). While the GCM and the GCR are still in the making at the time of writing this strategy, it is expected that both global compacts will considerably shape the global migration agenda for the coming years.

19 As of January 2018, the CRRF is being rolled out in 13 pilot states, including 7 African countries, of which 4 are situated in the HoA. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (the three others being Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia).

20 E.g. Turkey’s initial involvement in Somalia began in response to the 2011 famine. Since then, Turkey has not only delivered relief aid, but it has also hosted international conferences, mediated between Somalia and Somaliland, trained the Somali National Army, promoted bilateral trade and delivered development aid.


22 Somalia owes the Bank and the IMF over USD 300m as part of a USD 5bn debt owed to multilateral and bilateral creditors.

23 Country ownership, alignment, harmonization, management for results, mutual accountability.

24 Federal Decree (BBI 26.09.2016/7875)

25 The result frameworks of the food security, health and migration/protection sectors include outcomes at the level of the final beneficiary (direct benefits for the people in need) as well as at least one system building outcome (institution building etc.).

26 The contribution of the HSD to the Annual Reports has been defined in the Programmatic Report of the HSD. It is expected that the reports shall be structured and delivered in a more systematic manner, especially with regard to the health indicators. The relevant sector will have to develop results frameworks in consultation with the other sectors.

27 The “HoA” includes Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea and Djibouti. The Swiss Cooperation Strategy HoA covers Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya, with a focus on Somalia and the arid and semiarid lowlands of North Eastern Kenya and South Eastern Ethiopia. Humanitarian needs can be addressed in the entire region. South Sudan, Sudan (incl. Eritrea) and Yemen are covered by separate strategies.

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